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THE STRUGGLE FOR SEX EQUALITY IN SPORT AND THE
THEORY BEHIND TITLE IXt
Deborah Brake*
Title IX's three-part test for measuring discriminationin the provision of athletic
opportunitiesto male andfemale students has generated heated controversy in recent
years. In this Article, ProfessorBrake discusses the theoreticalunderpinningsbehind
the three-part test and offers a comprehensivejustification of this theory as applied to
the context of sport. She begins with an analysis of the test's relationship to other areas of sex discriminationlaw, concluding that, unlike most contexts, Title IX rejects
formal equality as its guiding theory, adopting instead an approach thatfocuses on
the institutionalstructures that subordinate girls and women in sport. The Article
then elaborates upon and offers a justficationfor the theory of equality underlying
Title IX's three-part test. To support this theory, the Article surveys existingfeminist
legal scholarshipon sport and identifies a need for an analysis of women's position
in sport that goes beyond a debate over assimilation versus accommodation, to analyze how educational institutions participate in the construction of sport as a
fundamentally masculine domain. To fill this void, the Article explores in detail the
processes through which educationalinstitutions construct the different relationships
of men and women to sport, through their control over athletic opportunities and the
culture of sport. Finally, ProfessorBrake takes this theory and applies it to other aspects of Title IX law, advocatingspecific doctrinal reforms that would make Title
IX's overall application to athletics more consistent with the theory articulatedin
this Article.
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INTRODUCTION

Tide IX is a federal statute that prohibits sex discrimination in
education programs and activities that receive federal funding.'
1.
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). This Article focuses on Title IX because it is the primary
legal mechanism that purports to provide redress for discrimination against girls and
women in sport. One disadvantage of this focus is that it does not address athletic opportunities outside of education programs, which may offer alternative visions of sport beyond
the relatively elite and exclusive opportunities offered through schools and colleges. See
Susan Birrell & Diana Richter, Is a Diamond Forever? Feminist Transformations of Sport, in
WOMEN, SPORT, AND CULTURE 221, 241-42 (Susan Birrell & Cheryl L. Cole eds., 1990)
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Although the statute itself says nothing about athletics, or any
other specific type of educational activity, it has precipitated a virtual revolution for girls and women in sports. Title IX has paved
the way for significant increases in athletic participation for girls
and women at all levels of education. Since the enactment of Tide
IX, female participation in competitive sports has soared to unprecedented heights. Fewer than 300,000 female students
participated in interscholastic athletics in 1971.2 By 1998-99, that
number exceeded 2.6 million, with significant increases in each
intervening year. To put these numbers in perspective, since Title
IX was enacted, the number of girls playing high school sports has
gone from one in twenty-seven, to one in three. Sports participation among even younger girls has also changed dramatically; a
1998 report found that the number of girls ages six to eleven who
regularly participate in vigorous sports such as soccer, volleyball,
and basketball increased eighty-six percent since 1987, from 2 million to 3.8 million. Women's competitive athletic participation at
the college level also has greatly expanded since Title IX was enacted, with the number of female intercollegiate athletes
increasing from just below 32,000 in 1971, to nearly 150,000 in
1998_99.6

(criticizing feminist scholars in sport for focusing on "dominant" and elite structures of
sport at the expense of alternative sport models). Nonetheless, Title IX's central place in
the legal response to sex discrimination makes it a critical component in an effort to use the
law to secure equality for girls and women in sport. Cf JENNIFER HARGREAVES, SPORTING
FEMALES: CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF WOMEN'S SPORTS 55-56
(1994) (noting the importance of education programs in the development of sports for
girls and women).
2.
National Federation of State High School Associations, Annual Sports Participation
Survey: High School Participation, Gender Equity in Sports, University of Iowa, at
http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/statistics.htm#220 (last modified Aug. 30, 2000) (on file
with the University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform) [hereinafter Gender Equity in Sports].
3.
National Federation of State High School Associations, Summary of Athletic Participation Totals by School Year, at http://www.nfhs.org/1999_partjindex.htn#year (last visited
July 7, 2000) (on file with the University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform) (showing the precise number for 1998-99 was 2,652,796).
4.
Michael Dobie, Evening the Score: Women's Wide-Ranging Success as Athletes-From
Basketball to Ice Hockey-Is Redefining the World of Sports, NEWSDAY (New York), July 11, 1999,
atA18.
5.
John Hanc, The Games Girls Play, NEWSDAY (NewYork), Oct. 26,1998, at B15.
6.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation: Title IX
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,419 (Dec. 11, 1979) [hereinafter Policy Interpretation] (listing women's intercollegiate athletics participation in 1971 at
31,852); National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1998-99 Participation Study-Women's
Sports, at http://www.ncaa.org/participationrates/ (last visited July 9, 2000) (on file with
the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) (showing that 148,803 women participated
in 1998-99).

University ofMichiganJournalofLaw Reform

[VOL. 34:1&2

These increased participation numbers alone do not capture the
extent to which women's relationship to sport has changed since
Title IX's enactment. More female athletes than ever before are
competing in traditionally male athletic activities.' For example, in
1997-98, there were 779 girls competing on high school football
teams, 1,262 on high school baseball teams, and 1,907 on high
school wrestling teams.8 Just fifteen years earlier, in the 1983-84
season, these numbers were 13, 137, and 0, respectively. 9 Girls and
women are increasingly making inroads into the terrain of traditionally male sports, including rugby, boxing, judo, wrestling,
body-building, stock car driving, weightlifting, and throwing
events.10
These changes in women's sports have been accompanied by increased status and respect for female athletes and a growing
enthusiasm for women's sports in popular culture, fueled by recent
public successes of elite female athletes.1 1 Women's team sports
took center stage in the 1996 Olympics, with U.S. women winning
gold medals in basketball, soccer, softball, gymnastics, and synchronized swimming.1 2 Women's ice hockey made its Olympic
debut in Nagano, Japan in 1998, and the U.S. women's team won
the event's first gold medal in a nail-biting victory over the Canadians in the finals. 13 Women's soccer gained new attention in 1999

7.

See Mariah Burton Nelson, Introduction: Who We Might Become, in NIKE Is A GODat ix, xvii (Lissa Smith ed., 1998) [hereinafter
Nelson, Who We Might Become] ("Girls and women are pinning male opponents to wrestling
mats, racing horses and cars and yachts alongside their brothers, and playing pro basketball
against men. Almost a thousand girls are playing high school football. Women have pitched
in college baseball games and kicked in college football games.").
8.
Gender Equity in Sports, supranote 2.
9.
Id.
10.
See, e.g., HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 281-83; see also Harriet Barovick, Diamonds
in the Ring: Boosted by the Daughters of Ali and Frazier, Women's Boxing Is Losing Its Novelty-Act
Status and Gaining Real Fans, TIME, May 1, 2000, at 66 (discussing increasing interest and
participation in women's boxing); Shawn Courchesne, Dupuis' Dream Is on Track; Utilizes
Opportunities on- Stock Car Circuit, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 27, 2000, at C1 (discussing
NASCAR driver Renee Dupuis).
11.
Cf Lucy Danziger, Conclusion: A Seismic Shift in the Culture, in NIKE IS A GODDESS,
supra note 7, at 315, 317 ("What happens among talented sportswomen at the elite levels
makes its way into the culture. It's our version of the trickle-down concept: When women
get paid to play basketball in front of 17,000 spectators, the rest of us, contenders in our
own world of sports, feel a little bit more legitimate and take our pursuits more seriously.").
12.
See Nelson, Who We Might Become, supra note 7, at xvi.
13.
See Barbara Stewart, In from the Cold, in NIKE IS A GODDESS, supra note 7, at 269,
269-72 (describing the drama of the United States win over Canada in women's ice hockey
in the 1998 Olympics).
DESS: THE HISTORY OF WOMEN IN SPORTS,
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In the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, for the first time, women competed in the same
number of team sports as men.15
Women's professional team sports also have had notable successes in recent years, particularly women's basketball. After
several earlier unsuccessful attempts at starting a professional
women's basketball league in the United States,' 6 women's professional basketball seems to have gained a firm foothold in the
sports world. The Women's National Basketball Association
(WNBA) started its inaugural season in 1997 with 50 million television viewers tuning in to one of three networks to watch. 17 By the
second and third seasons, nearly one million viewers a week
watched the WNBA play on national television. 8 Women's soccer
and ice hockey hold promise for attaining professional status in
the near future.' 9 Meanwhile, women's professional tennis has discovered a dynamic and exciting rivalry that has been missing in
recent years, with sisters Venus and Serena Williams breathing new
life and excitement into the sport while challenging its white,
country-club image.2 °
when the U.S. won the Women's World Cup.

14.
See 25 Significant Events in Women's Sports, THE WOMEN'S SPORTS EXPERIENCE,
Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 12-13.
15.
Women's Sports Foundation, Significant Events in Women's Sports History Post
Title IX History, at http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/templates/res-center/
rclib/results-topics2.html?article=51&record=36 (last visited June 5, 2000) (on file with
the University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform) (reporting that additional sports for women
include modem pentathlon, taekwondo, triathlon, trampoline, water polo, cycling (500
meter track), shooting (ball trap and skeet), synchronized swimming (duo), and weightlifting, and two additional teams in the women's handball and field hockey competitions).
See DAVID F. SALTER, CRASHING THE OLD Boys' NETWORK: THE TRAGEDIES AND
16.
TRIUMPHS OF GIRLS AND WOMEN IN SPORTS 96 (1996) (discussing previous failed attempts
to establish professional women's basketball leagues and stating that these efforts "never
had a well-conceived plan of action. Some former leagues have tried gimmicks like lowering
the rims, using different colored basketballs, or having the players jaunt around in skin-tight
uniforms.... No one has been able to identify and market the women's game for what it is:
.
a well-coached, fundamentally sound, team-oriented game .
17.
History of the WNBA, at http://www.wnba.com/basics/historyof-wnba.html (last visited July 7, 2000) (on file with the University of MichiganJournalofLaw Reform).
Id.
18.
19.
See Donna A. Lopiano, What's Wrong with This Picture?Am I Missing Something Here?,
THE WOMEN'S SPORTS EXPERIENCE, Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 12 (discussing struggles of women's
professional soccer, including pay disparities in men's and women's soccer salaries);
Stewart, supra note 13, at 288-89 (noting "talk around the NHL of forming a women's professional [ice hockey] league, along the lines of the Women's National Basketball
Association").
20.
Linda Robertson, Venus' Victory Recalls the Past, Foreshadowsthe Future of Tennis, MIAMI HERALD, July 12, 2000, at ID; see also Grace Lichtenstein, Net Profits, in NIKE IS A
GODDESS, supra note 7, at 57, 76-77 (discussing difficulties faced by women's tennis in the
1990s and the potential for the Williams sisters to re-energize the game).
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In short, opportunities for female athletes are at an all-time
high, and public interest in and support for women's sports has
never been greater. The changes in women's sports participation
have been accompanied by significant cultural change.2' Both
mothers and fathers typically support their daughters' involvement
in sports and are increasingly disturbed by ongoing inequities.
Title IX has played a large, if unquantifiable role in this cultural
shift and the new opportunities that made it possible.
And yet, as is so often the case with the law's relationship to social change, 24 these successes tell only part of the story.25 Title IX

has not succeeded in ending the long history of discrimination

21.
See, e.g., Anne Driscoll, Giving Girls a Sporting Chance: Female Athletes Win More Than
Points,Researchers Say, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 1999, (Magazine), at 18 (discussing dramatic
cultural change affecting girls' and women's sports participation since Title IX was passed);
Hanc, supra note 5, at B15 (discussing the "fundamental shift in public opinion over the
past decade" regarding girls and women in sport).
RICHARD W. RILEY & NORMA V. CANTO, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF
22.
EDUC., TITLE IX: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS (1997) [hereinafter 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS]
(reporting that eighty-seven percent of parents now feel "that sports are equally important for boys and girls"), available at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/TitleIX/title.html; see also
Mike Fish & David A. Milliron, Taking on Districts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 16, 1999, at

1G, available at http://www.accessadanta.com/partners/ajc/reports/gender-equity/day5/
index.html ("With college scholarships at stake, parents increasingly are insisting
[Georgia] high schools address disparities in opportunities that girl athletes receive.");
David Hill, Playing Hardball, EDUC. WEEK ON WEB (Sept. 4, 1996), at http://
www.edweek.org/ew/vol-16/Olgirls.h16

(last visitedJune 28, 2000) (on file with the University

of MichiganJournalof Law Reform) (discussing parents' activism in seeking equal athletic opportunities for their daughters in Oklahoma high schools); Kerry A. White, F/a. Trying to Court Girls
for Sports, EDUC. WEEK ON WEB (Oct. 13, 1999), at http://www.edweek.org/ew/
ewstory.cfm?slug=07sorts.h19) (last visitedJune 28, 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journalof Law Reform) (discussing parents' efforts to improve athletic equity for girls in Florida).
See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 188 (lst Cir. 1996) ("One need look
23.
no further than the impressive performances of our country's women athletes in the 1996
Olympic Summer Games to see that Title IX has had a dramatic and positive impact on the
capabilities of our women athletes, particularly in team sports."); 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS,
supra note 22 (discussing dramatic changes in women's and girls' sports participation since
the enactment of Title IX);Jere Longman, How the Women Won, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1996,
(Magazine), at 23-24 (attributing increased women's participation in the 1996 Olympics to
Tide IX).
To borrow a quote from Wendy Williams, "To say that courts are not and never
24.
have been the source of radical social change is an understatement." Wendy W. Williams,
The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
175, 175 (1982).
25.
See DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY 61
(1997) ("[flronically, our recent progress obscures the problems that remain. Opportunities for women athletes have improved so dramatically that we no longer notice what
chances they are still missing.").
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against girls and women in sport.16 Educational institutions continue to provide many more, and qualitatively distinct,
opportunities for male than female athletes at every level of education. Although female athletic participation in high school is at an
unprecedented 2.6 million, it still lags far behind the 3.8 million
high school males who participate in school sports. 7 Athletic par
ticipation at the college level is similarly skewed, with women
composing fifty-three percent of undergraduate students nationwide, but only thirty-seven percent of all intercollegiate athletes. 8
Many of the institutional practices that contribute to the disparate
participation rates of male and female students have remained
outside the reach of Tide IX enforcement. At the same time, those
aspects of the law that have been forcefully applied-namely, the
requirement of nondiscrimination in access to athletic participation opportunities-are under attack.29
The primary site of the legal struggle over the situation of
women in sport has been the interpretation of Tide IX as it relates
to the number of opportunities for males and females to

26.
There is some variance in academic writing on this subject in the use of the term
"sport" versus "sports." I have opted to use both terms distinctly to signify different meanings, based on my reading of the literature as using "sport" when speaking of sport as a
social institution, set in a specific social context, and "sports" as the actually and potentially
diverse activities in which people participate. Thus, I discuss men's and women's relationship to "sport," but women's increasing participation in "sports." See Pamela J. Creedon,
Women, Media and Sport: Creatingand Reflecting Gender Values, in WOMEN, MEDIA AND SPORT:
CHALLENGING GENDER VALUES 3, 3 (PamelaJ. Creedon ed., 1994) ("I say 'sport' instead of
'sports' because I define sport as a cultural institution and sports as activities or games that
are only one component of the institution of sport."); cf. HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 2
("The term 'sports' is used through the book rather than 'sport' in order to take account of
the diverse and non-essentialist nature of the activities."). Compare also Carole Oglesby,
Epilogue to SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER 243, 243 (Michael A. Messner & Donald F.
Sabo eds., 1990), who criticizes scholars of sport for
us[ing] the word sport as if there were one universal meaning to the word, even in a
gender context. This usage ignores what I have called sport-for-women, an invention
of English and American women physical educators of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries.... [A] complete sociology of gendered sport must be cognizant of at least
two sports--traditional sport and sport-for-women.
27.
National Federation of State High School Associations, 1999 Athletic Participation
Survey Index, at http://www.nfhs.org/1999._part.index.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2000) (on
file with the University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform).
28.
Gender Equity in Sports, supra note 2.
29.
See, e.g., Welch Suggs, Foes of Title IX Try to Make Equity in College Sports a Campaign
Issue, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 4, 2000, at A55, http://chronicle.com/weekly/v46/
i22/22a05501.html.
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participate in competitive sport programs. 3° Many supporters of
Title IX contend that the law has not done enough to increase
women's

opportunities

to

participate

in

sport. 3'

The

law's

detractors argue that Title IX has gone too far in the other
direction and is now mandating affirmative action for female
athletes, at the expense of men's opportunities. 32 The debate over
Title IX interpretation in this area has acquired a fever pitch in
recent years. New advocacy groups have sprung up with the sole or
primary purpose of reversing the interpretation of Title IX that has
developed over the past twenty-eight years.33 In addition, several
existing conservative advocacy organizations have put the repeal or
modification of Title IX's participation standard on their
agendas. 4 Men's athletic associations, too, are taking Title IX to
task, urging reversal of the law's core provisions. 5 Over the past
30.
See Renee Forseth et al., Comment, Progressin Gender Equity?: An Overview of the History and Futureof Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
51, 53 (1995) ("The central issue in most Title IX litigation is whether a university provides
equal opportunities for both women and men to participate in intercollegiate athletics.").
31.
Cf Sudha Setty, Leveling the PlayingField: Reforming the Officefor Civil Rights to Achieve
Better Title IX Enforcement, 32 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 331, 355 (1999) (recommending
enforcement of Title IX in middle schools and high schools).
32.
John Weistart, Equal Opportunity? Title JX and Intercollegiate Sports, 16 BROOKINGS
REV. 37, 38 (1998) [hereinafter Weistart, Equal Opportunity] ("The particular rhetorical
flourish that rallies these groups [that oppose Title IX] is the declaration that present policies under Title IX are 'affirmative action'-a not-so-subtle attempt to push the claims of
women for recognition of their athletic aspirations into the swirl of anger that makes racial
preferences such a political hot spot.").
33.
See, e.g., Americans Against Quotas, at http://www.aaq2000.org (last visited Aug.
30, 2000) (urging political involvement to eliminate quotas that encourage colleges to cut
wrestling programs); Iowans Against Quotas, at http://www.iaq2000.org/purpose.htm (last
visited Aug. 30, 2000) (same).
34.
See Curt A. Levey, Title IX's Dark Side: Sports Gender Quotas, USA TODAY, July 12,
1999, at A17 (representing the Center for Individual Rights); Feminists Blitz College Football
Teams, FEMINIST FOLLIES, Winter 1998, Clare Boothe Luce Policy Institute, at http://
www.cblpolicyinstitute.org/winterl998.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2000) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("[T] hanks to criticism from groups like the
Clare Boothe Luce Policy Institute, a number of groups including the NCAA are asking
Congress to look at how they enforce this strange law."); Independent Women's Forum,
GenderEquity and Title IX at http://www.iwf.org/issues/titleix/index.html (last visited Aug.
30, 2000) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) ("IWF continues to
expose the misguided applications and unintended consequences of Title IX.").
35.
See, e.g., SALTER, supra note 16, at 50-52 (describing College Football Association's
efforts to oppose Title IX's three-part test); Weistart, Equal Opportunity, supra note 32, at 39

("A common refrain from coaches in men's wrestling, swimming, and gymnastics teams, all
sports that have experienced waning fortunes in recent years, is that Title IX is 'promoting
discrimination.' "); Amateur Athletic Union Wrestling, at http://www.aauwrestling.org (last
visited Aug. 30, 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(including articles opposing Title IX on the ground that it reduces the number of athletic opportunities for males); Indiana St. Wrestling Assoc. of USA Wrestling, Inc., at
http://www.iswa.com (last visited Aug. 30, 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan
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few years, these groups have, with increasing urgency, stepped up
their efforts to lobby Congress to amend Title IX and/or to
pressure the enforcing agency, the Department of Education
Office for
Civil Rights (OCR), to retreat from its interpretation of
36

Title IX.

Critics of Title IX blame the law for a perceived demise of men's
sports programs and a reduction in opportunities for male athletes.37 Several legal scholars have taken up this refrain, criticizing
Title IX as a law that goes beyond merely requiring an end to
discrimination and instead mandating affirmative action for female athletes.38 Professors Earl Dudley and George Rutherglen,
Journalof Law Reform) (criticizing Title IX as a quota that eliminates male sport opportunities and urging viewers to sign a petition to abolish the "proportionality rule.").
36.
See, e.g., Americans Against Quotas, supra note 33 (providing links to members of
Congress and encouraging viewers to contact these members and voice their concerns that
Title IX is "morally wrong"); Indiana St. Wrestling Assoc. of USA Wrestling, Inc., supra note
35 (organizing a petition drive asking the next President to abolish the proportionality rule,
culminating in a "million man" march, and listing other organizations opposed to Title IX);
Iowans Against Quotas, supranote 33 (same as Americans Against Quotas); The Mat, Title IX
Task Force, at http://www.themat.com/etc/title9/042298.asp (last visited June 3, 2000)
(advocating a Congressional bill that would require universities to alert incoming students
to any sport program eliminations or reductions); see also MARY Jo FESTLE, PLAYING NICE:
POLITICS AND APOLOGIES IN WOMEN'S SPORTS 279-80 (1996) (discussing conservative Congressional opposition to Title IX).
37.
See, e.g., Ira Berkow, Baseball; The OtherSide of Title IX, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1999, at
D2 (criticizing so-called "quota" under Title IX for elimination of Providence College baseball team); Craig L. Hymowitz, Losers on the Level PlayingField; How Men's Sports Got Sacked by
Quotas, Bureaucratsand Title IX WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1995, at C05 (criticizing quotas under
Title IX that discriminate against male athletes); Levey, supra note 34 (criticizing "quotabased" enforcement of Title IX, and claiming that men participate in sports more than
women because men are more interested in sports than women); George Will, Extortion
Holds a Nation Hostage, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at 21 (criticizing Title IX as an example of "the New Executive State").
38.
See, e.g., Earl Dudley & George Rutherglen, Ironies, Inconsistencies, and Intercollegiate
Athletics: Title IX, Title WI, and StatisticalEvidence of Discrimination,1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 177,
179-80 (1999) (arguing that Title IX requires affirmative action for female athletes); Note,
Taking a Shot at the Title: A CriticalReview ofJudicialand AdministrativeInterpretationsof Title IX
as Applied to Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, 27 CONN. L. REv. 943, 977 (1995) (criticizing
Title IX's participation standards as discrimination against males and a "quota system"); see
also David Aronberg, CrumblingFoundations: Why Recent Judicial and Legislative Challenges to
Title IX May SignalIts Demise, 47 FLA. L. REv. 741, 762-66 (1995) (criticizing proportionality
as not required under Title IX language, and claiming that universities faced with proportionality requirements must cut men's sports because their budgets do not allow for
expansion); George A. Davidson & Carla A. Kerr, Title IX: What is Gender Equity, 2 VILL.
SPORTS & ENr. L.J. 25, 49 (1995) (criticizing Title IX's three-part test as reverse discrimination against males, and concluding that "[w]hatever merits the proportional to enrollment
test may have as a matter of social policy, the test awaits the analytical foundation which
would give it legitimacy"); Michael Straubel, Gender Equity, College Sports, Title IX and Group
Rights: A Coaches' View, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1039, 1041-42 (1996) (arguing that men are more
interested in participating in sports than women and that Title IX should be modified to
account for these different interest levels).
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for example, argue that Title IX discriminates against men by presuming that men and women have equal levels of interest in
participating in sports, and then using that assumption as a baseline for allocating an equal share of male and female athletic
opportunities. 9 They contrast this approach with the legal standards that have developed in the workplace where a "qualified
labor pool" standard defines discrimination based on women's
underrepresentation in certain jobs.4° The unspoken assumption
in these critiques is that the only legitimate interpretation of discrimination law is one that requires the equal treatment of persons
who are alike in their athletic interests-a perspective referred to
here as formal equality.
While I take issue with the reasoning and conclusions of Title
IX's critics, I agree with them in one respect: Title IX's interpretation of discrimination in athletics participation goes beyond the
narrow reach of a formal equality standard. Unlike those areas of
sex discrimination law that follow a model of formal equality, Title
IX's prohibition on discrimination is not so easily derailed by
41
pointing out differences in existing male and female interests.
Rather, Title IX holds institutions accountable for their role in
constructing and perpetuating such differences. 2 By taking a
broader view of discrimination and the myriad of ways in which it
plays out, Title IX law avoids some of the pitfalls that have shortened the reach of sex discrimination law in other contexts.
Title IX's contested legal standards have yet to be fully explored
by courts or feminist legal scholars. Prevailing court decisions have
partially explained their interpretation of Title IX in terms consistent with persuasive scholarly approaches to sex equality, but have
stopped short of spelling out the law's theoretical basis or exploring its implications. Feminist legal scholarship has not filled in the
theoretical gaps left by the courts, nor has it accorded substantial
attention to the further development of legal standards governing
sex equality in sports. Notwithstanding several notable and impor39.
See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 38, at 195-99.
40.
See id. at 207-10 (contrasting Title IX standard with the qualified labor pool analysis used in cases decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
41.
Cf Christine A. Littleton, ReconstructingSexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1282
(1987) [hereinafter Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality] ("In legal analysis, courts routinely find women's 'difference' a sufficient justification for inequality, constructing at the
same time a specious 'sameness' when applying phallocentric standards 'equally' to men
and women's different reproductive biology or economic position to yield (not surprisingly) unequal results for women."). See generally discussion infra Part IA (discussing the
theory behind formal equality including the challenges and alternatives to that theory).
42.
See discussion infra at Part II.A.
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tant writings, feminist legal scholars have largely ignored Title IX
as compared with other applications of discrimination law that affect women's lives.
Existing scholarly discourse on Title IX fails to appreciate the
extent to which the law focuses on the institutional structures that
suppress and discourage women from expressing and developing
their athletic interests and abilities. In this respect, the law reflects
strains of feminist legal theory not widely embodied in sex discrimination law. In particular, the. three-part test of Title IX
compliance is influenced by structuralism, a theoretical approach
which emphasizes the need to critically examine the structures and
cultures of institutions that differently situate men and women and
result in the subordination of women. Only by recognizing and
exploring Title IX's theoretical grounding can we adequately explain and justify the interpretation of Title IX that has generated
such fierce controversy. At the same time, a better theoretical
grounding will provide a firmer basis from which to analyze Title
IX's successes and shortcomings as a law that strives to secure sexual equality for girls and women in sports.
This Article explores the theory behind Title IX's standard for
measuring equality in athletic participation and examines its implications for further Title IX analysis. In the process, it seeks to
better integrate Title IX into feminist legal theory and provide a
more complete account of women's inequality in sport and how
the law can address it.
Part I of this Article lays the foundation for a theoretical analysis of Title IX by providing an overview of how sex discrimination
law generally stands in relation to feminist legal theory. This section contends that the dominant framework of sex discrimination
law is one of formal equality, in which the goal of discrimination
law is to require identical treatment of men and women when
they are similarly situated in relation to the treatment at issue.
Alternative feminist perspectives that focus on the structures and
practices that create and perpetuate women's subordinate status
have had less of an influence on sex discrimination doctrine, although they have made some mark on the development of the
law at the margins.
Part II argues that, unlike the dominant strain of sex discrimination law, Title IX's participation test transcends formal
equality and focuses instead on the institutional structures that
create, perpetuate and reinforce women's different and subordinate place in athletics. This section examines the development of
Title IX's participation standard and argues that it reflects a
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structuralist theory of equality that makes an institution's role in
shaping and contributing to the subordination of women fundamental to a discrimination analysis.
Part III seeks to provide a more complete theoretical justification for Title IX's participation test. This section begins with a
discussion of existing feminist legal scholarship on women in
sport. It argues that feminist legal scholarship on sport must go
beyond a debate over whether equal treatment or asymmetrical
treatment will best guarantee sex equality and instead work toward
developing the law to reach the institutional practices that masculinize sport and devalue women's sport participation. The
remainder of the section offers a detailed account of the role educational institutions play in confining women's sport opportunities
and shaping the culture of sport as fundamentally masculine.
These practices contribute to the construction of sport itself as a
male domain.
Finally, Part IV applies the theory behind Title IX's participation
standard and the analysis of how institutions construct and sustain
male dominance in sport to advocate doctrinal reform in other
aspects of Title IX interpretation. This section argues that the legal
standards governing the treatment of female athletes and the institutional practices that police and construct gender boundaries in
sport have not kept pace with the courts' understanding of institutional accountability in athletic participation.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW THROUGH

THE LENS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY

As even a cursory examination of sex discrimination law shows,
Title IX, in its application to athletics, takes an approach to sex
equality that is markedly different from the dominant approach
reflected in sex discrimination law generally. Title IX's departure
from sex discrimination's dominant legal framework is best understood through the lens of feminist legal theory.
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A. FormalEquality and Its Discontents
Sex discrimination law is often thought to embrace a conception
of equality identified by some feminist legal scholars as formal
equality. 3 The guiding principle in formal equality is that men and
women should be treated alike if they are similarly situated for
purposes of the policy or practice that is being challenged. 4
Scholars and advocates working within this approach emphasize
the overriding similarity between the sexes for the purposes of
defining access to societal benefits and privileges. 5 Legal
challenges premised upon formal equality seek to minimize and
destabilize what are typically regarded as "real" sex differences,
and to identify and eradicate stereotypes that traditionally have
been used to jUstify discriminatory treatment. 46 The core inquiry is
whether the asserted differences between men and women, once
stripped of archaic stereotypes and overbroad generalizations, are
sufficient to support treating the sexes differently, or are instead
43.
See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 2-3
(1994). Other feminist legal scholars use different terminology to describe a similar approach to equality. For example, Catharine MacKinnon has described the law's focus on
treating similarly situated persons alike as the "sameness/difference" approach. See Catharine MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination (1984), reprinted in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 32 (1987) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance]. Ruth Colker has styled this the "anti-differentiation"
approach, which she contrasts with anti-subordination. Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination
Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1003 (1986). Martha Chamallas uses the term "liberal feminism" to describe the approach to equality in which sex
differences are minimized to secure equal treatment. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION
TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 24-25 (1999). For the purposes of this discussion, I use the
term formal equality, without intending to distinguish substantively between these varying
perspectives.
44.
See CHAMALLAS, supranote 43, at 57; Bartlett, supra note 43, at 2.
45.
See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordinationand the Role
of Law, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 9, 13-20 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993)
(critiquing the use of sex difference to justify the differential treatment of women); Williams, supra note 24, at 175.
46.
See CHAMALLAS, supranote 43, at 24, 33-35. Not all feminist theorists view formal
equality, or liberal feminism, as premised upon the minimization of relevant sex difference.
For example, Martha Nussbaum's brand of liberal feminism combines liberalism's emphasis
on the equal worth and dignity of individuals with attention to the social construction of
individual preferences that underlie sex differences. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIALJUSTICE 6-13 (1999). However, as discussed below, the embodiment of formal equality

in sex discrimination doctrine typically does not look beneath sex difference to explore its
relationship to specific social and institutional structures. See discussion infra Part I.B.; see
also NUSSBAUM, supra, at 68 (acknowledging that "liberalism has sometimes been taken to
require that the law be 'sex-blind,' behaving as if the social reality before us were a neutral
starting point," but arguing that liberalism is not monolithic and that the intellectual tradition of liberalism includes thinkers who have rejected a "purely formal notion of equality").

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 34:1&2

mere remnants of traditional views about the proper place of men
and women. 47
One notable feature of formal equality is its focus on remedying
the harm to individuals who are disadvantaged by sex-based
criteria. The focus on the individual, rather than on the relative
social power of groups, renders men and women fungible for
purposes of the legal analysis. Men who are denied advantageous
treatment on the basis of an insufficiently supported sex-based
classification have as powerful a claim to formal equality under the
law as women who have been burdened by sex-based
discrimination.4 9
Formal equality is also characterized by its emphasis on sametreatment solutions to sex-based inequality, with a primary emphasis on breaking down the overt and covert use of sex-based
stereotypes to limit women's and men's opportunities.5 0 The goal
of this project is to expose and refute the stereotypes and assumptions underlying the categorical sorting of the men and women by
gender, leaving in place gender-neutral structures and institutions.51
As is evident from this description of formal equality, one difficulty with this formula is that it only provides relief from inequality
where persons are thought to be similarly situated with respect to
the treatment at issue. 2 Where persons are viewed as dissimilar in
ways defined to be relevant, the framework does not provide a
remedy to unequal treatment.
For nearly two decades, critics of formal equality have questioned its capacity to secure meaningful equality for women, and
have expressed concern that, in light of the different social and
economic power of men and women, formal equality may legiti-

47.
See CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 26.
48.
See id. at 35.
49.
See, e.g., David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigatingfor Women's Rights in a Man's
World, 2 LAw & INEQ. 33, 34 (1984) (observing that most winning sex discrimination plaintiffs are men).
50.
See Barrett, supra note 43, at 2-3; Mary Anne Case, Symposium: Discriminationand
Inequality Emerging Issues: The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns: ConstitutionalSex Discrimination
Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1447-78 (2000) (favoring
.sameness" solutions to problems of sex inequality).
51.
See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special TreatmentDebate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 329-31 (1984-1985); see

also Deborah L. Rhode, OccupationalInequality, 1988 Dura LJ. 1207, 1207-08 (1988).
52.
See Bartlett, supra note 43, at 2; MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance, supra note
43, at 32-33.
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mate or even exacerbate existing inequalities.53 Feminist legal
scholars have proposed, analyzed and debated numerous alternative approaches to equality, with a multiplicity of substantive and
strategic variations among them. 4 One widely discussed alternative
to formal equality is known as anti-subordination. 5 This approach
distinguishes itself from formal equality in several key respects. Unlike formal equality, its core concern is the relative power of social
groups, not the differential treatment of individuals. 56 Antisubordination is as concerned with the perpetuation of existing
disadvantages through formally neutral structures as it is with formal barriers to equality.57 It does not ask whether men and women
who are otherwise similarly situated are being treated differently;
53.
See, e.g., Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv.
513, 436-57 (1983); MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance, supra note 43, at 32-40; Rhode,
supra note 51, at 1207-08; Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95
YALE L.J. 1373, 1374-80 (1986); see also Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding
of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001)
(manuscript at 1-9, on file with author) (discussing the failure of equality law to reach the
majority of the manifestations of bias and discrimination in society today). But see NussBAUM, supra note 46, at 55-80 (articulating and defending her version of liberal feminism
that accounts for and examines the social construction of preferences). Similar criticisms
have been leveled at formal equality approaches to race discrimination. See, e.g., Alan David
Freeman, Legitimizing RacialDiscriminationThrough AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview of
Supreme CourtDoctrine,62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57; see also CHAMALLAS, supranote 43, at
142 ("Most critical race scholars regard the legal commitment to colorblindness as perpetuating rather than decreasing racial subordination.").
54.
See generally CHAMALLAS, supra note 43 (reviewing and analyzing feminist legal
scholarship from the 1970s through the 1990s).
55.
See Kathryn Abrams, GenderDiscriminationand the Transformation of Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1191 (1989); Colker, supra note 43, at 1028; see also CHAMALLAS,
supra note 43, at 53 (describing this approach as "dominance feminism"); MacKinnon, Dif
ference and Dominance, supra note 43, at 32, 40 (referring to this as the "dominance
approach").
56.
See CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 57-58; Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,5 PHIL. & PUB. ArF. 107, 157 (1976).
57.
See Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate But Equa4 or Anti-Subordination? The Uneasy Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson for Sex and GenderDiscrimination,12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1089,
1123 (1996). Finley describes anti-subordination as an approach to equality that:
transcends the supposedly oppositional status of the individualistic focus of the similarly situated approach and the countervailing "group-based discrimination"
approach, because it can embrace both depending on the context. It also overarches
the "sameness-difference" debate in which sex equality jurisprudence has been
mired, because it does not put the question in those terms. Thus, it can recognize
that sometimes facial distinctions along race or gender lines are subordinating, but
sometimes presumed neutrality can be subordinating.
Id.; see also ANDREW
(1996).

KOPPELMAN, ANTIOISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY

57-99
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rather, the central question is whether the challenged rule or practice perpetuates the subordination of women. Under this
approach, the identification of difference in the situations of men
and women does not immunize a practice from legal challenge.59
The tension between formal equality and anti-subordination
theories is particularly evident in their respective approaches to
sex difference. Advocates of formal equality minimize difference
and argue that men and women are alike for virtually all purposes
relevant in law and public policy, and therefore deserve equal
treatment. Anti-subordination theorists object to the very framing
of the question in terms of difference, contending that power, not
difference is at the heart of inequality. Instead of using sex difference as a basis to deny equal treatment, or even accommodating
sex difference to avoid disadvantage, anti-subordination theory
views difference as beside the point, and the critical issue as dominance. 60
The controversy surrounding the meaning of sex difference and
its role in equality law has received tremendous attention in feminist legal discourse. Feminist scholars have produced a multitude
of theories and strategies for approaching real or perceived sex
difference in the law.
One strain of feminist legal theory that has emerged from this
effort seeks to re-evaluate the meaning of difference so that difference is not turned into social disadvantage. Sometimes called
different voice, or cultural or relational feminism, this take on
equality focuses less on minimizing sex difference and more on
how difference is valued. 6' Cultural or relational feminists seek to
embrace and value women's experiences and perspectives equally
to those of men.62
Feminists working within both relational and anti-subordination
approaches have focused on how gender difference is socially constructed.63 One school of thought, particularly relevant for Title IX
58.
59.
60.

See MacKinnon, Difference andDominance, supra note 43, at 40-45.
See CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 57-58.
See MacKinnon, Difference andDominance, supra note 43, at 40-45.

61.

See CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 62, 65.

62.

See Adelaide H. Villmoare, FeministJurisprudenceand Political Vision, 24 LAw & Soc.
443, 453-54 (1999) (discussing the centrality of Carol Gilligan's research to cultural legal feminism, and surveying the works of feminist legal scholars writing in this
tradition, such as Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Robin West, and Ann Scales).
63.
See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW 50-53 (1990); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in
Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 354 (1995) [hereinafter Abrams, Sex Wars Redux].
INQUIRY
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analysis, is loosely identified as structuralism, or new structuralism,
and takes a critical approach to differences between men and
women and their significance in equality law.6 It analyzes difference not as inherent, but as constructed through social
relationships and institutional practices. The social construction
of difference in men's and women's preferences and choices plays
a central role in this approach.66 Scholars working within a structuralist framework emphasize the need to "unpack" women's
chosen identities and preferences in order to illuminate the institutional structures that constrain those choices. 67 Structuralist
approaches are reluctant to center equality law around the equal
valuation of women's preferences when those preferences themselves may be the products of social constraint rather than
authentic choices. Instead, a structuralist interpretation of

64.
See Kathryn Abrams, Symposium: Discriminationand Inequality Emerging Issues Afterword: CriticalStrategy and theJudicialEvasion of Difference, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1426, 1437 n.52
[hereinafter Abrams, JudicialEvasion of Difference] (defining "post structuralism" as opposed
to "structuralism," as "emphasiz[ing] the variety, complexity, and contingency of the discursive influences that shape subject formation"); Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural
Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REv.2370, 237885 (1994) [hereinafter Chamallas, Structuralist and CulturalDomination Theories] (discussing
"structuralist" approach to analyzing women and the workplace); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: JudicialInterpretationsof Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII
Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1749, 1825-26 (1990)
(discussing "new structuralism"). Scholars working in a structuralist framework typically
draw on sociological research to explain the connections between institutional practices
and the construction of preference.
65.
MINOW, supra note 63, at 50-53; see also CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 180
(explaining that structuralism's focus on "how perceptions of difference originate and are
maintained .... has much in common with theories such as Martha Minow's relational
approach to difference").
66.
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997)

(discussing the complexity and contingency of peoples' "choices" and "preferences," and
how they are shaped by social norms and law).

67. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 174; see also Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational
Determinants of Law Firm Integration, 46 Am.U. L. REv. 669, 673, 685-96 (1997) (discussing
organizational characteristics of law firms that affect composition of women and minorities
in law firms and shape their individual attainment); Rhode, supra note 51, at 1216-25
(discussing how workplace structures and unconscious bias constrain individual choice and
create inequality).
68. For example, Catharine MacKinnon, whose early work on sexual harassment emphasized how workplace structures facilitate the sexual harassment of women, has
questioned the authenticity of women's "different voice," stating that "the damage of sexism
is real, and reifying that into difference is an insult to our possibilities." MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance, supra note 43, at 39; see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 144 (1979).
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discrimination law centers the legal analysis on how institutions
and organizations construct sex difference and inequality. 69
One influence of structuralism on feminist legal theory is a
more sophisticated understanding of sex difference in men's and
women's respective choices, preferences, and life experiences."
Unlike formal equality, which implicitly assumes that individuals
can achieve equality by accessing gender-neutral opportunities
through which they may realize their aspirations, structuralism
views women's choices as falling along a continuum between
agency and constraint. Viewed through a structuralist lens,
women are neither free, unencumbered agents nor passive victims,
but choose their identities and life experiences while operating
within societal and cultural constraints. 72 This understanding leaves
room for individual resistance and social change, while analyzing
and addressing the forces that constrain and distort women's
choices.7 Thus, the condition of women has been described in the
literature as one of "partial agency."74
In addition to analyzing the concrete institutional practices that
directly regulate individuals within the institution, structuralist le69.
See CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 176-80; Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural
Domination Theories, supra note 64, at 2384; see also Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The
Gender Paradoxand the Limitations of DiscriminationAnalysis in Restructuring the Workplace, in
APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN'S LIVES 549-70 (D. Kelly Weisberg
ed., 1996) (offering a structuralist account of women's inequality in the workplace).
70.
See Chamallas, Structuralist and CulturalDomination Theories, supra note 64, at 2382
("Perhaps the most important contribution of the structuralist approach is its
ability to explain difference without naturalizing it."); see also Bartlett, supra note 43, at 14 (describing
the individual as "'constituted' from multiple institutional and ideological forces");Joan W.
Scott, DeconstructingEquality-Applicationsof Feminist Legal Theory to Women's Lives, in APPLICATIONS, supra note 69, at 611-23.
71.
Cf CHAMALLAS, supranote 43, at 174 (discussing feminist scholarship deconstructing women's economic choices). Compare also Martha Nussbaum who acknowledges that
many economists within the liberal tradition do not closely analyze the meaning of individual preferences. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 46, at 149. Nonetheless, she argues that:
[M]ost Utilitarian thinkers recognize that preferences may be distorted by a variety
of factors in such a way that they will fail to be the individual's own "true" or
"authentic" preferences. And most hold that democratic deliberation must try very
hard to separate the "authentic" from the "inauthentic" preferences, basing social
choice on the former rather than the latter when this can be done.
Id.
72.
See CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 102-06; Rhode, supra note 51, at 1214, 1216;
Schultz, supra note 64, at 1825. Kathryn Abrams labels this approach, which recognizes the
complexity and contingency of how human subjects are formed, "post structuralism."
Abrams,JudicialEvasion of DIfference, supranote 64, at 1437 n.52.
73.
See Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 63, at 352.
74.
See id.
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gal scholars also have identified a need to examine the cultures
and values within institutions to complete the discrimination
analysis." By exploring how institutions create and reinforce cultures of domination, the analysis enables a greater understanding
of how institutions participate in constructing an ideology of
dominance and privilege, as well as in subordinating certain social
76
groups.
Of the theories briefly touched upon here, formal equality is
without question the dominant paradigm in sex discrimination
doctrine. Alternatives to formal equality have made some mark on
sex discrimination law, but their impact has been more limited.
B. Sex DiscriminationLaw in Feminist Legal Theory
For the most part, sex discrimination doctrine, in both the constitutional and statutory arenas, can be characterized as falling
within the umbrella of formal equality. 77 Constitutional law, in particular, draws little from alternative frameworks such as antisubordination or structuralism."' Despite early race discrimination
cases in which the Court expressed a suspicion of rules and practices that stigmatize African Americans and perpetuate a social
caste, this dicta has never secured a strong foothold in the Court's
doctrine. 79 Aside from relying on historical discrimination against a
subordinated group to justify applying a higher level of scrutiny,
the Court's modern equal protection jurisprudence reflects as its

See Chamallas, Structuralistand CulturalDomination Theories, supra note 64, at 238575.
90 (discussing how institutions unconsciously continue to impose majority culture while
simultaneously supporting affirmative action).
76.
See id.
77.
See, e.g., CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 44-45; Bartlett, supranote 43, at 2-3; see also
Rhode, supra note 51, at 1207 (noting that the result of legal prohibitions on sex-based
discrimination "has been a large measure of equality in formal treatment of the sexes, but a
continued disparity in their actual status").
See, e.g., Finley, supra note 57, at 1091 (arguing that "most sex equality jurispru78.
dence has failed seriously to wrestle with or wholly adopt the anti-subordination or anticaste principle that is at the heart ofJustice Harlan's dissent" in Plessy v. Ferguson).
See id. at 1123 (describing the Court's focus on the stigmatizing practices of segre79.
gation and anti-miscegenation laws in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia as
"moments of serious engagement" with anti-subordination analysis); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Anticaste Principle,92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2422-29 (1994) (criticizing formal equality foundation of equal protection law and advocating an alternative anti-caste principle).
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guiding principle the neutral treatment of individuals, consistent
with formal equality."
Equal protection as applied to sex-based classifications had its
moorings in a formal equality perspective from the beginning."' A
majority of the Supreme Court first adopted intermediate scrutiny
for sex-based classifications in an equal protection challenge to
discrimination against men. Although the Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence has contained hints of an anti-subordination
analysis, the Court's doctrine has remained squarely within the
confines of formal equality. For example, the Court has often justified its protection of men from sex-based classifications with a
nodding recognition of the additional group-based harm that such
classifications inflict on women.83 And, the Court's justification for
applying a higher level of scrutiny to sex-based classifications in the
first instance depended in part on its recognition of the historic
discrimination against women as a group. 84 Nevertheless, once the
level of equal protection scrutiny was fixed, concerns about the
status of women as a group receded into the background, and the

80.
See Abrams, JudicialEvasion of Difference, supra note 64, at 1429-32 (discussing the
judicial evasion of group-based analysis in constitutional equal protection law); David
Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 954 (1989).
81.
See CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 33-35; Case, supra note 50, at 1448-52
(discussing the development of constitutional law of sex discrimination as a jurisprudence
centered on the elimination of the use of sex as a proxy for some other characteristic).
82.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (invalidating state statute permitting
eighteen to twenty-one-year-old women, but not men, to buy 3.2% beer). Although the
Court began its move toward heightened scrutiny in equal protection challenges to sexbased classifications that disadvantaged women, a majority of the Court did not explicitly
adopt heightened scrutiny until it was presented with a case of discrimination against males
in Craigv. Boren. See id. at 197-99; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973)
(plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down rule requiring female, but not
male, service members to prove spousal dependency in order to receive increased military
allowance); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (purporting to apply rational basis to state
law favoring males over equally qualified females as administrators of estates, but finding
the rule, though "not without some legitimacy," to be insufficiently related to state interest
in reducing administrative burdens on probate courts).
83.
The Court has done this by explicitly recognizing that sex stereotypes that are, in
the first instance, directed against men, nevertheless function as double-edged swords which
also negatively affect women. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 72930 & n.15 (1982); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 143-147 (1980); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 205-07 (1977); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645
(1975).
84.
See Craig,429 U.S. at 199, 202 (recognizing past history of discrimination against
women as ajustification for applying heightened scrutiny to sex-based classifications); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-86 (same); see also Colker, supra note 43, at 1024-26, 1028 (describing
the Court's reliance on historic group-based discrimination to justify heightened scrutiny as
an embodiment of the anti-subordination principle).
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Court primarily concerned itself with remedying the disadvantageous treatment of individuals because of their sex.8 5
Throughout its equal protection jurisprudence, the Court has
emphasized that the equal protection clause protects individuals
who have been treated differently because of their sex, and not
socially subordinated groups.8 6 Thus, the Court treats classifications that disadvantage members of a socially dominant group on

the same footing as discrimination against members of a socially
subordinate group, •even 'when
•
87 the purpose of the classification is
to remedy past discrimination.
In addition to the focus on the individual, another feature of
constitutional sex discrimination law that is consistent with formal
equality is its primary concern with the sex-neutral formulation of
policies and practices rather than the subordinating impact of
such policies and practices on socially disadvantaged groups. Sexbased different treatment, either in the form of a facial sex-based
classification or intentional discrimination, is a prerequisite for
heightened scrutiny of sex discrimination claims under the equal
protection clause.8 8 Policies and practices that are formally neutral, however burdensome to women, are beyond the reach of

See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140-43 (1994) (holding liti85.
gant's gender-based peremptory challenges unconstitutional and finding the litigant's
rationale to perpetuate gender stereotypes); see also Finley, supra note 57, at 1125
(discussing JE.B. as a case "locked within a comparative equality framework" because it
focuses on whether sex classifications are based on "real" differences or stereotypes, and
keeps the focus on "women rather than on the operative male-normed institutions.").
See, e.g.,
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) ("[Tlhe Court has re86.
peatedly recognized that neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the
equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because
they are women, full citizenship stature ....);J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127,
152 (1994) ("The neutral phrasing of the Equal Protection Clause, extending its guarantee
") (KennedyJ.,
to 'any person,' reveals its concern with rights of individuals, not groups ....
concurring); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976) ("[S]tatutory classifications that distinguish between males and females are
'subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.'") (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71,75 (1971)).
87.
See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-36 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to race-based affirmative action and espousing the need for parity in scrutinizing all
race-based classifications); see also id. at 247 (Stevens,J, dissenting) (noting anomaly created
by majority opinion in that sex-based affirmative action will be analyzed under the intermediate scrutiny standard applied to sex-based discrimination, while race-based affirmative
action will have to pass strict scrutiny). But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34
(1996) (distinguishing sex-based classifications that are designed to compensate for
women's economic and social disadvantages, which are permissible, from those that disadvantage women based on impermissible sex-based stereotypes, which are constitutionally
invalid).
See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979).
88.
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meaningful equal protection review absent proof of an intent to
discriminate. 9
A final feature of constitutional sex discrimination law that is
consistent with formal equality is its approach to sex difference.
Where sex-based discrimination is at issue, the Supreme Court
permits so-called "real differences" between men and women to
justify even explicitly sex-based different treatment.9° The existence
of such "real differences," as perceived by the Court, validates the
sex-based classification being challenged without regard to
whether it perpetuates the subordination of women, and without
regard to whether the perceived sex differences themselves stem
from social inequality.9'
Taken together, these features of equal protection doctrine
render constitutional law ill-suited at the present time to address
the far-reaching inequality experienced by women. The constitutional case that most famously illuminates the limits of formal
equality is Geduldig v. Aiello,9' in which the Court engaged in a tortured effort to force pregnancy into terms that formal equality
could comprehend.93 Because men and women are not similarly
situated with respect to the capacity to become pregnant, the
Court reasoned, a rule that singles out pregnancy for worse
treatment than all other medically disabling conditions is sexneutral. 9 In the Court's view, since no persons, male or female,
received pregnancy benefits, the classification merely distin-

89.
See id. at 279 (upholding under rational basis review preference for veterans for
state civil service jobs despite devastating adverse impact on women's job opportunities
where plaintiffs failed to establish that the measure was enacted "because of," rather than
"despite," its negative impact on women).
90.
See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434-37 (1998); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 76-79 (1981); Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469
(1981); see also Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE
L.J. 913, 922-60 (1983) (criticizing the Court's approach to sex difference in sex discrimination cases).
See, e.g., Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx.
91.
L. REV. 387, 413-28 (1984) (critiquing the Court's use of "real differences" in the Michael
M. decision from an anti-subordination perspective).
92.
417 U.S. 484 (1974).
See id. at 492-97; see also Sylvia A. Law, RethinkingSex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA.
93.
L. REv. 955, 983 (1984) (noting that criticism of the Geduldig decision has become a
"cottage industry").
94.
Geduldig,417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20. Although the statute technically exempted disabilities resulting from "the individual's court commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict,
or sexual psychopath," in practice, the only disabling condition exempted from statutory
coverage was pregnancy. Id. at 499 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Italso covered conditions
only or primarily affecting men, "such as prostatectomies, circumcision, hemophilia, and
gout." Id. at 501 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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guished between pregnant persons and non-pregnant persons.95
Thus, equal protection was satisfied because the benefits policy
treated all non-pregnant persons (male and female) the same.
The impact of this particular embarrassment to the Court's version of formal equality was mediated to some extent by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which amended Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to recognize pregnancy discrimination
as a form of sex discrimination under the statute. 96 However, even
under the PDA, formal equality remains the primary lens through
which Title VII evaluates workplace structures that penalize women
who become pregnant.9 7 The PDA broadened the comparison
groups used in Geduldig-which placed pregnancy in a class by itself-by defining pregnancy as comparable to other medically
disabling conditions.98 The statute does not set a floor for the
level of benefits to be afforded medically disabled persons; it
simply requires employers to treat persons disabled by pregnancy
the same as persons disabled by other medical conditions. Thus,
under the PDA, employers who deny job accommodations and
medical leave across the board do not violate the Act when they
deny such benefits to pregnant women. Depending on where the
employer chooses to set the baseline for accommodating workers'
medical problems and family responsibilties, men who choose to
have children may not face the same work-family conflict as
women who choose to do so. 99
95.
96.

Id. at 496-97 n.20.
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)

(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)).
97.
Although, in theory, disparate impact doctrine provides an additional basis for
challenging workplace structures that disadvantage pregnant women, in practice, such chal-

lenges are difficult to prove. See BARBARA

ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND

THE LAw: HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY

559-61 (2d ed. 1996). Disparate impact doc-

trine and its departure from formal equality is discussed infra.
98. The PDA added the following language to Title VII:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefits programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
99. See CHAMALLAS, supranote 43, at 49; Dowd, supra note 69, at 550-55. Although the
PDA does not take this approach, formal equality also could be consistent with a substantive
standard that raises the level of treatment for the comparison groups. For example, the
Family Medical Leave Act guarantees a minimum level of unpaid leave to all workers with
certain family and medical justifications. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994). However, any
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Like equal protection doctrine, statutory law on sex discrimination generally has followed -a formal equality course.'00 Courts
applying Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964, the federal law governing sex-based discrimination in the workplace, have often taken
an approach to sex difference that draws from formal equality,
permitting the socially constructed different situations of men and
women to justify rules and practices that disadvantage women.101
One example of formal equality's influence on Title VII jurisprudence is EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co.'0 2 In Sears, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) used a groupbased disparate treatment theory to challenge the relative dearth
of women holding higher-paying and higher status sales commission jobs at Sears, compared to the overrepresentation of women
in the company's lower-paying non-commission sales jobs.0 3 The
EEOC argued that the lower share of women in sales commission
jobs compared to the proportion of women who applied for all
sales jobs at Sears raised an inference of discrimination in hiring
for the higher status and more lucrative commission sales jobs. 14
substantive guarantee of better treatment must come from an independent normative principle other than the formal equality directive to treat likes alike. Cf Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-90 (1987) (upholding a state law that required employers
to make special accommodations for pregnancy as consistent with the PDA, even though
the PDA itself would permit employers to deny accommodations to all medically disabled
workers).
100. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 180 (stating that the structuralist approach has
not reshaped Title VII doctrine); id. at 309-10 (stating that disparate treatment, a formal
equality approach, is used most frequently under Title VII); Tracey E. Higgins & Laura A.
Rosenbury, Symposium: Discrimination and Inequality Emerging Issues: Agency, Equality, and
AntidiscriminationLaw, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1194, 1205-13 (2000) (discussing trend in Title
VII cases toward group-blindness and formal neutrality).
101. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (attributing the risk of
rape of female prison guards to their "very womanhood," and permitting prison to exclude
women from contact positions guarding male inmates based on this risk).
102. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
103. Id. at 333-34. Between 1973 and 1980, Sears' commission sales jobs paid about
twice as much as Sears' non-commission sales jobs. Schultz, supra note 64, at 1752 n.5. See
generally Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (providing a general
discussion of the requirements for proving group-based disparate treatment claims under
Title VII).
104. Sears, 839 F.2d at 312. The EEOC presented exhaustive statistical evidence to support this claim, including regression analyses based on information from employment
applications of rejected sales applicants and Sears' computerized payroll records from 1973
through 1980. Id. The EEOC bolstered its statistical proof with evidence of the subjective
nature of Sears' hiring process and testing practices. Id. at 331. This evidence included
Sears' documents evincing gender-stereotyping in defining the jobs themselves and the
employees who hold them. For example, Sears' Retail Testing Manual included a description of an ideal commission salesperson as "active," "has a lot of drive," possesses
"considerable vigor," and "likes work which requires physical energy." Id. In addition, the
EEOC established that Sears used a testing practice that included a "vigor" scale, which
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The court rejected the EEOC's argument, finding more persuasive
the employer's position that the groups of male and female employees that the EEOC compared were differently situated in their
relative levels of interest in holding commission sales jobs.105 The
court credited testimony from Sears managers that women were
less interested than men in holding high pressure commission
salesjobs involving the sale of durable goods. 10 6 The court accepted
Sears' assertion that differences in the interest and qualifications
of potential male and female applicants for the jobs negated any
inference of discrimination. 07 The court also faulted the EEOC for
failing to put forward anecdotal evidence in the form of testimony
of individual women who had been denied access to a commission
sales job, despite having interest in the position.'0 8
The decision is firmly entrenched within a formal equality
framework in several respects. First, the Court's search for
asked questions more likely to be answered affirmatively by men, such as, "Have you played
on a football team?" Id. at 332.
105. See id. at 319. Sears did not undertake its own regression analysis, or introduce its
own statistical evidence to counter that submitted by the EEOC. Id. at 312. Rather, Sears
based its defense on the lack of interest argument, which it used to undermine the validity
of the EEOC's statistical evidence. Id.
106. Id. at 320. In support of its lack of interest argument, Sears relied on the testimony
of Sears store managers, personnel managers, and other store officials; a study based on
interviews of women in nontraditional jobs at Sears; national surveys and polls regarding the
changing status of women in America; morale surveys of their employees; national labor
force data; an analysis of Applicant Interview Guides which attempts to measure differences
between men and women; and evidence of its hiring figures, as well as general evidence
regarding the characteristics of commission salespersons. Id. at 312-13. The appellate court
upheld the district court's dismissal of EEOC expert testimony that no significant differences existed between men and women in regard to interests and career aspirations,
affirming the District Court's finding that this evidence was "not credible, persuasive or
probative." Id. at 320-21. The court found Sears' analysis to be "more helpful on the question of differences," finding that there were various reasons for women's lack of interest in
commission selling (including increased pressure, and fear or dislike of being perceived as
overly competitive), and that commission-based saleswomen were generally less happy in
theirjobs. Id.
107. See id. at 334, 340. The EEOC had contended that even with adjustments for differences in men's and women's interest levels, the disparities were still statistically
significant. Id. at 334. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court's determination that Sears' interest evidence "substantially reduced" the EEOC's alleged disparities. Id.
at 334-35. The court did not reject the district court's finding that Sears' analysis of the
Career Aspiration Questionnaires administered to Sears employees demonstrated that interest alone could not account for the disparities computed under the EEOC's statistical
analysis. Id. at 337.
108. Id. at 310-11. The court stated that such a group of "disappointed witnesses who
preferred commission selling but were rebuffed" would have assisted the EEOC in its argument that lack of opportunity, rather than lack of interest, was the explanation for women's
underrepresentation in the jobs. Id. at 322. However, as Vicki Schultz points out, evidence
from individual women who were interested in yet denied commission sales jobs is wholly
irrelevant to a group-based disparate treatment claim. See Schultz, supranote 64, at 1797-98.
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individually identifiable victims of discrimination reflects formal
equality's focus on the denial of equal treatment to individual men
and women. Indeed, the court's focus on individual victims of
discrimination is all the more remarkable given that the EEOC
brought the case as a systemic disparate treatment case.'9 Second,
the court focused on the potential for the differenetial treatment
of men and women within a subjective hiring process.10° The effect
of Sears' practices on women was not the issue. Finally, and most
significantly for the purposes of this discussion, the relevance of
the comparison groups was at the heart of the court's inquiry."'
Once the court accepted the alleged dissimilarity of male and
female employees and the existence of sex difference in worker
interest levels, Tide VII offered no recourse.1 2 Sears' role in
shaping the culture and structures in the workplace that may have
distorted women's and men's interest in the jobs at issue was not
touched upon in the court's analysis." 3
The Seventh Circuit's approach to sex difference in EEOC v.
Sears is typical of the formal equality perspective that dominates
Tide VII doctrine. In Vicki Schultz's study of Tide VII cases addressing the lack of interest defense, slightly over half of the
decisions ultimately rejected the defense." 4 However, even these
more liberal courts operated within a formal equality perspective.
They rejected the employer's view that women were not interested
in the jobs, but accepted the premise that interest is fully formed
independent of workplace structures." 5 Thus, the decisions merely
applied formal equality, finding that since men and women were
similarly situated for the jobs at issue, Title VII provided a remedy.
In two notable, but ultimately limited, respects, Title VII law has
been more receptive than equal protection doctrine to alternative
theories of sex equality that go beyond the limits of formal equality. One important exception to the statute's emphasis on formal
inequality is the recognition of disparate impact as a form of un-

109. SeeSchultz, supra note 64, at 1797-98.
110. See Sears, 839 F.2d at 331-32.
111. Seeid. at 334.
112. See id. at 334-35; see also CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 69-71 (discussing Sears as a
case where different voice feminism backfired, lending credence to arguments that men
and women were not sufficiently similar so as to be comparable for Title VII purposes).
113. See Schultz, supra note 64, at 1804-05 (arguing "that the gendered characteristics
Sears ascribed to the commission sales position" signaled to potential employees that such
jobs required "masculine" traits).
114. Id. at 1776-77.
115. See id. at 1785-88.
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lawful sex discrimination.' 1 6 Disparate impact doctrine, as opposed
to disparate treatment-which focuses on sex-based different
treatment-enables women (and men) to challenge sex-neutral
rules that have a disproportionate adverse effect on the employment opportunities of persons of one sex."17 If the plaintiff or
plaintiffs can identify a specific employment practice (or, under
some circumstances, a group of practices) with a disparate impact
on women, the practice will violate Title VII unless the employer
justifies it under a business necessity standard.""
Disparate impact doctrine departs from formal equality in that it
focuses on the harm to social groups rather than solely to individuals, and it recognizes the capacity for facially neutral rules and
practices to disadvantage members of a protected group." 9 However, disparate impact, like formal equality, has the potential to
become derailed when confronted with sex difference. Proof of
disparate impact depends on establishing a disparity by comparing
the challenged practice's effect on men and women in relevant
comparison groups. Evidentiary battles in disparate impact cases
typically center on whether the relevant comparison is men and
women in the general population or within a more narrowly constructed labor pool, taking into account relevant qualifications and
interest. 2 ° So constructed, the available labor pool operates as a
similarly situated requirement in disparate impact cases: proof of
disparity only counts if the men and women compared are otherwise comparable with respect to the jobs at issue.12 ' Thus, the
116. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating Title VII reaches
.not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation.").
117. See, e.g., Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977)
(defining disparate treatment as the treatment of "some people less favorably than others
because of their [sex]," and disparate impact as "employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.").
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (2000).
119. See Colker, supranote 43, at 1019-20 (viewing disparate impact doctrine under an
anti-subordination paradigm).
120. See, e.g., BARBARAJ. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BuT Now I SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW 91 (1998) (noting that key issues in disparate impact challenges
"include the choice of comparison groups-e.g., general population versus qualified labor
force") (endnote omitted).
121. See Dowd, supra note 69, at 559 (discussing the failure of disparate impact law to
address women's work-family conflict, and observing that the doctrine permits an employer
to argue that worker choice, rather than any policy of the employer, caused the disparity);
Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 100, at 1205-07 (discussing courts' increasing resistance to
disparate impact as a viable theory for proving discrimination, and noting the potential for
disputes about the level of interest in the relevant labor pool to defeat a disparate impact
claim).
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potential for disparate impact doctrine to reach policies and practices that disadvantage women depends on whether the available
labor pool is defined in such a way that it does not replicate
women's disadvantage in the workplace. If the available labor pool
itself has been shaped by institutional bias and workplace structures, the use of that pool in the analysis may hide the
discriminatory impact of the challenged practice.'
For example, if the EEOC had brought a disparate impact challenge in the Sears case, it would have had to demonstrate that a
particular employment practice selected a significantly lower share
of women than men from the pool of workers interested and able
to perform commission sales jobs. If Sears, through its workplace
structures and institutional practices, had already suppressed
women's level of interest in the labor pool for such jobs, a comparison of the practice's impact on men and women within the
"available labor pool" would not capture the full extent of
123
women's disadvantage in the workplace.
When confronted with arguments about sex difference in
women's interest and abilities, the potential for disparate impact
doctrine to transcend the limits of formal equality depends on the
capacity of courts to critically analyze the role of difference and its
connection to institutional structures. In some Title VII disparate
impact cases, courts have taken a more sophisticated approach to
the problem of sex difference and have looked beyond women's
lower representation in the available labor pool to see whether the
employer participated in constructing that difference. If the court
believes that the employer itself has shaped the sex composition of
the constructed labor pool, it will not allow the existence of sex
difference within that pool to defeat a disparate impact claim.
Courts that take such approach adopt a structuralist analysis that
critically examines the role employers play in constructing sex difference.

122. Cf FLAGG, supra note 120, at 94-95 (discussing small sample size of individuals in
the workplace affected by the challenged practice as substantial barrier in disparate impact
claims); Clark Freshman, What Ever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science Theories
Identify Discriminationand Promote CoalitionsBetween "Different"Minorities,85 CORNELL L. REv.
313, 339-43 (2000) (discussing the small numbers problem in proving disparate impact
discrimination).
123. See FLAGG, supra note 120, at 96 (discussing problems of proof of disparity in the
employer's actual workforce); see also id. at 171 n.15 (noting that the Supreme Court has
rejected "workforce stratification- overrepresentation of whites in higherjob classifications
and overrepresentation of nonwhites at lower levels-as a method of proving disparate
impact").
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An example of a Tide VII disparate impact case that more2
closely resembles a structuralist approach is Dothard v. Rawlinson,11
a case involving a female plaintiffs challenge to a state prison's use
of height and weight requirements to screen out employees for
certain prison security jobs. 125 The Court permitted the plaintiff to
establish disparate impact by showing how the requirements would
affect men and women in the general population, rather than using
the pool of men and women who actually applied for the positions. 126 The Court reasoned that the height and weight
requirements themselves would have the effect of distorting or suppressing the proportion of women in the applicant pool, because
women could readily see that they would not meet the employer
qualifications and would not apply for the jobs. 127 In such a situation, the employer could not insist on proof of disparate impact
within the applicant pool when the employer itself had participated in constructing the sex composition of the applicant pool. 128

By recognizing the employer's role in shaping women's expressed
interest in prison guard jobs, the Court did not permit differences
in male and female representation
in the applicant pool to un29
dermine the plaintiffs case.1
Courts have been more inclined to take such a structuralist
approach when dealing with objective and quantifiable employment
criteria such as height and weight requirements and standardized
tests. 130 They have been less likely to critically examine how
institutions shape the pool of interested and able employees when
dealing with higher level jobs and more complex, subjective
124. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
125. Id. at 323-24.
126. Id. at 330.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. Justice White, in a dissenting opinion, viewed the employer's argument more favorably, stating that he was not "convinced that a large percentage of the actual women
applicants, or of those who are seriously interested in applying, for prison guard positions
would fail to satisfy the height and weight requirements." Id. at 348. Like the Court in Sears,
839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988),Justice White did not consider how the prison's structuring of
the job and its requirements would affect male and female interest levels. See discussion
supranotes 109-13 and accompanying text.
130. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking Glass: Can Title VII Help
Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1517, 1526-49 (1995)
(discussing Title VII's failure to enable women to break through the glass ceiling); cf
FLAGG, supra note 120, at 97 (discussing tendency of courts to find that a challenged practice did not cause the disparate impact if members of the disadvantaged group could have
changed their behavior to meet the employer's requirements). See generally Daniel Gyebi,
The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Favoring Women and Minorities in DisparateImpact Discrimination
Cases InvolvingHigh-LevelJobs,36 How. L.J. 97 (1993).
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decision-making processes.13' The effectiveness of disparate impact

doctrine depends on the ability of courts to critically examine
arguments based on sex difference in worker interests and
abilities, and to* recognize workplace structures that shape and
distort women's relationship to the jobs at issue.
Disparate impact doctrine is an important but limited counterpoint to the dominant strain of formal equality in sex
discrimination law. 13 Despite its promise for transforming workplaces that disadvantage women, disparate impact law has made
less of a mark on sex inequality than one might expect. 13 3 In addition to the law's potential for insulating institutionally constructed
sex difference from disparate impact challenges, disparate impact
doctrine contains further obstacles that render it incomplete as an
alternative model to formal equality. The requirement that plaintiffs identify a specific practice that caused the disparate impact is a
high hurdle for employees faced with complex employment selection processes
Moreover, even if disparate impact is established,
the disparity may still be justified if the challenged practice falls
within the business necessity defense.1 35 For example, if the employer demonstrates that a certain level of experience is necessary
to do the job, the employer may require such experience even if
structures or cultures within its workplace have limited the capacity
of women to obtain such experience. Taken together, these difficulties have meant that disparate impact doctrine has had only a

131. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 947, 948-50 (1982).
132. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 335-38 (arguing that the category of cases in which the
distinction between disparate impact and disparate treatment proves decisive is quite narrow).
133. SeeJohnJ. Donahue III& Peter Siegelman, The ChangingNature of Employment DiscriminationLitigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 989 (1991) (noting that disparate impact cases
accounted for less than two percent of federal employment discrimination cases in 1989);
Linda Hamilton Kreiger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1162 n.3 (1995) (noting that
the vast majority of Tide VII challenges are disparate treatment cases).
134. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k) (1) (A) (i)-(B(i)) (requiring the complaining party to identify the specific employment
practice that causes disparate impact, but providing that a plaintiff may challenge a multicomponent process if its elements "are not capable of separation for analysis"); FLAGG,
supra note 120, at 97 (explaining how this requirement places a high burden on disparate
impact plaintiffs).
135. See Selmi, supra note 132, at 287 n.31 (noting that courts deciding disparate impact cases show a strong willingness to accept employer justifications, so that "disparate
impact cases are notoriously difficult to prove and infrequently brought").
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on women's ability to challenge inequality in the
limited impact
136
workplace.

A second area of sex discrimination law that strays from the
boundaries of formal equality is sexual harassment law. Sexual
harassment doctrine reflects an amalgam of formal equality and
anti-subordination, sharing features of both. 37 The analysis for determining whether the conduct at issue was sexual harassment
starts from a formal equality premise. To be actionable, the harassment must occur because of the sex of the target, requiring the
plaintiff to demonstrate that she (or he) was singled out for harassment because of her (or his) sex. This requirement is consistent
with formal equality, as it focuses on whether the individual who
experienced the harassment was treated differently on the basis of
his or her sex.lss However, in applying this standard, courts have
not strictly required proof of differential treatment on the basis of
sex, and have instead focused on the disadvantageous effect of the
harassment on its

victims.1s

At least with respect to male-female

conduct of a sexual nature, courts typically presume that the harassment occurred because of sex.' 4 Thus, although the inquiry
into whether the plaintiff was harassed because of her sex fits
well within a formal equality framework, the test for sex-based
treatment is applied more loosely, focusing on sex-linked disadvantages rather than different treatment. Some courts have even
more explicitly drawn on structuralist interpretations to ground

136. See FLAGG, supra note 120, at 98 (concluding that while none of the individual
hurdles facing disparate impact claimants is insurmountable, "the cumulative effect of these
obstacles is significant").
137. Cf CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 54-55 (discussing roots of sexual harassment in
anti-subordination theory, but noting that the courts have never fully accepted this theory);
Abrams, JudicialEvasion of Difference, supra note 64, at 1431 (noting that sexual harassment
law under Title VII reflects a "fuller appreciation of group-based difference" and
"acknowledges power inequalities between men and women," in contrast to the general
"difference evasion" in discrimination law).
138. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
(emphasizing that sexual harassment plaintiffs must always demonstrate that the harassing
conduct occurred because of their sex).
139. See Vicki Schultz, ReconceptualizingSexual Harassment, 107 YALE LJ. 1683, 1716-20
(1998) (demonstrating that courts are much less inclined to find that nonsexual harassment
occurred on the basis of the target's sex than they are to find that sexual harassment occurred because of the target's sex).
140. See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998) (stating that
"[s]exual harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct"); Oncale, 523 U.S. at
80 (stating that it is reasonable for courts to presume, in cases involving male-female harassment of a sexual nature, that the conduct occurred because of sex).
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that
the sex-based nature of the harm in employment structures
4'
render women more vulnerable to workplace harassment.
Sexual harassment law transcends the limits of formal equality
in another respect as well. The standard for institutional liability
for sexual harassment is not the typical formal equality standard.
Tide VII holds employers liable for sexual harassment-even by
persons who are not regarded as agents of the employer-if the
employer failed to take reasonably responsive action after
receiving notice of the harassment.4 4 This standard requires
employers to do more than treat all harassment victims the same
regardless of their sex, as formal equality would require.
Employers cannot successfully argue that they treat men and
women alike by ignoring all sexual harassment, regardless of the
sex of the victim. Sexual harassment doctrine under Tide IX takes
a similar approach, although it adopts a more stringent standard
for institutional liability, requiring actual notice and deliberate
indifference.'4 3 By focusing on how institutions perpetuate
discriminatory cultures, this standard goes beyond formal equality,
requiring more than the identical treatment of similarly situated
men and women.'44
Despite important exceptions in the areas of disparate impact
doctrine and sexual harassment, alternative approaches to formal
equality have not taken root in sex discrimination law on a widespread basis. 45 In light of this picture, one might expect that Title
IX would approach sex equality in sport from a formal equality
perspective. Yet, the test that has developed for measuring participation opportunities in school athletic programs, and the way
141. See Chamallas, Structuralist and CulturalDomination Theories, supra note 64, at 23992401 (discussing structuralist influences in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991), a hostile environment sexual harassment case).
142. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982); EEOC--Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)-(e) (2000).
143. SeeDavis v. Monroe County Bd. Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
144. See Deborah Brake, School Liabilityfor PeerSexual HarassmentAfter Davis: Shiftingfrom
Intent to Causation in Discrimination Law, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. (forthcoming 2001)
(manuscript on file with author); Deborah Brake, The Cruelest of the GenderPolice: Student-toStudent Sexual HarassmentandAnti-Gay Peer Harassment Under Title IX,1 GEO.J. GENDER & L.
37, 50-51 (1999) [hereinafter Brake, The Cruelistof the Gender Police].
145. See Chamallas, Structuralist and CulturalDomination Theories, supranote 64, at 2371
(stating that while structuralist and cultural domination theories have had some impact on
Title VII doctrine, their influences "are still at the margins of Tide VII"); Rhode, supra note
51, at 1208 ("In part, the difficulty stems from the law's traditional focus on gender differences rather than gender disadvantage. Its primary objective has been to secure similar
treatment for those similarly situated; less effort has centered on remedying the structural
factors that contribute to women's dissimilar and disadvantaged status.").
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courts have applied it, draws more from anti-subordination and
structuralist analysis than formal equality. The remainder of this
Article attempts to elaborate and justify the theory of equality underlying Tide IX and to explore the implications of this theoretical
grounding.
II.

THE LAW OF TITLE

IX:

BEYOND FORMAL EQUALITY AND

TOWARD A MORE CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SEX DIFFERENCE

Commentators who have examined Tide IX's relationship to
feminist theory have generally concluded that Title IX is a liberal
feminist law that requires only formal equality. 146 At most, they view
Title IX as a slight departure from formal equality because it
accommodates sex difference through the authorization of sexseparate teams, thus supplementing formal equality with special
treatment in certain circumstances. 47 Although this understanding
is consistent with the law's early applications, 148 it does not account
for modern developments in Title IX law. In recent years, the case
law evaluating Title IX compliance has surpassed the limits of
formal equality, most significantly in the approach to sex
difference in the area of athletic participation.
The most litigated and contested part of Title IX's application to
athletics, and its most notable departure from formal equality, is
146. Jessica E. Jay, Women's Participation in Sports: Four Feminist Perspectives, 7 TEX. J.
& L. 1, 19 (1997) ("Title IX is a formal equality law, subject to some exceptions
which are still based on this model."); see also Birrell & Richter, supra note 1, at 222-23
(characterizing Title IX as a "liberal" approach to "remedy ... women's exclusion from
sport [that] has merely resulted in incorporation and has failed to accomplish the farreaching changes in sport some feminists had advocated"); Michael A. Messner & Donald F.
Sabo, Toward a CriticalFeminist Reappraisalof Sport, Men, and the Gender Order,in SPORT, MEN,
AND THE GENDER ORDER, supra note 26 (describing Title IX as "a decidedly liberal initiative," and defining liberal feminism as an approach to equality that stresses sex similarities
and the individual's right to equal opportunity); Wendy Olson, Beyond Title IX: Toward an
Agenda for Women and Sports in the 1990's, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 105, 116-17 (1990)
(analyzing Title IX as based on an "equality" model that uses male sports as the standard);
Note, Cheering on Women and Girls in Sports: Using Title IX to Fight Gender Role Oppression, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1627, 1634-35 (1997) (stating that Title IX comes out of a formal equality
model, defining equal opportunity as opening up access to male structures).
147. Cf Bartlett, supra note 43, at 4-6 (discussing substantive equality as a strain of
feminist legal theory in which sex difference is recognized and accommodated through sexspecific treatment).
148. See Diane Heckman, Scoreboard:A Concise ChronologicalTwenty-Five Year History of Title IX Involving Interscholasticand IntercollegiateAthletics, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 391, 398
(1997) (discussing Title IX litigation on "cross-over" cases, in which girls or boys attempt to
play on a team that is offered to members of the other sex).
WOMEN
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the standard for measuring equality in the allocation of athletic
participation opportunities. 49 This aspect of Title IX compliance
examines whether the number of opportunities provided to male
and female athletes discriminates on the basis of sex.'5 ° The test for
measuring discrimination in this area-commonly known as "the
three-part test"--comes from the statute's regulations and the interpretations by the agency primarily responsible for enforcing
Title IX, the Department of Education Office for Civil Rights
(OCR).
A. The Development of Title IX Standards in
Athletics and the Three-Part Test
Title IX itself does not specify any standards for identifying sex
discrimination in school athletic programs or in any other specific
context. The statute's prohibition of sex discrimination is framed
generally and comprehensively: "No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis,,151
tance....
Title IX's standards governing athletics derive from the
regulations and interpretations issued by the federal agency
charged with enforcing Title IX, previously the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), and now the Department
of Education (DOE) . The Title IX regulations that were issued in
1975 pursuant to congressional authorization remain controlling
149.

See Anne Bloom, FinancialDisparity as Evidence of Discrimination Under Title IX, 2
& ENT. L.J. 5, 11 (1995) (noting that most Tide IX litigation has focused on
the three-part test to increase women's share of athletic participation opportunities); B.
Glenn George, Title IX and the ScholarshipDilemma, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 273, 275, 278 (1999)
(noting that litigation in the 1990s "focused primarily on the issue of participation rates,"
and contending that the next wave of Tide IX enforcement is focusing on the equitable
allocation of athletic scholarships).
150. See generally Policy Interpretation, supra note 6 (establishing standards for measuring equal accommodation of student interests and abilities in the provision of athletic
participation opportunities).
151. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
152. The former Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was the primary enforcement agency for Title IX until 1979, when HEW was abolished and the
Department of Education assumed primary responsibility for Tide IX enforcement. Cohen
v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing history of federal responsibility
for Tide IX enforcement).
VILL. SPORTS
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today.'53 These regulations reflect the agency's assessment that
equality in this context requires more than an equal right for male
and female students to try out for the same teams. Instead of
adopting such a classic formal equality stance, the regulations
permit schools to offer separate athletic teams for male and female
athletes, and set standards for measuring equal opportunity in the
context of sex-separate programs.154
The resulting set of standards divide Title IX compliance into
three main areas, which must be independently evaluated. 55 The
three areas are, broadly speaking: participation, scholarships, and
the treatment and benefits provided to male and female athletes.'5 6
Of these, by far the most litigated, and arguably the most
important, is participation, which addresses the allocation of
opportunities to play competitive sports among male and female
students. 57 In the terms used by the regulations, the relevant
inquiry asks "[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of
competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of
members of both sexes.",5 Compliance in this area has come to be

measured by a three-part test developed by HEW in a Policy

153. See id. (deferring to Title IX regulations and noting the particularly high degree of
deference afforded because Congress specifically authorized HEW to prescribe standards
for athletics programs). The regulations were the result of a congressional compromise
known as the "Javits Amendment," that, in lieu of attempting to exempt revenue-producing
sports from Tide IX, instructed the agency to issue regulations implementing Title IX,
"includ[ing] with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports." Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380,
§ 844, 88 Star. 484, 612 (1974); see also Heckman, supra note 148, at 395 (describing the
political events leading up to the Title IX regulations).
154. The regulations explicitly permit institutions to provide separate-sex athletic teams
"where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a
contact sport." 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1999). Because intercollegiate and interscholastic
athletic teams are nearly always selected on the basis of competitive skill, these programs are
typically provided on a sex-segregated basis.
155. Institutions covered by Tide IX must comply with each of these three areas in order to be in compliance with Tide IX; they may not "trade off' compliance in one area with
a violation in another, or meet two out of three. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897; Roberts v. Colo.
St. Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 1993).
156. See generally ELLEN J. VARGYAS, BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: A LEGAL GUIDE TO
TITLE IX 15-30 (1994) (explaining Title IX athletics framework).
157. See, e.g., George, supra note 149, at 275-76 ("The question of participation opportunities understandably took precedent-issues like financial aid, equipment budgets, and
practice facilities were irrelevant unless women's teams existed to enjoy those benefits.").
158. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). The other nine factors listed in the regulation for determining "equal athletic opportunity" relate to the treatment of and benefits provided to male
and female athletes, which are evaluated separately from the allocation of participation
opportunities. Id. These factors include the scheduling of games, availability of facilities,
coaching, and equipment and uniforms, among others. Id.
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Interpretation that the agency issued in 1979.' 59 Under the threepart test, an institution may comply with Title IX by meeting any
one of the following three standards:
(1)

[providing] intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students ...

(2)

(3)

in

numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or
show[ing] a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive
to the developing interest and abilities of the members of [the underrepresented] sex; or
demonstrat[ing] that the interests and abilities of
the members of [the underrepresented] sex have
been fully and effectively accommodated by the
present program.'-

Although the test is phrased in terms of intercollegiate athletics, it
also applies to other types of athletic programs, including
elementary and secondary competitive sports, club sports, and
recreational sports.'6'
The test's focus on the situation of the "underrepresented sex"
reflects the agency's concern with expanding opportunities for
female athletes and avoiding measures of interest that would have
the effect of suppressing the growth of women's athletic participation. 6 Throughout the Policy Interpretation, the agency
acknowledged that female sports participation has been and continues to be limited by institutional discrimination. 63 The
159. Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,414. The Policy Interpretation was issued
to provide greater clarity in response to university questions after the agency had received
nearly 100 complaints alleging discrimination in intercollegiate athletics. Id. at 71,413.
160. Id. at 71,418. The plaintiff has the burden of proof on prongs one and three of the
test; the university has the burden of proof under prong two. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 901-02.
161. Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,413-14 ("This Policy Interpretation is designed specifically for intercollegiate athletics. However, its general principles will often
apply to club, intramural, and interscholastic athletic programs, which are also covered by
regulation. Accordingly, the Policy Interpretation may be used for guidance by the administrators of such programs when appropriate."); see also Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 274 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying three-part test to Title IX challenge to
interscholastic athletic opportunities).
162. Although in theory, "the underrepresented sex" might in some instances refer to
males, it was commonly understood that in the context of athletics, this meant women. See
Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,419 app. A (discussing widespread discrimination
against women in intercollegiate athletics).
163. See id. at 71,414 (discussing the obligation to effectively accommodate the interests
and abilities of male and female students, and stating that "[i]n most cases, this will entail
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document states that, in determining student athletic interest, care
must be taken to ensure that the measurement of interest does not
disadvantage the underrepresented sex.' 64 It explicitly recognizes
the connection between the athletic interests and abilities that girls
and women possess and the presence
of discrimination in the op65
portunities available to them.

Read as a whole, the Policy Interpretation reflects a critical approach to sex difference that does not accept existing differences
in male and female interest levels as either inherent or independent of past and present opportunity structures. The test and the
rationale behind it mark a departure from formal equality by targeting the structures that have resulted in different levels of
athletic interest and participation, rather than accepting malefemale difference as a legitimate basis for allocating resources and
opportunities. Court decisions applying the three-part test even
more clearly articulate this perspective.
B. The Three-Part Test in the Courts

In several significant cases, the courts have elaborated upon the
interrelation between institutional structures and the respective
situations of men and women in athletics. 66 To date, courts have
development of athletic programs that substantially expand opportunities for women to
participate and compete at all levels"); id. at 71,419 ("Participation in intercollegiate sports
has historically been emphasized for men but not women. Partially as a consequence of this,
participation rates of women are far below those of men.").
164. The Policy Interpretation specifically directs institutions that they may assess student interest and ability:
[B]y nondiscriminatory methods of their choosing provided.... [t]he processes take
into account the nationally increasing levels of women's interests and abilities.. .[and] [t]he methods of determining interest and ability do not disadvantage
the members of an underrepresented sex... [and] [t]he methods are responsive to
the expressed interests of students capable of intercollegiate competition who are
members of an underrepresented sex.
Id. at 71,417.
165. See id. at 71,419 (citing data documenting discrimination against women's athletic
programs in the numbers of participation opportunities offered, scholarship dollars, and
other benefits provided to female athletes including recruiting and coaching).
166. Title IX is enforceable in court or through the Office for Civil Rights. See Cannon
v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). The substantive standards for evaluating Title
IX compliance do not depend on the route of enforcement, although the available remedies and the procedures for complaining vary. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503
U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (upholding availability of damages remedy under Tide IX for private
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adopted the three-part test as the governing standard for measuring Tide IX compliance in the area of athletics participation,
despite challenges to the test's legitimacy. 167 The most significant
challenge to the three-part test, and the most comprehensive explanation of the rationale underlying the test, are found in the
district court and First Circuit decisions in Cohen v. Brown University. 6

This protracted litigation was initiated by a class of female
athletes, including lead plaintiff Amy Cohen, a gymnast who lost
her team when Brown eliminated university funding for its varsity
women's gymnastics and volleyball teams as part of a budgetcutting plan to reduce athletic expenditures. 69 The case began in
1991 when Brown, facing a budget crunch, demoted the two
women's varsity teams to "donor-funded varsity status"-a move
that effectively would have ended varsity level competition for the
two teams. 70 At the same time, Brown also demoted men's water
polo and golf to donor-funded status.'
Although at face value, the cuts appeared gender-neutral, the
reality is more complex. The elimination of the two women's
teams in a program already disproportionately slanted in favor of
male athletes exacerbated the situation of female athletes at Brown
by further reducing the number of participation opportunities
available to them.172 Moreover, the budgetary impact of the cuts
cause of action alleging intentional discrimination); Setty, supra note 31, at 339-46
(comparing difficulties involved in enforcing Title IX through litigation and through the
Office for Civil Rights and urging reforms of OCR to facilitate better Title IX enforcement).
167. Every circuit that has considered the issue has adopted the three-part test as the
controlling test for Title IX compliance in the area of athletic participation opportunities.
See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (lst Cir. 1993), remanded to, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I.
1995), affd in part and rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (lst Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186
(1997); Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 1999); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of
Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 335-36 (3d Cir. 1993); Pederson v. La. St. Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 879 (5th Cir.
2000); Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 274 (6th Cir. 1994); Kelley v. Bd.
of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1994); Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. St. Univs., 198 F.3d 763,
767-68 (9th Cir. 1999); Roberts v. Colo. St. Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828-29 (10th Cir.
1993); see alsoBeasleyv. Ala. St. Univ., 966 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (explaining
Title IX requirements using the three-part test); Bryant v. Colgate Univ., No. 93-CV-1029,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8393, at *26-38 (N.D.N.Y.June 11, 1996) (applying the three-part test
to decide motion for summaryjudgment).
168. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), afj'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), remanded to, 879
F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), affid in part and reo'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997).
169. Brown, 101 F.3d at 161.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 163 (accepting plaintiffs' contention that, because men retained a disproportionate share of intercollegiate athletic opportunities at Brown both before and after the
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was far from neutral. Cutting the women's teams would have resulted in a net savings of $62,000 per year, while the cuts in the
men's teams netted only $16,000 per year. 17 3 The reason for the
disparity was that the men's teams had a strong donor base of sup1 4
portive alumni, and were already primarily funded by donations.
The four teams were told that they could continue to play at the
varsity level if they could find donations to make up for the lost
university funds.15 While both men's and women's donor-funded
teams are at a comparative disadvantage to university-funded
teams, the men's donor-funded teams generally enjoy a wider donor base by virtue of having existed for a longer period of time.1176
77
Thus, the teams were differently situated with respect to the cuts.

In defending the lawsuit, Brown launched a full-scale assault on
the three-part test and its underlying philosophy. 7 8 Brown argued
that, by focusing on raising the opportunities available to the underrepresented sex, the three-part test discriminates against male
athletes because men as a group are more interested in playing
sports than women. 179 As an alternative to the three-part test,
Brown proposed measuring the relative levels of interest expressed
by men and women in playing intercollegiate sports, and then providing opportunities to both sexes commensurate with their
demotions, "what appeared to be the even-handed demotions of two men's and two
women's teams, in fact, perpetuated Brown's discriminatory treatment of women in the
administration of its intercollegiate athletics program").
173. Lynette Labinger, Title IX and Athletics: A Discussion ofBrown University v. Cohen by
Plaintiffs' Counsel 20 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 85, 89 (1998). Interestingly, as a statement of
Brown's priorities, the year before Brown cut the four teams in response to budget pressures, it spent $250,000 to buy out and replace its entire football coaching staff mid-contract
in the middle of a losing football season. Id.; see also id. at 95 (estimating that Brown spent
"at least $1 million, and probably closer to $2 million, if not more, to defend this case," not
including the costs of complying with the settlement and the court order, all to save $80,000
per year by cutting the four teams); John C. Weistart, Can GenderEquity Find a Place in Commercialized College Sport, 3 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'v 191, 220 (1996) [hereinafter Weistart,
Gender Equity] (noting that at the time of the cuts, Brown spent $4.74 million on varsity
sports, and that of this, "three men's sports-football, basketball and hockey-received 42
percent of the available funds").
174. Labinger, supra note 173, at 89.
175. See id.
176. See Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 201 n.30 (citing coach's testimony that women's teams,
although they invested the same amount of efforts into fundraising, met with much lower
success in the fundraising arena because men typically control household finances and
men's teams had many more alumni due to their much longer history at Brown).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 205.
179. Brown made this argument at all levels and in various forms throughout the protracted litigation. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 987 (D.R.I. 1992), affd, 991
F.2d 888, 899 (lst Cir. 1993), remanded to879 F. Supp. 185, 204-06 (D.R.I. 1995), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155, 169 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997).
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relative interest levels. 8 ° Brown argued that its proposal would
treat men and women equally because their expressed interest in
athletics would be accommodated to the same extent. For example, if, as Brown argued, twice as many male students than female
students were interested in playing intercollegiate sports, Title IX
should permit it to maintain approximately twice as many athletic
opportunities for male than female athletes.'
The First Circuit twice rebuffed Brown's challenge to the threepart test and its proposed alternative, first in affirming the district
court's preliminary injunction ordering Brown not to cut the two
women's teams,8 2 and second in affirming the district court's posttrial decision finding Brown in violation of Title IX. 8's Both First

Circuit opinions in the case resoundingly rejected Brown's argument that Title IX should measure equality in participation
opportunities based on
the actual, expressed interest levels of male
84
and female students.

The First Circuit's second decision in the case, affirming the district court's determination of liability, provides the most
comprehensive analysis and defense of the three-part test by a
court to date. This decision upheld the district court's ruling,
which it made after a trial on the merits in which the relative interest argument was extensively litigated, that Brown failed to comply
with each prong of the three-part test.8 8 First, Brown failed prong
one of the test because the evidence showed that women held a
disproportionately low share of Brown's intercollegiate athletic
participation opportunities, constituting thirty-eight percent of the
school's athletes, compared to fifty-one percent of the student
body.8 6 Second, Brown failed prong two of the test because it
could not show that it had "maintained a continuing practice" of
program expansion for women; in fact, other than adding one new
180. Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 204.
181. Id. at 204 n.40.
182. See Brown, 991 F.2d at 907.
183. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 187.
184. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 174; Brown, 991 F.2d at 899.
185. See Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 211-13.
186. Id. at 211, affd in part and rev'd in part, 101 F.3d at 166. Because institutions largely
control the number of athletic positions available to men and women when they decide to
offer single-sex teams, decide what teams to sponsor, and allocate funding and a coaching
staff for those teams, the court measured participation opportunities by counting the number of actual participants. Brown, 101 F.3d at 164. Brown's argument that there existed a
certain number of "unfilled slots" on the women's teams that should be counted as participation opportunities was rejected by the court and refuted by the testimony of Brown's
coaches, who stated that they recruited the number of athletes that the team could support.
Id. at 164, 167; Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 202-04.
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women's team in the 1980s, Brown had not increased its women's
program since the 1970s,
S •187 when it first launched a women's athletic
program at the school. Finally, Brown failed prong three of the
test because there were women on campus with sufficient interest
and ability to field additional intercollegiate teams not offered at
the school.e
In its defense, Brown attacked the legitimacy of the three-part
test itself. 9 The First Circuit's response to these attacks, and its
justification and explanation of the three-part test, constitute the
most enduring and far-reaching parts of its opinion. The court first
addressed Brown's argument that the test amounted to affirmative
action and preferential treatment for female athletes and rebuked
Brown for its "persistent invocation of the inflammatory terms
'affirmative action,' 'preference,' and 'quota."" 0 As the court saw
it, "this is not an affirmative action case." 9' Rather, the court explained, the plaintiffs sought neither....preferential
treatment nor
192
affirmative action, but an end to discrimination.
As the court seemed to recognize, Brown's characterization of
the three-part test as an affirmative action requirement stemmed
from Brown's constricted view of the meaning of discrimination.
Because Brown equated "discrimination" with the formal equality
187. Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 191, aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 101 F.3d at 166. In determining program expansion, the court disregarded evidence of contraction in the men's
athletic program, holding that program expansion for the underrepresented sex may not
be satisfied by reducing the opportunities available to the overrepresented sex. Id.; see also
Labinger, supra note 173, at 89 (discussing history of women's athletics at Brown and noting
that between 1979 and the time of the lawsuit, Brown added only one women's sportwomen's track in 1982).
188. See Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 190, affd in part and rev'd in part, 101 F.3d at 180. The
First Circuit noted that:
[W]hile the question of full and effective accommodation of athletics [sic) interests
and abilities is potentially a complicated issue where plaintiffs seek to create a new
team or to elevate to varsity status a team that has never competed at the varsity level,
no such difficulty is presented here, where plaintiffs seek to reinstate what were successful university-funded teams right up until the moment the teams were demoted.
Brown, 101 F.3d at 180. In addition to the two demoted teams, the plaintiffs also established
unmet interest in women's fencing, skiing, and water polo, sports that were not offered at
the varsity level. Id. at 190, n.16; Labinger, supra note 173, at 91-92; see also Heckman, supra
note 148, at 420-21 n.142 (discussing successful litigation brought by female athletes seeking to upgrade club sports to varsity status).
189. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 162.
190. Id.at 169.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 170-72. The court also noted that Brown had not demonstrated that the enforcement of Title IX compliance in the case would adversely impact male athletes. Id. at 172.
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standard of treating similarly situated persons the same, Brown saw
the three-part test as going beyond merely ending discrimination
and requiring instead the preferential treatment of female athletes.'9 ' Critics of the three-part test since the Brown litigation have
continued to attack the three-part test as an affirmative action
requirement,94 sharing Brown's more limited conception of discrimination. 1

The First Circuit viewed Title IX as ending discrimination rather
than requiring affirmative action because it took a more searching
approach to the existence of sex difference and its role in a discrimination analysis.9
The court rejected Brown's implicit
assumption that the sex differences that it identified were inherent
or natural, and independent of institutional structures. Instead, it
found that the differences Brown cited were, to some extent, the
product of the very institutional practices that were being challenged.

96

As the court explained:

Interest and ability rarely develop in a vacuum; they evolve
as a function of opportunity and experience....

Thus, there exists the danger that, rather than providing a
true measure of women's interest in sports, statistical evidence purporting to reflect women's interest instead provides
only a measure of the very discrimination that is and has been
the basis for women's lack of opportunity to participate in
sports .... We conclude that, even if it can be empirically
demonstrated that, at a particular time, women have less interest in sports than do men, such evidence, standing alone,
cannot justify providing fewer athletics opportunities for
women than for men.197

The First Circuit's understanding of the connection between
opportunity structures and men's and women's interest levels
benefited greatly from the district court's findings on the subject
in its post-trial decision on the merits.' 9 The district court rejected
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See id. at 169.
See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 38, at 212.
Brown, 101 F.3d at 174-80.
See id. at 178-81.
Id. at 179-80.
See Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 206.
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each of Brown's proposed measures of male and female interest
levels on the grounds that they were not independent of existing
differences in opportunities. The court first rejected Brown's use
of student surveys to prove women's lower level of athletic interest
because any survey of Brown's student body would be distorted by
the existing athletic opportunities at Brown. 200 As the court explained, "[w] hat students are present on campus to participate in a
survey of interests has already been predetermined through the
recruiting practices of the coaches." 20 1 In addition, the district
court rejected Brown's reliance on surveys of applicants to Brown
since these measurements also would be influenced by Brown's
existing opportunities. 2 Students seriously interested in sports not
offered at Brown would be less likely to apply to Brown.0 3 Finally,
and most significantly, the district court found that no measurement of existing interest levels would be reliably independent of
existing opportunity structures.0 4 The court concluded that as long
as institutions such as Brown allocate a greater share of athletic
resources and opportunities to males, the very allocation decisions
that are being challenged shape the relative interest of men and
women in playing sports. 205
The First Circuit's appreciation of the interdependence between
opportunity structures and interest levels enabled it to hold Brown
accountable for the different opportunities that it provided to
male and female students. The court believed that accepting
Brown's position would be tantamount to letting the university off
the hook for differences in interest levels that Brown itself had
participated in constructing. 0° Moreover, the court concluded, if
Title IX standards were altered to adopt Brown's position, Title
IX's potential as an antidiscrimination law would be severely
limited. 27 As the court explained, Brown's "relative interests
199. See id. at 206-07.
200. Id. at 206.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 206-07.
203. Id. at 206
204. Id. at 207 (concluding that surveying the relative interest levels of men and women
in playing intercollegiate athletics cannot "account for the extent to which opportunities
drive interests"). The court cited crew as an example of a sport in which interest commonly
develops only after matriculation at college. Id.
205. Id. (citing testimony of Brown's expert, who, when asked, "Would you agree with
the following statement? If Brown provides far more opportunities for women, then maybe
the percentage of interested women will rise?" answered, "Sure, I don't see anything wrong
with that.").
206. Brown, 101 F.3d at 169.
207. Id. at 176.
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standard would entrench and fix by law the significant genderbased disparity in athletics opportunities found by the district
court to exist at Brown." 2°8 Brown ultimately settled the case and

agreed to provide guaranteed levels of funding to women's
gymnastics, fencing, skiing, and water polo.2

9

The terms of the

settlement require Brown to maintain the percentage of female
athletes within 3.5% of men's share of participation. °
The decisions in Brown represent an important step toward a
more sophisticated analysis of the meaning and relevance of difference in discrimination law. The approach taken by the district
court and the First Circuit represents a significant departure from
formal equality in two respects. First, both courts rejected the notion that treating male and female athletes the same, by
accommodating their expressed interests to a similar degree, is
sufficient under equality law."' Second, the courts critically probed
the meaning of sex difference in athletic interest, finding that institutions such as Brown were at least in part responsible
•••
•
212 for
constructing men's and women's relative interests in athletics. In
doing so, they refused to simply attribute the asserted sex differences to nature or to general societal forces, and instead focused
on the ways in which institutions such as Brown shape athletic interest.2 1 3 Taken together, the opinions in the case are a powerful
indictment of a formal equality perspective that accepts the existence of sex difference as a basis for limiting the reach of equality
law.
Other courts have followed the reasoning of the Brown decisions. In a recent opinion, the Fifth Circuit ruled against Louisiana
State University (LSU), rejecting LSU's argument that women are
less interested in participating in sports than men. 4 The court
went so far as to chastise LSU for taking such a position, stating
208. Id. The court concluded that Brown's proposal would have the effect of" 'limiting
required program expansion for the underrepresented sex to the status quo level of relative
interests.'" Id. at 174 (quoting Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 209).
209. Labinger, supra note 173, at 94. Brown had already agreed to continue to fully
fund women's varsity volleyball at the varsity level on the eve of trial in 1994. Id. at 91.
210. Id. at 94. This margin assumes that Brown does not eliminate any women's teams
or add any men's teams without also adding women's teams; otherwise, if Brown alters its
program in any way that would reduce either women's absolute number or relative share of
athletic opportunities, the permissible disparity drops to 2.25%. Id.
211. See Brown, 879 F. Supp. at 206-07, affd in partand rev'd in part, 101 F.3d at 178-79.
212. See id.
213. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 180 (stating that "the tremendous growth in women's participation in sports since Title IX was enacted disproves Brown's argument that women are
less interested in sports for reasons unrelated to lack of opportunity").
214. Pederson v. La. St. Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 878 (5th Cir. 2000).
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that, "advancing this argument is remarkable, since of course fewer
women participate in sports, given the voluminous evidence that
LSU has discriminated against women in refusing to offer them
comparable athletic opportunities to those it offers its male students." 15 While other courts have been less explicit in their
rationales, they have uniformly applied the three-part test in Title
IX challenges to inequality in participation opportunities. 216
In addition to the arguments made by educational institutions
defending their programs from Title IX challenges brought by female athletes, opposition to the three-part test also has come from
male athletes whose teams have been cut, arguing that the test discriminates against males. In such cases, male athletes, as plaintiffs,
have attacked the three-part test using the same theory as that advocated by Brown: that males are more interested in participating
in sports than females and therefore deserve a larger share of athletic opportunities. 7 In this context too, courts have rejected the
relative interest argument, emphasizing the importance of context
to the determination of interest and the role of institutional
2 18
structures in differently situating men and women in athletics.

Like the courts in Brown, courts that have considered reverse discrimination claims by male athletes have rejected a formal
equality approach that would treat the claims of male athletes
(the overrepresented sex) identically to discrimination claims by
female students (the underrepresented sex). 219 Instead, they have
recognized that male athletes overall retain a disproportionately
large share of the institution's athletic opportunities, even if individual male athletes are denied an opportunity to participate in
the sport of their choice. 220
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Neal v. Board of Trustees of the
California State Universities2' is representative of the approach
courts have taken in reverse discrimination claims by male
215. Id.
216. See cases cited supranote 167.
217. See, e.g., Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. St. Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 1999);
Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, Ill. St. Univ., 198 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 1999); Kelley v. Bd. of
Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 270-72 (7th Cir. 1994); Harper v. Bd. of Regents, Ill. St.
Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122-23 (C.D. Ill. 1999); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp.
1000, 1006 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
218. See, e.g., Neal 198 F.3d at 768-69; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 638; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 269,
272; Harper,35 F. Supp. 2d at 1122; Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1004-05.
219. See, e.g., Nea4 198 F.3d at 767-69; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 638; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272;
Harper, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1122; Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1006.
220. See Nea 198 F.3d at 768; Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639; Nea 198 F.3d at 768-70; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 269; Harper,35 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23; Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1004.
221. 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999).
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athletes. 222 In Neal, the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim brought by
male wrestlers whose positions were eliminated when the university
decreased the size of its men's athletic teams, as part of a plan to
comply with Title IX by raising women's disproportionate share of
participation opportunities. 23 Echoing the First Circuit in Brown,
the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim that men's greater interest in
athletics warranted the allocation of a larger percentage of athletic
opportunities to male athletes. 4 Calling Title IX a "dynamic
statute," the court acknowledged the complex, reciprocal
relationship between changing societal expectations and women's
interest in sports:
[W]here society has conditioned women to expect less than
their fair share of the athletic opportunities, women's interest
in participating in sports will not rise to a par with men's
overnight.... Title IX has altered women's preferences, making them more interested in sports, and more likely to
become student athletes.2 5
But the Ninth Circuit did not limit its insight into the social construction of interest to changes in society generally. Instead, the
court, like the courts in Brown, recognized the capacity for institutional practices to contribute to the construction of interest levels
and, in turn, shape the social norms that influence interest and
expectations. The court stated that:
[T]he creation of additional athletic spots for women would
prompt universities to recruit more female athletes, in the
long run shifting women's demand curve for sports
participation. As more women participated, social norms
discouraging women's participation in sports presumably
would be further eroded, prompting additional increases in
women's participation levels.2
The court decisions in this area are consistent with the most recent
official guidance by OCR, which continues to stand by the threepart test. In a 1996 policy clarification, the Office for Civil Rights
expressed its approval of recent court interpretations of the three222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See cases citedsupra note 217.
Nea4 198 F.3d at 765-66.
See id. at 767-69.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 768 n.4.
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part test.22 7 In a letter accompanying the policy clarification from
Norma Cantu, the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, the Department explicitly rejected the charge of critics that the test is a
"quota," explaining that in the context of sex-separate athletic opportunities, any test for equality must look at the numbers of
opportunities available to men compared to the numbers available
to women.22 8 The Policy Clarification essentially adopts the reasoning of the First Circuit in Cohen v. Brown University and reaffirms
the three-part test, while providing a greater level of detail about
how to apply the test than had been provided in the Policy Interpretation.
C. Continuing Controversy Over the Three-Part Test
The uniformity of the courts' and OCR's interpretation of the
standards for measuring discrimination in the allocation of athletic
participation opportunities has resulted in a stable body of law in
this area. To date, the Supreme Court has indicated no interest in
reviewing these standards,2 9 and persistent efforts to amend Title
IX or obtain other congressional action disapproving of the threepart test have been unsuccessful2.
The consistency of interpretive authority in this area, while
reassuring to Title IX supporters, has not quieted the ongoing
attacks on Title

IX which derive from arguments

that the

227. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Clarification of Intercollegiate
Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test, available at http://www.ed.gov/
offices/OCR/clarific.html (Jan. 16, 1996). The Clarification responded to requests for clarification of the three-part test by critics of the test who professed "confusion" about the test's
requirements. See Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long
Road Toward Gender Equity in IntercolegiateAthletics, 3 Duicu J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 51, 69-73
(1996) (describing the background to the Policy Clarification). The real agenda behind the
request was to urge the agency to jettison the existing three-part test for something closer to
the standard advocated by Brown University. Id.
228. Letter from Norma V. Cant6, Assistant Secretary, Office for Civil Rights U.S. Dep't
of Educ. (Jan. 16, 1996), available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/clarific.html
(accompanying the Clarification).
229. See, e.g., Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents of Ill. St. Univ., 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2762 (2000); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997); Kelley v. Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1128 (1995); Roberts v. Colo. St. Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
230. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text (discussing recent efforts of Title IX
opponents to roll back Title IX's legal standards); see also Brake & Catlin, supranote 227, at
69-74 (discussing failed efforts to revise Title IX in Congress).
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three-part test discriminates against men and mandates affirmative
action for women. 23' These critics take measures of existing athletic

interest as their baseline and argue that the three-part test
discriminates against men because it does not similarly
accommodate existing male and female interest levels.232 Their
perspective is that of formal equality: men and women should be
treated the same (with an equal allocation of athletic
opportunities) only to the extent that they are alike (have the same
current level of athletic interest). What the critics fail to
appreciate, however, is that the three-part test as applied by the
courts and OCR is not moored in a formal equality perspective.
The First Circuit, for example, rejected formal equality when it
refused to assume that any difference in men's and women's
athletic interests is independent of the conditions of inequality
that limit women's opportunities in athletics.

233

As the court

explained, those who call the test a "quota" fail to acknowledge the
extent to which universities themselves determine the gender ratio
of their athletic participation.2 3

4

By offering a fixed number of

athletic opportunities separately to male and female athletes, and
then recruiting male and female athletes to fill those slots,
universities predetermine the gender composition of the pool from
which they select their athletes. 235 For this reason, the Brown court
explained, rejecting the three-part test in favor of a standard
modelled on a Title VII qualified labor pool analysis that uses the
share of men and women currently interested in playing sports as a
baseline for setting participation levels, would simply reproduce
existing inequality in opportunities. 236

231. See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 38, at 212; see also supra notes 33-36
(discussing advocacy groups that have mobilized around this issue).
232. See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 38.
233. Cf Rhode, supra note 51, at 1211-12 (stating that "[ilt is not self-evident that proportional representation in all employment sectors is the ultimate ideal." However, such
.questions about the precise degree of sex-role differentiation in the ideal society" can remain open without ignoring the disadvantages that face women).
234. Brown, 101 F.3d at 177.
235. See id; see also Weistart, GenderEquity, supra note 173, at 234 ("[M] ost schools in Division I and Division II create interest in their programs. They do this by recruiting. Their
coaches.., search out appropriate athletic candidates, who are then cajoled, entreated, and
given special considerations solely to induce them to come to school to play sports.").
236. The court explicitly addressed Brown's use of a Title VII analogy to argue for a
more narrowly defined athlete pool than the student body as follows:
[W]hile Title VII "seeks to determine whether gender-neutral job openings have
been filled without regard to gender[,] Title IX ...was designed to address the reality that sports teams, unlike the vast majority of jobs, do have official gender
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The defense of the three-part test adopted by Brown and other
court decisions is on solid ground, both theoretically and doctrinally. However, while rejecting formal equality, the courts have not
yet explicitly articulated the theory of equality that does underlie
the three-part test, nor have they fully explored its implications.
Court decisions adopting the three-part test have not looked beyond the disparities in participation opportunities to more fully
understand the relationship between how sport programs are
structured and the shaping of men's and women's interest in
sport.237 The next section takes a closer look at how institutions
construct sex inequality in sport, with the objective of strengthening the legitimacy of the three-part test and further developing the
theoretical basis for Title IX's departure from formal equality.
III.

UNDERSTANDING TITLE

IX

THROUGH FEMINIST THEORY AND

DEVELOPING A MORE COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF
SEX INEQUALITY IN SPORT

A. ExistingFeminist Legal Scholarship on Women and Sport: The Search
for Equality Beyond Assimilation orAccommodation
In the past two decades, a substantial body of nonlegal scholarship
has developed that analyzes sport from a feminist perspective. 238 This
literature includes historical, sociological, and political analysis of

requirements, and this statute accordingly approaches the concept of discrimination
differently from Title VII."

Accordingly... the Title VII concept of the "qualified pool" has no place in a Title
IX analysis of equal opportunities for male and female athletes because women are
not "qualified" to compete for positions on men's teams, and vice-versa.
Brown, 101 F.3d at 176-77 (citaitons omitted).
237. See cases cited supra note 167.
238. See, e.g., Messner & Sabo, Toward a Feminist Reappraisa, supra note 146, at 1, 2
(discussing historic feminist neglect of sports and relatively recent growth of feminist scholarship in this area). For two excellent recent anthologies of feminist writings on sport, see
generally WOMEN, SPORT, AND CULTURE, supra note 1, and SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER
ORDER, supra note 26. For scholarly textbooks on women in sport, see generally WOMEN
AND SPORT: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (D. Margaret Costa & Sharon R. Guthrie
eds., 1994) and WosMEN IN SPORT: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES (Greta L. Cohen ed., 1993).
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how sport structures and reinforces gender relations. 3 9 Feminist
analysis of sport explores both the contradictions and conflicts that
face female athletes, and how sport constructs and shapes male and
female identities.2 ° The use of sport to "naturalize" sex difference
and perpetuate male dominance is also acknowledged and discussed.
Some feminist analyses of sport struggle with the
question of how or whether women can transform sport from a
male-dominated and socially masculine institution into something
more useful for women. 2 Much of this scholarship exposes the institutional processes though which sport itself becomes gendered.
Feminist legal scholarship, however, has not kept pace with the
contributions made by sports scholars or with the .legal developments under Title IX. Compared to other topical areas, such as
employment discrimination, sexual harassment, reproductive issues, sexual exploitation and violence against women, athletics has
received relatively little attention by feminist legal scholars. Yet,
239.
(1983);

See, e.g.,
K.

SUSAN

MARY

A.

BOUTILIER & LUCINDA SANGIOVANNI,

THE SPORTING WOMAN

CAHN, COMING ON STRONG: GENDER AND SEXUALITY

(1994);

IN TWENTIETH-

supranote 36; HARGREAVES, supranote 1; HELEN
LENSKYJ, OUT OF BOUNDS: WOMEN, SPORT & SEXUALITY (1986); Creedon, supra note 26.
240. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Cole, Resisting the Canon: Feminist Cultural Studies, Sport, and
Technologies of the Body, in WOMEN, SPORT, AND CULTURE, supra note 1, at 5, 6.
241. See, e.g., Lois Bryson, Challenges to Male Hegemony in Sport, in SPORT, MEN, AND THE
GENDER ORDER, supra note 26, at 173, 175-176 (discussing how sport constructs a dominant
masculinity by supporting the ideology of male physical dominance and "inferiorizing the
'other' "); Paul Willis, Women in Sport in Ideology, in WOMEN, SPORT, AND CULTURE supra note
1, at 34, 41-44 (discussing the power of sport more than other social institutions to naturalize gender difference and reinforce the ideology of male superiority because sport is
perceived to be more free and voluntary since it is set apart from the confines of work or
family life).
CENTURY WOMEN'S SPORT

FESTLE,

242. See, e.g., MARIAH BURTON NELSON, ARE WE WINNING YET? How WOMEN ARE
CHANGING SPORTS AND SPORTS ARE CHANGING WOMEN 9 (1991) (discussing the emergence

of a "partnership model" of sport and citing RIANE ENSLER, THE CHALICE AND THE BLADE:
OUR HISTORY, OUR FUTURE (1987) to observe that "[p]ower is understood not as powerover (power as dominance) but as power-to (power as competence)"); Birrell & Richter,
supra note 1, at 221-44 (discussing model of sport played by feminist softball players as
valuing teamwork, skill, inclusiveness, physicality and cooperation); Nancy Theberge, Toward a Feminist Alternative of Sport as a Male Preserve, in WOMEN, SPORT, AND CULTURE, supra
note 1,at 181, 181-92 (proposing the development of sport as a feminist social practice in
which sport is an integrated physical and mental process that gives meaning to women's
experience and enables them to experience their bodies as powerful); David Whitson, The
Embodiment of Gender: Discipline, Domination and Empowerment, in WOMEN, SPORT, AND CULTURE, supra note 1, at 360, 353-71 (discussing the potential for women's empowerment
through "mastery play," the development and self-discovery of skills that women can draw
on when necessary and enjoy for their own sake); Willis, supra note 241, at 44 (urging
women to "offer much more strongly their own version of sports reality which undercuts
altogether the issues of male supremacy and the standards which measure it," by emphasizing a form of activity that is not competitive and that expresses values of human similarity
and individual well-being).
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while it is relatively sparse, existing feminist legal scholarship on
athletics makes important contributions toward an understanding
of women's situation in sport and lays the groundwork for further
analysis of Title IX.
A common theme in feminist legal analysis of sport is an emphasis on the need to equally value women's sport perspectives,
rather than forcing women to adopt men's athletics as the guiding
standard. 42 Professors Catharine MacKinnon and Christine Littleton have both explored this theme and argued for an
interpretation of equality law that accepts and values women's distinct athletic perspectives, rather than simply treating men and
women the same.244 Their writings reflect the influence of different
voice feminism and its approach to varied masculine and feminine
life experiences and values.
Catharine MacKinnon's 1982 essay, Women, Self-Possession, and
Sport in her book, Feminism Unmodified, argues that sport, like other
male-dominated institutions, has been used to construct a dominant male sexuality, and that the role of women in sport has been
limited by the social meaning of being female.4 5 MacKinnon applauds female athleticism for its challenge to dominant notions of
femininity, which force on women a passive vulnerability.246 At the
same time, she recognizes and exposes the socially constructed
conflict facing female athletes in a society where "[f] emininity has
contradicted, [and] masculinity has been consistent with, being
athletic."2 4 MacKinnon observes that when women participate in
sport as athletes, their very assertion of ownership of their bodies
athprovokes hostility by the dominant culture that equates24female
s
leticism with lesbianism and the absence of femininity.
243. I use the term "women's sport perspectives" here to refer to the ways in which
women define, value, and experience sport. It draws from MacKinnon's suggestion that
women have "a contribution of perspective" to make in sport that is distinct, "neither a
sentimentalization of our oppression as women nor an embrace of the model of the oppressor." Catharine MacKinnon, Women, Self-Possession, and Sport (1982), reprinted in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 43, at 123.
244. Christine Littleton, Equality Across Difference: A Place for Rights Discourse, 3 Wis.
WOMEN'S LJ. 189, 208-11 (1987) [hereinafter Littleton, Equality Across Difference]; Christine
A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. Pi-r. L. REv. 1043, 1058-59 (1987)
[hereinafter Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory]; Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual
Equality, supra note 41, at 1312-13; MacKinnon, supra note 243, at 117-24.
245. MacKinnon, supra note 243, at 119.
246. See id. at 121 ("For women, when we have engaged in sport ... it has meant claiming and possessing a physicality that is our own.... This physical self-respect and physical
presence that women can get from sport is antithetical to femininity. It is our bodies as
acting rather than as acted upon.").
247. Id. at 120.
248. Id. at 122.

[VOL. 34:1&2

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

MacKinnon's vision of equality in this context would enable
women to develop and experience their own distinct physicality
through sport. MacKinnon warns against an approach to equality
that forces women to "emulat[e] the existing image of the athlete,
which has been a male image."249 Instead, she urges a feminist transformation of sport which recognizes that women "have a distinctive
contribution to make to sport that is neither a sentimentalization of
our oppression as women nor an embrace of the model of the oppressor." 250

Her analysis

of women

in sport

bears

a strong

resemblance to "different voice" feminism because it acknowledges
and values women's different athletic perspectives. 251 Her analysis in
this context is in some tension with the body of her work generally,
which views the existence of female perspectives critically as inextricably intertwined with and the product of male dominance. 2

249. Id. at 119.
250. Id. at 123.
251. See Note, Cheering on Women and Girls, supra note 146, at 1628 n.l (concluding
that MacKinnon's discussion of women in sport draws as much from different voice feminism as it does from antisubordination or dominance feminism).
252. A dialogue between Catharine MacKinnon and Carol Gilligan, who is often associated with different voice femininism (see generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFRENr VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982)), illustrates the tension between MacKinnon's views on equality for women in sport and her views on women's
subordination generally:
MacKinnon: Power is socially constructed such that ifJake [exemplifying the "male"
voice] simply chooses not to listen to Amy [exemplifying the "female" voice], he
wins; but if Amy simply chooses not to listen to Jake, she loses. In other words, Jake
still wins because that is the system ....
Gilligan: Your definition of power is his definition.
MacKinnon: That is because the society is that way, it operates on his definition, and I
am trying to change it.
Gilligan: To have her definition come in?
MacKinnon: That would be part of it, but more to have a definition that she would articulate that she cannot now, because his foot is on her throat.
Gilligan: She's saying it.
MacKinnon: I know, but she is articulating the feminine. And you are calling it hers.
That's what I find infuriating.
Gilligan: No, I am saying she is articulating a set of values which are very positive.
MacKinnon: Right, and I am saying they are feminine. And calling them hers is infuriating to me because we have never had the power to develop what ours really would be.
Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law--A Conversation, 34
(1985).

BUFF.

L. REV. 11, 74-75
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Although MacKinnon traces women's different perspective in
sports to social inequality, she does not analyze the social circumstances that have constructed men's and women's existing sport
perspectives; her focus instead is on the need to place a higher
value on the sport experiences that women have embraced.2

53

Nor

does she discuss the role that educational institutions-the actors
with primary legal responsibility for discrimination against women
in sports-play in reinforcing and perpetuating different male and
female perspectives on sport. She mentions Title IX only in noting
that she grew up in "pre-Tide IX America," 254 and states that Title
IX has not eliminated the socially constructed conflict between
femininity and athleticism.
Like MacKinnon, Christine Littleton seeks to formulate a vision
of equality for women in sport that allows sufficient room for female athletes to construct their own model of athletics and would
require this model to be equally valued. 56 She calls her approach
"equality as acceptance," and argues that it is preferable to a formal equality, or a "symmetrical" approach that requires equality
257
for women only to the extent that they are already "like" males.
Littleton's approach would require institutions to accept and value
women's perspectives as much as they value culturally-coded male
perspectives, on the theory that "male and female 'differences'
must be costless relative to each other."2 5 Applied to athletics, Littleton interprets equal acceptance to require equal resources for
male and female sports programs, regardless of whether women
choose to compete in the same sports as men, and regardless of
any differences in male and female participation rates. 59 In order
to ensure that women are not disadvantaged due to their asymmetrical position in sport, she suggests that institutions may have to
men's sports,
provide equal support for three types of programs:
2
women's sports and "genuinely co-ed sports.",
253. See MacKinnon, Women, Self-Possession, andSport, supra note 243, at 121-22.
254. Id. at 117.
255. Id. at 122.
256. See Littleton, ReconstructingSexual Equality, supra note 41, at 1296-97; see also Littleton, Equality Across Difference, supra note 244, at 208-11; Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal
Theory, supra note 244, 1058-59 (discussing applications of "equality as acceptance", including in the context of athletics).
257. Littleton, ReconstructingSexual Equality, supra note 41, at 1285.
258. Id. at 1285.
259. Id. at 1312-13; see also Lyn Lemaire, Women and Athletics: Toward a Physicality Perspective, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 122 (1982) (arguing for an approach to athletic equity
that would revalue women's place in athletics rather than forcing women to assimilate
within a male model of athletics).
260. Littleton, Equality andFeminist Legal Theory, supra note 244, at 1058.
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Littleton's project is less concerned with the construction of
sport perspectives as male or female and how institutions participate in constructing masculinity and femininity in sport than it is
with the values placed on these perspectives.261 She takes men's and
women's existing sport preferences as the legal starting point and
requires institutions to equally value them. 62 Once these perspectives become "costless" in relation to one another, she believes that
the gendered boundaries of "male" and "female" experience in
sport will become more fluid, perhaps ultimately decoding the
gender of the experiences themselves, and enabling the develop263
ment of a more varied spectrum of human sport experiences.
Littleton's approach shares the vision of equality expressed by
MacKinnon in this context-a vision that recognizes and values
264
women s distinct sport perspectives.
In athletics, as in other areas of feminist concern, there is a
tension among feminist scholars about how best to respond to
conditions of inequality and the resulting different situations of
men

and

women

in

society.6

Contrary

to

Littleton

and

MacKinnon, Professor Karen Tokarz has taken a position more in
line with formal equality and has argued that women will not
achieve equality in athletics until they compete on the same terms

261. See Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, supra note 41, at 1313. For example, Littleton acknowledges that her framework would "provide little support" for modifying
traditionally male sports, such as football, to accommodate women. Id.
262. That is not to say that the equal acceptance model takes as its starting point the
premise that sex difference in sport is natural or fixed. Littleton explicitly states that she
does not view sex differences as inherent or independent of social interactions. Rather, she
explains, "[a]s social facts, differences are created by the interaction of person with person
or person with institution; they inhere in the relationship, not in the person." Id. at 1297.
Littleton's approach thus allows for the linking of sex difference to institutional practices of
dominance and exclusion, and, in this respect, is consistent with the more structuralist approach taken in this Article. However, the approach advocated here differs in its emphasis
on how institutional practices create, shape, and reinforce-as well as differently valuemale and female perspectives in sport.
263. See id. at 1332-34.
264. Other feminist commentators writing on women in sport also have focused on the
need to redefine sport to better fit with women's experiences. See, e.g., Lemaire, supra note
259, at 134-42 (advocating a "physicality" model of sport for women and focusing on the
value of athletic participation per se, rather than winning or losing, and contrasting this
model with the traditional, combative male model of sport); Olson, supra note 146, at 13746 (criticizing a separate but equal model of athletics that assimilates female athletes into an
athletic program that is modeled on men's competitive athletics, and arguing that there
must be room for women to develop their own model of sport).
265. See, e.g., CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 47-53; see also Littleton, ReconstructingSexual
Equality, supranote 41, at 1292-1301 (summarizing feminist debates over symmetrical versus
asymmetrical models of equality).
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as men. 26 Tokarz criticizes the sex-segregation of athletics as
inconsistent with the norms of equality law, and questions the
legitimacy of any interpretation of discrimination law that
measures equality from the starting point of sex-separation. 67 She
argues that sex segregation in athletics, much like "separate but
equal" in the context of race, is inherently unequal because its
major premise is the inferiority of female athletes as a class.268 She
contends that the harm of sex-segregation in athletics is twofold:
female athletes are stigmatized as second-class athletes and, at the
same time, sex-segregation reinforces the exclusivity
of the male
2 69
role in sports as aggressive, violent, and combative.
Tokarz's proposal for responding to women's inequality is to
eliminate forced sex-segregation in athletics, substituting sexneutral criteria for sports participation, such as competitive skill
and ability, height, weight, or strength.2 0 Recognizing that the shift
to sex-neutral rules could, at least in the short term, reduce the
participation and competitive success of female athletes overall,
she would allow for some all-female teams as a form of permissible
affirmative action, but limit the discrimination principle to mandating coeducational, merit-based teams.271 Her proposal thus
would mean that all-female teams could exist as a form of affirmative action for an unspecified period of time, but all other athletic
programs would have to be open to both sexes on identical
terms.272
The differences in the approaches taken by Littleton, MacKinnon, and Tokarz reflect ongoing debates within the feminist legal
community about how equality law should respond to sex inequality and the asymmetrical positions of women and men in society.
Each of these scholars offers important insights into the problem
of sex inequality in sport and the implications for Title IX analysis.
Littleton and MacKinnon appropriately recognize that any meaningful interpretation of equality must account for women's distinct
relationship to sport. Treating men and women under a single
standard, for example, by limiting Title IX to a requirement that
athletic teams be equally open to both sexes, or equally accommo-

266. Karen L. Tokarz, SeparateBut UnequalEducationalSports Programs:The Need for a New
Theory ofEquality, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 201, 206 (1985).
267. See id. at 232-33.
268. Id. at 232.
269. Id. at 239-40.
270. Id. at 244.
271. See id. at 206, 244-45.
272. Id. at 244-45.
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dating men's and women's relative interest in sports, could further
marginalize women in sports by fostering the ideology that sports
participation should be determined by sex-blind standards. Such a
result would serve to naturalize current sex inequality in sport.
Moreover, it would force women to conform to a model of sport
that they have not chosen, denying them the space and resources
to develop their own, distinctive athletic identities and experiences.
Tokarz's approach, while vulnerable to Littleton's and MacKinnon's criticisms of an equality model that would force women to
assimilate into structures and institutions designed by and for men,
nevertheless raises an important concern: how to disarm the cul2 73
tural identification of sports as "quintessentially masculine."
Tokarz's proposal reflects her concern that the organization of
sports by sex perpetuates dichotomous and unequal gender roles
by protecting the masculinity of sport while relegating female athleticism to the sidelines. 74
In the final analysis, neither equal acceptance nor equal treatment through sex-blind standards sufficiently challenges the layers
of institutional structures that continue to construct sex inequality
in sport. What is missing is a critical analysis of the construction of
men's and women's relationship to sport and the inequality that
results from it. Equal acceptance of women's athletic choices will
not eradicate sex inequality in sport as long as institutions continue to shape and structure those choices. 275 The contention that
the gender-coding of men's and women's sport experiences will
cease to disadvantage women once those different experiences are
rendered "costless" is appealing, but ultimately unpersuasive.276
273. Id. at 202.
274. See id. at 232-33, 239-40. Tokarz would allow for the existence of separate
women's teams to compensate for women's lower level of sports participation, but would do
so under the guise of voluntary affirmative action. Id. at 244-45. The approach advocated in
this Article differs in that it analyzes the structuring of athletic programs, not limited to the
provision of sex-separate programs, under a discrimination analysis. As discussed infra in
Section III.B-C, I view the sex-segregation of athletic teams not as inherently stigmatizing to
women, but as dependent on the context. My analysis focuses on the broader ways in which
institutions use sex and gender to organize and construct their athletics programs beyond
the sex segregation of teams.
275. Littleton's "equality as acceptance" would challenge the overvaluation of what is
"male" without distinguishing between the role of society at large and that of specific institutions (such as employers) in coding the perspective at issue as "male." Littleton,
ReconstructingSexual Equality, supranote 41, at 1312. In contrast, the approach taken in this
Article emphasizes how the institutions covered under discrimination laws have contributed
to the gender-coding at issue, and argues for greater institutional accountability under the
law.
276. See id. at 1333-34.
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Equally valuing men's and women's sports by requiring parity in
concrete measures of support (such as the funding provided to
athletic programs) will not put an end to less tangible inequalities
in the social and cultural values placed on male and. female ath27
letic experiencesY.
Although rendering male and female
perspectives "costless" may, in theory, go a long way toward eliminating the forces that direct men and women toward different
sport choices, those choices will never be costless in noneconomic
terms as long as institutions continue to shape and define sport
itself as fundamentally male.
The approach advocated in this Article would embrace equality
as acceptance by equally valuing women's athletic experiences, but
at the same time, would challenge the construction of what is
"masculine" and "feminine" in sport. The equal valuation of
women's athletic experiences and the interruption of the institutional practices that construct masculine and feminine sport
practices are complementary strategies. The construction of sport
as masculine, and the corresponding devaluation of the feminine
in sport, are reinforcing and interrelated mechanisms for preserving male dominance in sports. A legally adequate response to
these mechanisms must focus more sharply on how institutions
both construct and value male and female sport experiences. This
approach requires a more complete analysis of how institutions
participate in the construction and valuation of masculinity and
femininity in sport beyond that recognized by the courts.
B. The Need for a CriticalAnalysis of How Schools Construct Male and
Female Athletic Interests and Experiences
The relationship between institutional practices and the extent
and nature of women's athletic interest and experience is
complex. It includes, but goes well beyond, the sheer number and
proportion of the athletic participation opportunities provided to
women-a connection appropriately recognized by the district
court and the First Circuit in the Brown litigation.278 Educational
institutions discourage and impede the full participation of women
in sport in a myriad of ways. The treatment of athletes, the
277. For example, I do not think that the different social status of male football players
and female field hockey players would be equalized by providing equal financial and tangible support.for both teams.
278. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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allocation of resources, publicity and promotion, the treatment of
women's coaches, the gender composition of the athletic
administration, and the culture of the athletic program as a whole
fundamentally influence both the ability of women to participate
meaningfully in athletics and how they choose to participate. 79
Rather than focusing exclusively on early socialization or societal
discrimination as immutable factors in shaping women's athletic
interest, legal analysis of sex inequality in sport should analyze and
expose the role that institutions play in the construction of
women's athletic interest and experience. Through this process of
"unpacking women's choices," we can better understand the
constraints that shape these choices. 80
The work of Professor Vicki Schultz in analyzing the interplay
between employment structures and women's job aspirations has
important implications for understanding how educational institutions affect women's athletic interests and sport identities.28 '
Schultz's critique challenges the typical assumption made by courts
that women's job preferences are formed independent of the
structures and cultures of the workplace. 2 She criticizes courts
which have found in Tide VII cases that work interests are either
natural or stem from early socialization, rather than understanding
such work interests to reflect institutional practices.282 According to
Schultz, many Title VII courts, including the court in EEOC v.
Sears,284 have wrongly attributed women's lower level of participation in nontraditional jobs to a lower level of interest among
women in holding such jobs.2

5

Even those more liberal judges who

suspect that women's underrepresentation in nontraditional jobs is
not the result of a lack of interest limit their discrimination analysis
to scrutiny of employer policies and practices that exclude women
from these jobs.2 86 Like more conservative courts, these more liberal judges share the view that women's interests in non-traditional

279. See discussion infra.
280. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 20-21 (using this term to describe the feminist
"move" in which feminist scholars investigate the constraints under which women make
choices); see also discussion supraPart II (discussing structuralist influence on the analysis of
women's choices in feminist legal scholarship).
281. SeeSchultz, supra note 64, at 1824-39.
282. Id. at 1750.
283. Id.
284. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
285. Schultz, supra note 64, at 1754. Professor Schultz states that about half the courts
to date that have considered the lack of interest argument have accepted it as ajustification
for women's disadvantaged position in the workplace. Id.
286. Schultz, supra note 64, at 1790.
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jobs are preexistent and independent of the labor market. 8 7 This
stance forces courts to deny the existence of gender difference in
worker interest in order to find sex discrimination in a sexsegregated workplace, and enables discrimination law to effectively
reach only formal barriers that deny women access to nontraditional work opportunities.2 s
Rather than viewing worker preferences as fixed and autonomous, Schultz argues that women's work interests reflect and
respond to the structures and cultures of the workplace. 89 She cites
extensive sociological literature demonstrating that, although sexrole socialization does influence job aspirations early in life,
women can and do change their job preferences in response to
work experiences and opportunities. 29° In particular, women's interest in nontraditional work typically develops only after
opportunities become available. 9 1 Women workers, like other persons, tend to respond realistically to their options. Thus, she
argues, Tite VII should hold institutions accountable for their role
in shaping the disparate levels of interest among men and women,
rather than simply allow institutionally-shaped preferences
to jus3
tify further discrimination against women at work.2
Schultz's analysis has great relevance to Title IX's approach to
ensuring equal participation opportunities for men and women in
sport. Institutional practices that shape men's and women's
preferences in sport should be considered in any assessment of
Title IX's test for discrimination in the allocation of athletic
participation opportunities. As the court in Brown recognized,
allowing institutions to justify the allocation of fewer opportunities
to female athletes on the grounds that girls and women are less
interested in sport would enable them to justify an unequal
allocation of opportunities 94based on their own practices that have
suppressed female interest.2

The Brown courts' recognition of the circularity of such an approach and the need to scrutinize closely institutional practices
that construct interest represents a structuralist analysis. This
analysis finds support in the work of feminist legal theorists such as
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 1787.
Id. at 1792.
Id. at 1840-41.
Id. at 1818.
Id. at 1823.
Id. at 1825.
Id. at 1841-42.
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 176 (lst Cir. 1996).
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Schultz who recognize and explore the dynamic connections between institutional structures and individual choice. It also finds
support in the Supreme Court's recognition in Dothard v. Rawlinsonms that the failure to account for the effect of institutional
structures in a discrimination challenge makes for an incomplete
analysis.2 6 However, the court's analysis in Brown exhibited a
deeper understanding of the relationship between institutional
structures and male and female interest levels than that reflected
in the Supreme Court's opinion in Dothard. Dothard'sstructuralism
was limited to the fairly obvious recognition that the existence of
readily apparent height and weight requirements would distort the
composition of the applicant pool, making it an inadequate reference point from which to measure the impact of the requirements
on men and women.297 Brown's more sophisticated approach
looked at the disproportionately low number of opportunities allocated to female athletes and acknowledged its effect on
suppressing women's interest in sport.298
One reason that Tide IX courts have been better able than
many Title VII courts to discern the connections between women's
interests and the institutional structures that shape them is that
athletic opportunities are facially sex-segregated in the first instance.2 . Because athletic opportunities are offered separately for
male and female students, it has been easier for Title IX courts to
see how the disparate allocation of opportunities between men
and women affects their respective levels of interest. In contrast,
when the lack of interest argument has arisen in the workplace,
there typically has not been a facial classification that has provided
a ready explanation for how institutional practices may have shaped
men's and women's interest levels.3 0 ' However, the existence or
295. 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977).
296. See discussion supra Part I.B.
297. See Dothard,433 U.S. at 330.
298. See supranotes 198-206 and accompanying text.
299. See Dana Robinson, A League of Their Own: Do Women Want Sex-Segregated Sports , 9 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 321, 351 (1998) (noting that completely coed sports, such as chess,
sailing, and pool, are a rarity in our culture, and that schools and colleges offer few, if any,
of such sports).
300. Cf Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 332-34 (1997) (arguing that it has been easier for the Supreme
Court to attribute the disadvantaged status of women and minorities to discrimination in
contexts where the use of a suspect criteria is overt, such as segregation, affirmative action,
and redistricting cases).
301. See discussion of Sears case supra Part I.B; see also City of Richmond v. JA Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499, 510 (1989) (suggesting that there is no reason to expect that a nondiscriminatory setting would produce proportional numbers of white and black contractors,
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nonexistence of a facial classification is not instrumental to the structuralist's understanding of the effect that limited opportunity
structures have in shaping and suppressing women's interests.
Women's opportunities can be limited in innumerable ways even
without a facial classification that makes the limitation so readily
visible. A structuralist analysis of how institutions shape the interests and experiences of those who operate within them should not
be limited to an examination of those structures that facially classify based on sex.
In fact, as discussed below, disparities in the number of sport
opportunities assigned to male and female athletes are only the
most apparent evidence of the institutional construction of male
and female sport preferences. °2 The courts' analysis in Brown falls
far short of capturing the full extent to which institutions shape
and suppress female interest in athletics. The processes that create
and reproduce women's inequality in sport are intricate and complex, and they lie deep within the structures of interscholastic and
intercollegiate athletic programs. Once again, Schultz's work in
the employment context is helpful in explaining the relationship
between athletic interest and institutional practices. Schultz identifies two interdynamic structural features of work that discourage
women from pursuing nontraditional work and construct work
and workers along gendered lines. First, she notes that limitations
on the rewards and mobility available for female employees result
in lowered expectations in response to blocked opportunities.0 3
Second, she points to the male-dominant workplace cultures in
traditionally male jobs, including harassment, that signal to women
that they are unwelcome and encourage a "proprietary"
interest on
0 4
the part of men in retaining these jobs for themselves.
Both of these processes are at work within interscholastic and
intercollegiate athletic programs. First, through the disproportionate allocation of athletic opportunities, as well as the unequal
valuation of men's and women's sporting experiences, educational institutions provide opportunities to male and female
and invalidating Richmond's affirmative action plan on the ground that no inference of
past discrimination by the City may be drawn from the underrepresentation of minorities in
the construction industry in Richmond); Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County,
480 U.S. 616, 668 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a lack of interest on the
part of women in holding construction jobs is the likely cause of women's underrepresentation in such jobs, and accordingly, disagreeing with the majority ruling upholding a city
affirmative action plan to remedy women's underrepresentation in such jobs).
302. See infra III.C-D.
303. Schultz, supra note 64, at 1827.
304. Id. at 1832.
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athletes that are very different in quantity and quality. 305 Second,
schools, colleges, and universities engage in a number of practices
that perpetuate a male culture in sport, signaling to young men
and women that sport is masculine and potentially hostile to female athletes. 3 6 Much as employers perpetuate a culture of
maleness in male-dominated jobs and foster men's feelings of entitlement to certain jobs, school athletic programs instill in male
athletes a sense of entitlement to their programs. The connections
between the structures and cultures of school athletic programs
and the relationship of male and female students to sport deserve
further exploration in order to fully appreciate the theory underlying Title IX.
C. Opportunity Structures and the Construction
of Sex Inequality in Sport

Sociologists who study the workplace have long maintained that
workers shape their interests and aspirations in response to the
opportunity structures available to them.s 7 Economists who study
preference-formation also have found that individuals shape their
preferences in accord with the set of opportunities they actually
have. 308 Not surprisingly, in light of this research, male and female
students also appear to adapt their athletic interests and preferences in response to existing opportunity structures."
305. See infra Part III.C.
306. See infra Part III.D.
307. See Schultz, supra note 64, at 1824-32 (citing extensive sociological literature
demonstrating that workplace structures, including the allocation of rewards, affect worker
aspirations).
308. NUSSBAUM, supra note 46, at 151-52 (discussing economic literature of preference-deformation and its interaction with opportunity structures).
309. See, e.g., Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 526 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (discussing
evidence that the number of students who are interested in competing in intercollegiate
athletics is not independent of the money devoted to scholarships, advertising, promotion,
and sports information activities); Bloom, supra note 149, at 12 (citing United States Commission on Civil Rights' statement in 1980 that the "'relatively less money allocated [to]
women's programs' may limit the number of female athletes and 'discourage' participation"); Weistart, Gender Equity, supranote 173, at 227 (discussing the "sobering" experience
of a private school in North Carolina that made a commitment to fund and find competition for any group of students interested in forming an interscholastic team and observing
that, "For the last several years, 80 percent of the girls, as well as a similar percentage of the
boys, have chosen to participate in interscholastic sports"); White, supra note 22 (quoting
the response of Florida's director of the education department's equal educational opportunity program to administrators who claim that girls are not interested in playing more
sports: "If you add a team with a good, enthusiastic coach, good facilities, and good public-
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The courts in Cohen v. Brown implicitly recognized the relationship between interest and opportunity when they rejected Brown's
assertion that men are more interested in sports participation than
women, independent of the opportunities provided by Brown. 30
The core insight in these decisions remains relevant today. Despite
steady increases in women's athletic participation, men still retain
about sixty percent of intercollegiate athletic opportunities nationwide.3 1 1 But the numbers of opportunities alone do not begin
to capture the extent to which opportunity structures and rewards
differently situate men and women in sports.3 1 ' As detailed below,

educational institutions continue to provide vastly different resources, benefits, and treatment to their male and female athletes.
Despite progress since Title IX's enactment, movement toward
equality in the resources, benefits, and opportunities provided to
male and female athletes has proceeded slowly.

313

A study by the

Chronicle of Higher Education of athletics expenditures for 1995-96
found that twenty-five years after Title IX was enacted, NCAA Division I schools awarded only thirty-eight percent of athletic
scholarship dollars to women.314 In 1997, to mark the twenty-fifth
anniversary of Title IX, the National Women's Law Center filed
complaints with the Office for Civil Rights against twenty-five colleges and universities for sex discrimination in awarding athletic
315
scholarships. The complaints were resolved two and a half years
ity, [and] if you show that you really mean business, girls will come out ....

We looked all

over the state, and we never found a school that did all of that and still had problems with
turnout.").
310. See discussion supraPart II.B.
311. See Facts & Figures: Gender Equity: Participation,CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., at http://
chronicle.com/stats/genderequity/participation-search.php3 (last visited June 28, 2000)

(on file with the University of MichiganJournalofLaw Reform) (reporting 1998-99 NCAA data
showing that women's share of intercollegiate athletic participation as: 42% in Division I;
38.4% in Division II; and 40.6% in Division III).

312.

Cf

IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE

26 (1990).

Young argues that:
We may mislead ourselves by the fact that in ordinary language we talk about some
people having 'fewer' opportunities than others .... Opportunity is a concept of enablement rather than possession; it refers to doing more than having. A person has
opportunities if he or she is not constrained from doing things, and lives under the
enabling conditions for doing them.

Id.
313.

Ful'

Jim Naughton, Women in DivisionI Sports Programs: 'The Glass Is Half-Empty and Half-

CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 11, 1997, at A39.

314. Id.
315. Jim Naughton, Advocacy Group Charges 25 Colleges with Violating Title X
HIGHER EDuc.,June 13, 1997, at A39.

CHRON.
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later: eight institutions were found to be in compliance, while the
other seventeen
schools agreed to provide more scholarship aid to
.1•
316
female athletes. More recent reports indicate that female athletes
at some institutions continue to receive a lower share of athletic
scholarships than their share of athletic participation, indicating that
some institutions continue to violate Title IX's scholarship requirements.3 1 7 Given that Title IX's test for compliance in the area of

athletic scholarships is quite lenient, requiring only that women's
share of scholarships match women's already low participation
rates, most institutions probably comply with Tide IX in this
area. However, because women still have substantially fewer opportunities to play sports at the college level, female athletes receive
only forty-two percent of the athletic scholarships awarded to college students. 3 9 A 1997 study by the NCAA found that the athletic
scholarship gap between men and women translates into $142 million less each year for female athletes. °
Intercollegiate athletic recruitment and operating budget expenditures in intercollegiate athletics also greatly favor male
athletes. In 1998-1999, NCAA Division I institutions spent nearly
twice as much recruiting male than female athletes. 2 ' Recruiters

for women's sports at Divisions II and III fared no better than their
Division I counterparts; in all three divisions, women's sports re-

316.

Sidelines: Education Dept. Resolves Last of 25 Bias Complaints Filed by Women's Group,
21, 2000, at A49.
317. Athletics Scholarships: Proportions for Female Athletes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., at
http://chronicle.com/stats/genderequity/scholarship-search.php3 (last visited June 28,
2000) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) (reporting serious inequities at some institutions where female athletes still receive a lower share of athletic
scholarships than their participation levels warrant).
318. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) (1999) (requiring "reasonable opportunities" for athletic
scholarships for male and female athletes that are proportionate to the numbers of men
and women who participate in intercollegiate athletics at that institution). Because the
scholarship test is tied to athletic participation, which remains disproportionatetly male, it
authorizes colleges to award less scholarship assistance to female athletes than male athletes
if women on campus have a lower share of athletic participation. The regulation may, however, permit institutions to spend more resources on athletic scholarships for female
athletes as a means to increase their disproportionately lower rate of athletic participation.
See Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989,995,998 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
319.
Facts & Figures: Gender Equity: Athletic Scholarships: Proportionsfor Female Athletes,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,Jan.

CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., at http://chronicle.com/stats/genderequity/participation

(last

visitedJune 28, 2000) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform); see also
Welch Suggs, Uneven Progressfor Women's Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 7, 2000, at A52,
available at http://chronicle.com/free/v46/:31/31aO5201.html [hereinafter Suggs, Uneven
Progress].
320. Heckman, supra note 148, at 417 n.129 (citing 1997 NCAA Gender Equity Study).
321. Suggs, Uneven Progress, supra note 319.
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ceive only one-third of total funds spent to recruit new athletes. 2
The same was true for operating expenses in 1998-99: Division I
schools spent only 32.8% of their athletic operating budgets on
women's sports, spending more than twice as much money on operating expenses for men's sports.323 Divisions II and III spent a
relatively larger share of their athletic budgets on female athletes,
but still only awarded them forty percent of the total funds available for operating budgets.

324

Moreover, rather than spending all

newly available funds to narrow this gap, colleges and universities
have continued to pour vast new sums of money into their men's
athletic programs. From 1992-1997, overall operating expenditures for women's intercollegiate athletics grew 89%, compared to25
a 139% increase in spending for men's intercollegiate athletics.
With less
money for women's sports come fewer benefits and lower
3 26
status.

Elementary and secondary schools, like colleges and universities, also provide very different opportunity structures to male and
female athletes. As institutions accountable under Title IX for providing nondiscriminatory participation opportunities, their role in
constructing male and female interest in sport also deserves scrutiny.
The extent of discrimination in school sports at the high school
level and below is more difficult to assess, in part because the disclosure requirements of the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act and
the NCAA only apply to post-secondary institutions.32' All indica-

tions are, however, that these programs exhibit disparities in the

322.

Welch Suggs, At Smaller Colleges, Women Get Bigger Share of Sports Funds, CHRON.

Apr. 14, 2000, at A69, available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v46/
i32/32a06901.html [hereinafter Suggs, At Smaller Colleges].
HIGHER EDUC.,

323.
324.

325.
326.

Suggs, Uneven Progress, supranote 319.
Suggs, At Smaller Colleges, supranote 322.
25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supranote 22.
See, e.g., Andrew Zimbalist, Backlash Against Title IX. An End Run Around Female Ath-

letes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 3, 2000, at B9 ("Female athletes still play in inferior
facilities, stay in lower-caliber hotels on the road, eat in cheaper restaurants, benefit from
smaller promotional budgets, and have fewer assistant coaches."). For an interesting case
study comparing the treatment of men's and women's basketball programs at one university, see B. Glenn George, Miles To Go and Promises to Keep: A Case Study in Title IX, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 555, 562-67 (1993) (identifying inequalities in resources spent on women's
and men's basketball teams at the University of Colorado in training, equipment, and recruiting budgets, and on coaches' salaries).
327. Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 103-382 § 360(B), 108 Stat. 3969,
3969-71 (1994).
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opportunities provided to male and female athletes similar to
those that exist at the post-secondary level 8
Recent years have seen a surge in Title IX litigation at the elementary and secondary levels involving sex discrimination against
female athletes.5 Such challenges have questioned disparities in
the scheduling of game and practice times, coaching, equipment,
facilities, uniforms, publicity and promotions, and allocation of
participation opportunities.3 3 0 Female high school students and
their parents also have brought Title IX claims against state high
school athletic associations for adopting rules and procedures that
deny equal sport opportunities to female athletes statewide.3
328. See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 239, at 260 (citing evidence that high school girls receive inferior facilities, uniforms, practice schedules, and promotional support).
329. See Karen Diegmueller, Inequities in Girls' Sports Programsin Nebraska Alleged, EDUC.
WEEK ON WEB, Apr. 19. 1995, at http://www.edweek.org/ew/vol-14/30title.hl4 (on file
with the University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform) (reporting on lawsuits filed against four
Nebraska school districts alleging discrimination against female athletes in participation
opportunities, equipment, supplies, uniforms, scheduling, travel, coaching, per diems,
locker rooms, cheerleading, band performances, and publicity); see also White, supra note
22 (discussing OCR compliant alleging dangerous conditions on girls' softball practice field
and inequality with boys' teams).
330. See, e.g., Daniels v. School Bd., 985 F. Supp. 1458, 1460-62 (M.D. Fla. 1997)
(finding parents of female high school softball players are entitled to a preliminary
injunction where school had a state-of-the-art boys' baseball facility and an inferior girls'
softball field), and 995 F. Supp. 1394, 1397-98 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (rejecting school district's
plan for compliance and entering preliminary injunction, pending resolution of additional
cases charging district with similar disparities in other district schools); see also Diane Heckman, Title IX's 25th Anniversary: Sex Discriminationin the Gym and Classroom, 21 NOVA L. REV.
545, 587 (1997) (discussing four Tide IX lawsuits brought on behalf of female athletes
against school districts in Nebraska); Ray Yasser & Samuel J. Schiller, Gender Equity in InterscholasticSports: A Case Study, 33 TULSA L.J. 273, 286 (1997) (discussing lawsuit and resulting
consent decree in Title IX lawsuit on behalf of parents of high school and middle school
female students in Owasso, Oklahoma).
331. E.g., Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir. 1994)
(upholding, against a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs' claim that the KHSAA discriminated
against girls by refusing to sanction fast-pitch softball), appeal after remand, 206 F.3d 685, 696
(6th Cir. 2000) (upholding grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs after association
changed its rules and sanctioned fast-pitch softball for girls); Communities for Equity v.
Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 80 F. Supp. 2d 729, 731, 733, 743-44 (W.D. Mich. 2000)
(holding state association subject to Tide IX because it exercises controlling authority over
federally funded high schools' athletic programs, and denying summary judgment in case
alleging discrimination in the allocation of participation opportunities, scheduling of
games and sports seasons, provision of athletic facilities, and allocation of resources); Alston
v. Va. High Sch. League, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 220, 222-24 (W.D. Va. 1997) (denying motion to
dismiss plaintiffs' claim for discrimination in the scheduling of boys' and girls' sport seasons), motion for class certification denied, 184 F.R.D. 574, 576 (W.D. Va. 1999); Ridgeway v.
Mont. High Sch. Ass'n, 633 F. Supp. 1564 (D. Mont. 1986) (finding that the MHSA discriminated in provision of sports opportunities to female athletes, but refusing to require
alignment of girls' basketball and volleyball seasons to correspond to normal college recruiting seasons). Although the Supreme Court recently ruled that an athletic association is
not subject to Title IX merely because its member schools receive federal funds, it did not
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Studies of gender equity in high school sports continue to find
significant disparities in the benefits and status afforded male and
female athletes. One particularly thorough investigation of gender
equity in Georgia high schools was undertaken recently by the
33
This series of articles, published in
Atlanta Journal-Constitution.

December 1999, concluded that, "gender equity still is not the
standard in most Georgia High Schools. Not even close."3 3 The
report identified major discrepancies in such areas as the opportunity to play interscholastic sports, the provision of coaching for
boys' and girls' teams, the scheduling of games and practices, and
the competitive and practice facilities provided.334 In addition, the
investigation found significant differences in the level of participation among male and female athletes: sixty-four percent of boys
play competitive sports, compared to thirty-six percent of girls.335
The disparity is all the more striking because these figures included cheerleading as a girls' sport, a practice not endorsed by
OCR. 33 The series prompted the Georgia legislature to pass new

legislation authorizing a state enforcement agency to take an active
role in monitoring gender equity in interscholastic sports in Georgia.337
Studies in other states have found similar inequities. A 1994
study of gender equity in athletics in Iowa high schools found that
the average operating expenditure for girls' sports was sixty-five
percent of what the boys received. 33 A 1992 study of gender equity

in interscholastic sports in Minnesota found that "the data does
make unequivocally clear that athletic programs for boys and girls
are not equal. There are more, and more varied sports offerings

rule out the possibility that such an association could be subjected to Title IX if it exercised
control over the education activities of its federally funded member schools. See NCAA v.
Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 469-70 (1999).
332. Mike Fish & David A. Milliron, Georgia High School Sports: Girls Still Come in Second,
ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., Dec. 12, 1999, at 1A, available at http://www.accessatlanta.com/
partners/ajc/report/genderequity/dayl/index.hunl.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Mike Fish & David A. Milliron, Hollow Cheers, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 18, 1999,
at DI, available at http://www.accessatlanta.com/partners/ajc/reports/genderequity/
day7/index.html.
337. See Mike Fish & David A. Millron, EqualPlay for Georgia Girls: New Law Puts Teeth in
Title IX Rules that Schools Provide Equal Opportunityfor Female Athletes, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr.
29, 2000, at IA.
338. Jeff Oliphant, Iowa High Schools Athletic Gender-Equity Study Summary of Results, University of Iowa (June 1995), at http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/iowastudy/iowahs.html
(on file with the University ofMichiganJournalof Law Reform).
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for boys, more money spent on boys 3athletics,
and more money
39
spent per participant for boys athletics.

One widespread and well-documented disparity in male and female athletic programs at all levels of education is the amount of
money spent on coaching male versus female sports. Data from the
intercollegiate level show that salaries for coaches of male sports
tend to be substantially higher than the salaries for coaches of female sports.3 40 A report by the Chronicle of Higher Education for
1998-1999 showed that in NCAA Division I athletic programs, universities spent nearly twice as much on salaries for coaches of their
men's teams than they did for their women's teams.341 In 1998-99,
the average Division I men's coach earned twice as much as the
average Division I women's coach . Similar disparities were found
in the less competitive college athletic programs. Women's
coaches received only thirty-two percent of the budget for coaching salaries at Division II schools, and forty percent of the salary
budget in Division III.

343

The lower valuation of coaches of female

teams cuts across a wide range of sports. A 1997 Gender Equity
study by the NCAA found substantial disparities in men's and
women's coaching salaries in basketball ($99,283 to $60,603), ice
hockey ($64,214 to $25,478), lacrosse ($35,745 to $26,871), rowing
($30,838 to $22,623), soccer ($32,275 to $27,791), and squash
($45,547 to $22,200).'
There are also substantial disparities in coaching salaries for
male and female teams at the high school level. In Georgia, for
339. Laurie Priest & Liane M. Summerfield, PromotingGender Equity in Middle and Secondary School Sports Programs, ED367660 ERIC DIG., Apr. 1994, at 1, 3, available at
http://www.ed.gov/databases/ERICDigests/ed367660.html (quoting R.A. Dildine, A Report to the Minnesota Legislature Concerning Interscholastic Athletic Equity in Minnesota High
Schools (1992)).
340. See SALTER, supra note 16, at 91 (noting that, in addition to salary disparities, few
women's basketball coaches have written, multi-year contracts, unlike their male counterparts coaching men's basketball); Coaches: Salariesfor Division I-A Men's and Women's Coaches
(1996-1997), University of Iowa, at http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/statistics.htm#Salary
Index (last visited May 25, 2000) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) (stating that the median personnel expenditure for women's Division I-A athletics was
less than half of the amount spent on Division I-A football alone).
341. Suggs, Uneven Progress, supra note 319. This amount refers only to base salaries,
and not the total compensation packages for men's coaches, which can exceed the base
salary many times over. See Zimbalist, supra note 326 ("Although the base salaries for men's
coaches-to which women's coaches' salaries are compared-are normally in the range of
$125,000 to $200,000, total compensation packages for men's coaches on the leading teams
routinely reach from $700,000 to $1.4 million.").
342. Suggs, Uneven Progress, supranote 319.
343. Suggs, At Smaller Colleges, supranote 322.
344. Heckman, supranote 148, at 417 n.130.
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example, in 1998, boys' teams received $16.4 million of the
$22 million spent on high school coaches' salaries, seventy-five
percent of the state's salary supplements for coaches, and ninetyfive percent of the state's extended pay supplements for coaches,
leaving coaches of girls' teams with only $5.6 million of the overall
$22 million, twenty-five percent of the state's salary supplements,
and five percent of the state's extended pay supplements for
coaches. 3 45 Not surprisingly, boys' sports in Georgia schools have a
higher coach-athlete ratio than girls' sports. 46
All in all, the widespread disparities in the treatment of male
and female athletic programs at all levels of education situate men
and women (and boys and girls) very differently with respect to the
incentives and messages surrounding their participation in sports.
The different opportunity structures provided to male and female
athletes influence athletic interests, while at the same time they
347
shape the culture of sport and its relation to gender. These opportunity structures construct sport as a realm of male privilege
where male athletes are more highly valued than female athletes.
The message conveyed by disparities in the treatment and benefits
provided to male and female athletes is unmistakable: women's
athletics may be gaining increasing attention and support, but
men's sports still take center stage.348 As one court explained, in
addressing gender disparities in high school's boys' baseball and
girls' softball facilities:
As with all the differences the Court addresses in this Order,
the fact that the boys have a scoreboard and the girls do not
sends a clear message to the players, fellow students, teachers
and the community at large, that girls' varsity softball is not as
worthy as boys' varsity baseball.4
The persistence of inequality in the sport opportunities available
to male and female athletes reinforces notions of male entitlement
and sex difference that further marginalize attempts to reallocate
345.
346.
347.

Fish & Milliron, supranote 332.
See id.
Cf ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN'S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES 8 (1990) ("The wage frames gendered messages; it encourages or inhibits
certain forms of behavior; it can reveal a system of meaning that shapes the expectations of
men and women and anticipates their struggles over power.").
348. See, e.g., George, supra note 326, at 562 (stating that the disparities in the University of Colorado's treatment of its male and female basketball teams "convey a message
about the importance of the women's program and the students' contributions to this institution," a message that is "widely understood as a statement of priorities").
349. Daniels v. School Bd., 985 F. Supp. 1458, 1461 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
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these opportunities more equitably.35 As a result, disparities in
treatment and support, much like disparities in the number of athletic opportunities, contribute to the construction of interest in
sport in a way that is not gender-neutral. In addition, these opportunity structures contribute to a culture in which sport-at least
highly valued sport-is defined as male. It is to that broader culture, and the role that institutions play in shaping that culture, that
I now turn.
D. Sport Cultureand the Masculinization of Sport

The discussion so far has focused on how institutions allocate
opportunities and resources between male and female athletesthe numbers of sport opportunities and the benefits and rewards
provided to male and female athletes. Although inequities in these
areas play an important role in shaping male and female interests
and experiences in sport, they are only part of a broader picture.
Equally important is the social meaning of male and female sport
participation and the culture of sport itself.35 ' At the present time,
the dominant culture of sport is overwhelmingly masculine.3 52
Educational institutions play a key role in the social processes
that construct the cultural meaning of sport and its relationship to
masculinity and femininity.353 Schools, as well as parents, peers, and
350. See Bruce Kidd, The Men's CulturalCentre: Sports and the Dynamic of Women's Oppression/Men's Repression, in SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER, supra note 26, at 31, 36-37.
351. See Schultz, supra note 64, at 1832-39 (discussing how separate-but-unequal job
structures encourage women to reduce their career aspirations and encourage male workers to develop proprietary attitudes toward what they see as "their" jobs); cf YOUNG, supra
note 312, at 23 (arguing that distributional models alone, which focus on the distribution of
benefits and burdens, are inadequate to explain domination and oppression, and that social
justice theories must also analyze the institutional context in which unequal distributions
take place).
352. SeeYOUNG, supra note 312, at 23 (defining culture as "the symbols, images, meanings, habitual comportments, stories, and so on through which people express their
experience and communicate with one another").
353. I use the terms "masculinity" and "femininity" to refer to the social construction of
gender identities in a patriarchal society, and do not intend to suggest either that these
identities are inherent or that they are homogenous. Although there are a wide variety of
masculinities and femininities, they are not all socially constructed as equal. In this discussion, "masculinity" is shorthand for "dominant masculinity"/"hegemonic masculinity." See,
e.g., Bryson, supra note 241, at 173 ("This dominant form of masculinity has been usefully
called hegemonic masculinity ... , and the message it conveys renders inferior not only
femininity in all its forms but also nonhegemonic forms of masculinity." (citation omitted)).
I use "femininity" here to refer to the social construction of the qualities and characteristics typically associated with being female. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, THROWING LIKE A GIRL
AND OTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY 143-44 (1990). As Young
explains:
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the media, participate in the process of defining the cultural
meaning of sport as masculine, producing and reinforcing the social norms that encourage boys and men to play sports in order to
develop a masculine identity. 5 4 The linkage of sport and masculin-

ity, referred to herein as the masculinization of sport, shapes and
defines both men's and women's relationship to sports. At the
same time that males are encouraged to participate in sport to bolster their masculinity, the establishment of sport as a
predominantly male activity calls into question
the relationship
s
between female athleticism and femininity3 5
There are at least three ways that educational institutions participate in the masculinization of sport: (1) through the
structuring of sport leadership; (2) through the cultivation of a
masculine culture in their sports programs; and (3) by fostering
conditions that constrain female athleticism.
1. Male Leadership and the Social Construction of Sport--As social
scientists have recognized, leadership structures within institutions
play an important role in shaping gender relations within those
institutions. 56 Sociological literature describes how the absence of
a significant presence of women in institutional leadership roles
leads to the phenomenon of "tokenism," in which predominantly
male leadership profoundly contributes to the male culture of an
institution and creates conditions conducive to gender bias. 5'7 This

I take 'femininity' to designate not a mysterious quality or essence that all women
have by virtue of their being biologically female. It is, rather, a set of structures and
conditions that delimit the typical situation of being a woman in a particular society.... This understanding of 'feminine' existence makes it possible to say that some
women escape or transcend the typical situation and definition of women in various
degrees and respects.
Id.
354.

See, e.g., David Whitson, Sport in the Social Constructionof Masculinity,in SPORT, MEN
supra note 26, at 19, 22-23.
355. See Michael A. Messner, Masculinitiesand Athletic Careers: Bonding and Status Differences, in SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER, supranote 26, at 97, 106-07.
356. See Martha Chamallas, The New GenderPanic:Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Military, 83 MINN. L. REv. 305, 328-29 (1998) [hereinafter Chamallas, New GenderPanic] (citing
social science literature demonstrating that the relative absence of women in leadership
positions in organizations affects gender relations within those institutions); see also Elizabeth Chambliss & Christopher Uggen, Men and Women of Elite Law Firms: Reevaluating
AND THE GENDER ORDER,

Kanter's Legacy, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 41, 61 (2000) (discussing their own empirical re-

search finding that the composition of women and minorities in law firm partnership
positions affects the gender and race composition of associates within the firm).
357. See Chamallas, New Gender Panic, supra note 356, at 324-29 (discussing social science literature on "tokenism," where members of the token group are substantially
underrepresented and considered as "outsiders," to explain how lack of women in leadership positions increases sex-stereotyping and gender bias in predominantly male-controlled
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literature also explains how the dearth of women in leadership positions affects the expectations and aspirations of women who are
involved at other levels in those institutions."' Although typically
focused on the specific context of the workplace, this scholarship
has important implications for how sport leadership in educational
institutions constructs sport as a male activity and shapes the interests and expectations of male and female athletes.
Ironically, Tide IX has had a negative effect on women's
opportunities in athletics administration. Before Title IX, women
held nearly all of the positions overseeing women's intercollegiate
athletic programs.359 After Title IX was enacted, the vast majority of
intercollegiate athletic departments merged from previously
separate men's and women's departments into a combined,
unitary administrative unit, with the effect of displacing women
from control over women's intercollegiate

athletics.

360

Today athletic leadership and governance is overwhelmingly
male. 361 A recently released longitudinal study of women in inter-

institutions); see also Annelies Knoppers, Gender and the Coaching Profession, in WOMEN,
SPORT, AND CULTURE, supra note 1, at 119, 128-30 (discussing the existence of "tokenism"
in athletic departments and its implications for women in the coaching profession).
358. Cf Chamallas, Structuralist and CulturalDomination Theories, supranote 64, at 238081 (discussing ways in which male-dominant leadership structures in the workplace shape
and distort identities and behaviors of employees); Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational
Determinants of Law Firm Integration, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 669, 678-91 (1997) (discussing extensive body of literature demonstrating how organizational determinants of the workplace,
including upward mobility and leadership structures, construct worker aspirations and
achievement).
359. CAHN, supranote 239, at 260-61. According to Vivian Acosta and Linda Carpenter,
in 1972, over ninety percent of women's intercollegiate athletic programs were directed by
a female administrator. R. VIVIAN ACOSTA & LINDAJEAN CARPENTER, WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY-TWENTY THREE YEAR UPDATE 1977-2000, at 9
(2000) (on file with author); see also Messner & Sabo, supra note 146, at 5 (explaining

women's loss of control over women's athletic programs in the post-Title IX era as a result
of increased budgets and status that enabled women's athletic programs to pose a
"challenge to masculine hegemony").
360. See, e.g., CAHN, supranote 239, at 260-61 (discussing post-Tide IX merger of men's
and women's athletic programs and resulting decline of women in athletic administration);
Suggs, Uneven Progress, supra note 319 (noting that only six Division I programs [out of 311 ]
have separate men's and women's athletics departments, and reporting that staff within
these women's departments claim that the separation gives them a distinct competitive
advantage because they have their own trainers, strength coaches, and publicists, so that
their female athletes "never play second fiddle"). For an interesting discussion of the history
of the merger of men's and women's athletics departments and the NCAA's role in hastening the diminishing control of women over women's athletics, see FESTLE, supra note 36, at

199-227.
361.
See, e.g., HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 179 (discussing post-Title IX trend of decreasing presence of women in coaching and leadership positions within athletics);
Theberge, supra note 242, at 182 (noting that post-Title IX increase in women's athletic
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collegiate athletics conducted by Professors Vivian Acosta and
Linda Carpenter found that from the level of athletic director on
down, including coaches and other athletics jobs, men increasingly
hold the positions that oversee competitive sports. As of the year
2000, only 17.4% of women's programs were headed by women.
This represents a decrease from 19.4% just since 1998.6 s Women
hold only 34% of all intercollegiate athletic administrative positions
in women's sports. 64 Even this snapshot may exaggerate the presence of women in athletic leadership, given that most
administrative positions held by women in intercollegiate athletics
are support staff positions rather than policy-making positions. 365
Twenty-three
percent
of NCAA .women's
athletic
wome
invlvedin
ahletcs
.
. 366 programs have no
women involved in athletics administration. The disproportionately low share of women in other intercollegiate athletic jobs is
also notable. In 2000, only 9.5% of sports information directors in
NCAA programs t were
female, and only 25.5% of head athletic
•
367
trainers were female.
The problem of women's displacement from intercollegiate athletics administration does not appear to be improving. Although
the number of athletic administration positions at colleges and
universities is increasing, these additional positions have not translated into employment gains for women. Of the 418 new athletic
administrative jobs added at NCAA institutions since 1998, women
were hired for only forty-five of these positions, less than eleven
percent of the total .
A similar phenomenon has occurred with respect to coaching
positions. Prior to Title IX, women held over 90% of the jobs
coaching female athletes 6 9 As of 2000, women held only 45.6% of
the head coaching positions for women's intercollegiate athletic

participation has been accompanied by a decrease in the percentage of women in athletic
leadership positions).
362. ACOSTA & CARPENTER, supra note 359, at 9. Acosta and Carpenter offer the interesting statistic that there are more female college presidents of Division I-A colleges and
universities than there are female athletic directors at these institutions. Id.; see also SALTER,
supra note 16, at 66-69 (describing accounts of discrimination faced by women who have
become athletic directors).
363.

AcOSTA & CARPENTER, supra note 359, at 10.

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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teams, the lowest percentage on record. 7 ' Like the situation with
respect to athletic directors, women's share of coaching jobs continues to decline. Of the 524 new coaching positions created for
NCAA women's teams in the last two years, women were hired for
only 37
107
of those positions, approximately twenty percent of the
1
total.
The movement of men into positions coaching female athletes
has not been matched by an expansion of opportunities for
women in jobs coaching men. Women continue to hold less than
two percent of the jobs coaching male athletes, as they have for the
past three decades.372 Among the top twenty-five Division I football
schools, men hold all of the coaching positions for all men's
sports. 373 The few jobs women hold coaching male athletes typically
involve coaching sports in which both male and female athletes
participate and practice together, such as track and field and
swimming.374 There remains a virtual bar to women coaching male
athletes in sports where males and females do not practice together. 37 5 The operative assumption-that women are not qualified

to coach male athletes-speaks volumes about the role of women
in sport and the construction of sport itself as a male activity. No
similar assumption, that athletes require a coach of the same sex,
interferes with the opportunities for men to coach women, even in
sports where males have not had extensive intercollegiate opportunities to participate themselves, such as softball and volleyball. 76

370. Id. In absolute numbers, of the 7,771 NCAA head coaching jobs for women's
teams, women hold approximately 3,544 of those jobs. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Top 25 Division I FootballPrograms (July 17, 2000) (unpublished chart, on file with
author).
374. R. Vivian Acosta & Linda Jean Carpenter, Women in Intercollegiate Sport: A
Longitudinal Study-Nineteen Year Update 1977-1996, University of Iowa, at http://
www.bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/Acosta/womensp.html (on file with the University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform); see also Ellen Staurowsky, Women Coaching Male Athletes, in SPORT,
MEN, AND THE GENDER OmER, supra note 26, at 163; see also id. at 165-67 (discussing the
sexism and discrimination faced by women who coach male athletes).
375. See Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in Intercollegiate Athletics
During 1992-93: Defining the 'EqualOpportunity'Standard,1994 DETROIT C. L. REV. 953, 1001,
1002 (noting that no lawsuits have yet been brought by women seeking to coach a men's
intercollegiate athletics teams, and stating that the virtual absence of women coaching
men's teams "goes beyond evidence of a glass ceiling, it is more akin to a bolted and locked
door").
376. See AcosTA & CARPENTER, supra note 359, at 6. Women are 65.4% of women's
softball coaches and 59.6% of women's volleyball coaches, despite the status of these sports
as historically female sports. Id.
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The unwritten rule in athletic departments is that the most highly
37
valued sports-those played by men-must be coached by men.
Although data is less readily available at lower levels of education, the picture of athletic leadership at the high school level also
appears to be overwhelmingly male. A statewide study of Iowa high
schools found that males were: 98.1% of athletic directors, 81.3%
of athletic trainers, 98% percent of head coaches for boys' teams,
72.7% of head coaches for girls' teams, 97.4% of assistant coaches
for boys' teams, and 50% of assistant coaches for girls' teams. 78
As exclusionary as sport leadership structures are to women in
general, they are particularly inaccessible when the disadvantages
of sex and race are combined. Women of color are in an especially
precarious situation in relation to leadership positions in sport.
The barriers to women of color in athletic coaching and
administrative positions are not well documented.379 However, by
piecing together what data there is, one finds that women of color
are substantially worse off than both white women and men of
color in sport leadership positions. A survey of all NCAA Division I
schools conducted by the Orange County Register found that, as of
September 1999, African American women held only 1.9% of the
head coaching positions for women's sports, and were only 1.4%
of Division I athletic directors, assistant or associate athletic
directors in college and university programs that included
women's athletics.8 0 The same study found that white women
without previous college coaching experience were thirty times
more likely to get a Division I coaching job than African American
women with no coaching experience. 3"1 In Division I women's
basketball, only 6.4% of the head coaches are black women. This
figure looks especially low when compared to the twenty percent
377. See Heckman, supra note 148, at 418 & n.132 (citing 1997 NCAA Gender Equity
Study finding that no women coached men's football, baseball, or basketball in Division I
schools and an absence of women head coaches in these sports in Divisions II and III).
378. Oliphant, supranote 338.
379. See Scott M. Reid, For Black Women, A Coaching Void, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Dec.
20, 1999, at DI (noting that the NCAA does not keep track of the number of African
American women head coaches and administrators, and that there is a general "inability of
African-American women and their advocates to obtain the numerical data to support their
argument that they are being denied jobs").
380. Reid, supra note 379; see also Craig T. Greenlee, NCAA Report Finds Little Diversity in
Sports Administration, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC.,June 22, 2000, at 16, 16 (reporting
data from NCAA report that percentage of African American (male and female) athletic
directors at Division I schools dropped from 10.1% to 7.5% between 1995 to 1999).
381. Reid, supra note 379.
382. Greg Garber, Progress?Not for Black Women Coaches, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 16,
2000, at Cl.

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 34:1&2

of Division I men's basketball coaches who are African American.5 5
Data on Asian American women, Latinas and other women of
color in sport leadership positions appear non-existent. There is
also a lack of data on women of color in coaching and
administrative sport positions at the high school level and below.
The structure of athletic leadership shapes the context in which
athletic interests and identities are molded. The disproportionately
low presence of women-and women of color in particular-in
athletic leadership positions renders them tokens in the world of
sports. 4 As tokens, women working in athletics face gender and
race bias and stereotyping because white males are defined as the
norm in sport leadership. 5 This has implications for female students as well as employees. One implication is that, since the norm
of athletic leadership is male, female students are more likely to
prefer males as coaches.5 5 Because tokenism results in occupational stereotyping, in which competence is linked to maleness,
subordinates as well as superiors prefer having men in positions of
7 This explains why researchers have found that both
leadership.Y8
female and male athletes are more likely to express a preference
for male coaches, and perceive them to be more competent than
female coaches, even though men who coach females have lower
objective qualifications, compared to both women who coach females and to men who coach males. 388 Thus, to the extent that

athlete preferences shape hiring decisions, tokenism in sport is
self-reinforcing.389
The linkage of athletic leadership with maleness also affects female athletes in how they see themselves as athletes and their
future role in sport. The absence of women in sport leadership
383. See id.
384. See Knoppers, supra note 357, at 128-30 (discussing Rosabeth Moss Kanter's analysis of tokenism, and her definition of a ratio of 0.15 or less as "skewed" and one of 0.16 to
0.35 as "tilted;" and stating that, "[I]f all coaches and athletic administrators are included in
the total count, then in most athletic departments the gender ratio is probably titled or
close to being skewed."); cf. Chambliss & Uggen, supra note 356, at 62-63 (discussing research showing that the presence of women in leadership positions is more important to
the gender inclusiveness of institutions than integration at lower levels).
385. See Knoppers, supra note 357, at 128-30.
386. Id. at 125.
387. Id. at 128.
388. See id. at 123-24, 125, 128.
389. See id. at 125-26 ("Although evaluations by athletes may not always be part of the
formal feedback, if any, received by coaches, such negative attitudes toward female coaches
may create another gender-related obstacle in their career ladders."). The occupational
stereotyping associated with tokenism also perpetuates itself by shaping the gender expectations of the persons who make hiring decisions. See id. at 129-30.
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positions reinforces stereotypes about girls and women in sport
and contributes to the ideology that athletic excellence is male.390
The conflation of maleness and athletic competence profoundly
influences how girls and women perceive their place in sport. As
sociologist Ellen Staurowsky explains:
The underrepresentation of women in coaching and
leadership positions speaks to the strength of the connection
between sport and gender. There is an underlying
assumption that links sport expertise with masculinity and
leadership with male superiority.... For those participants
who are gendered female, there is an automatic devaluation of
experience, of achievement, and of self.39
In this way, sport leadership structures preserve sport as a male
domain
for athletes as well as for athletic coaches and administra92
tors.3

The constricted role for women in sport leadership positions
also shapes the aspirations of female athletes in their future careers. The lower share of female coaches and athletic
administrators means that female athletes have fewer role models
393
in sport. The absence of female role models as coaches or administrators places a ceiling on the female athletic experience that
limits the female athlete's potential for future involvement in
sport. 394 African American athletes in particular have very few, if
390. See id. at 120 ("The absence of women from such [sport leadership] positions may
reinforce the gender stereotyping traditionally associated with the sports world and women
in general.").
391. Staurowsky, supranote 374, at 163.
392. Cf Weistart, GenderEquity, supra note 173, at 200-04 (discussing how sport leadership structures have built-in headwinds that resist efforts to attain gender equity in sport and
instead preserve existing male-dominant hierarchies).
393. See HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 201-02 ("Because male coaches greatly outnumber female coaches (particularly in senior positions), and men are increasingly involved in
coaching women's sports, there are very few role models to encourage young women to
take up coaching."); Knoppers, supra note 357, at 120 (citing research suggesting that the
decline of women coaches "could have a detrimental effect on female athletes ... beyond
the technical aspects of coaching," due to the "fewer visible role models for women in
sport").
394. Knoppers, supra note 357, at 120. Knoppers observes:
This absence may mean not only that fewer women than men will consider coaching
as a career, but also that fewer women will be able to continue their sport involvement once their own college athletic participation is over. In addition, since
coaching is the entry-level job for careers in athletics, fewer women will have careers
in sport and possibly will miss opportunities for mobility through such involvement.
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any, African American women as role models in coaching and administration positions, and receive an especially bleak picture of
their future athletic opportunities.9' Overall, current leadership
structures convey to female athletes a message that males in sport
do not receive: your chance for a future in sports will be limited by
your sex and, if you are a woman of color, also by your race.
The increasing male control over female athletes has another
dimension as well: athletics becomes another arena where men
exert control over women. 96 Female athletes may be more vulnerable to abuse of the disparate power inherent in the coach-athlete
relationship when they are coached by men.39' The sexual abuse of

female athletes by male coaches is gaining increasing recognition
as a widespread problem in girls' and women's sports. 39 Some such
cases make their way to the courts, although most go unreported
and unaddressed. When male coaches and administrators abuse
Id.
395. See Reid, supranote 379 (discussing the impact of the absence of African American
women coaches and athletic administrators on female athletes and the importance of role
models).
396. See Elaine Blinde, Unequal Exchange and Exploitation in College Sport: The Case of the
Female Athlete, in WOMEN, SPORT, AND CULTURE, supra note 1, at 135, 144 ("Patterns of interaction between male coaches and female athletes may sometimes parallel the dominantsubordinate roles usually accorded males and females respectively in a patriarchal society.").
397. See id. at 142-44 (discussing emotional and psychological exploitation of female
athletes by male coaches, and concluding, "it appears that female athletes may be subject to
some unique forms of psychological exploitation given the fact that they are frequently
(and increasingly) placed under the direction of male coaches.").
398. See PAT GRIFFIN, STRONG WOMEN, DEEP CLOSETS: LESBIANS AND HOMOPHOBIA IN
SPORT 200 (Becky Lane et al. eds., 1998) (citing recent articles "indicat[ing] that male

coaches' sexual involvement with female athletes is a problem that has only recently come
to light"); Julie Cart & Theresa Mufioz, A Touch Too Much-Harassment and More are Possible
When Men Coach Women Athletes, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1992, at C1 (discussing specific instances
of male coaches accused of sexually harassing their female athletes at the undergraduate
level); Robin Finn, Out of Bounds-A Special Report: Growth in Women's Sports Stirs Harassment
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999, at Al (reporting recent instances of female athletes accusing
male coaches of sexual harassment, and discussing the conditions in sports that are condu-

cive to sexual abuse and harassment of female athletes by male coaches); Marina Pisano,
Insight, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, Aug. 4, 1996, at L- ("'Some of the "best" coaches in
the country have seduced a succession of their female athletes. We've sexualized little girls.
We've eroticized domination.'").

399. See, e.g., Klemencic v. Ohio St. Univ., No. 96-3851 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 8117, at
*6 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1997) (rejecting qualified immunity defense in suit for sexual abuse by
assistant coach); Canty v. Old Rochester Reg'l Sch. Dist., 54 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D. Mass.
1999) (rejecting sexual assault claim against public high school coach because assault was
not within the scope of employment); Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 326, 328-29
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (upholding Title IX claim for sexual harassment of two students by their
coach); R.L.R. v. Prague Sch. Dist., 838 F. Supp. 1526, 1530, 1534 (W.D. Okla. 1993)
(granting defendant summary judgment in Title IX claim for sexual harassment of female
athlete by her male coach); Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (D. Conn. 1977)
(one of female plaintiffs alleged that she stopped serving as team manager for her field
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their power over female athletes, it has the potential to transform
athletics from a physically and psychologically liberating activity to
one that exacerbates women's relative powerlessness in relation to
men.4 0 While it is important to acknowledge that most men who
hold positions of leadership in female sports do not abuse their
power over female athletes, and that some women who hold sport
leadership positions do, the existing gender dynamics of sport create conditions more favorable to the abuse of male power over
female athletes.4°' The lack of a strong institutional response to the
problem exacerbates and perpetuates the conditions in sport that
contribute to such abuse.4°'
In summary, the male-dominant leadership structures in place
in athletic departments shape men's and women's relationship to
sport. They do this at the level of athletic culture, by linking sport
leadership (and, by extension, competence in sport) with mascuhockey team because of sexual harassment by their male coach); King v. U.S.D. No. 446,
No. 59,346, 1987 Kan. App. LEXIS 857, at *13-17 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1987) (rejecting
due process claim for sexual assault of a nine-year-old girl by coach); Durham City Bd. of
Educ. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 109 N.C. App. 152, 157 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993) (refusing to find a coach accused of raping a student-athlete to be covered under
school district's insurance. policy because the assault was not within the scope of employment); Scadden v. Wyoming, 732 P.2d 1036, 1054 (Wyo. 1987) (upholding conviction of
high school volleyball coach for sexual assault of athlete); see also Leslie Heywood, Despite the
Positive Rhetoric About Women's Sports, Female Athletes Face a Culture of Sexual Harassment,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 8, 1999, at B4 ("[M]any women rightly believe that doing so
[reporting abuse by a coach] would bring about reprisals, such as being ostracized by their
teammates and coaches, and being given less playing time.").
400. See Birrell & Richter, supra note 1, at 227-29 (describing feminist-identified softball players' negative experiences with abusive male coaches whom they perceived as
replicating unequal societal power structures)..
401. See Alan Tomlinson & Ilkay Yorganci, Male Coach/Female Athlete Relations: Gender
and PowerRelations in Competitive Sport, 21J. SPORT & Soc. ISSUES 134, 134 (1997) (reporting
results of a study of harassment of female athletes by male coaches, and concluding that,
when men coach female athletes, "the power dynamics [of the relationship between coach
and athlete] are accentuated, and a perfect climate for exploitation has been created");
Robin Finn, Harassment a Concern as Women's Sports Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999, at Al
(discussing increasing reports of sexual harassment of female athletes by male coaches and
quoting sociology professor Don Sabo as stating that reports of harassment by female
coaches are much less prevalent); Pisano, supra note 398, at L-1 (quoting author Mariah
Burton Nelson as stating that although "some sexual molestation in sports involves female
coaches and male athletes or gay/lesbian cases[,] ... about 95 percent of the cases occur
between older male coaches and young female athletes."); cf GRIFFIN, supranote 398, at 58,
191, 201-04 (asserting that, despite images of "lesbian predators" in sports, female athletes
statistically are much more likely to be sexually harassed, assaulted, and coerced into sexual
relationships with hetereosexual male coaches and athletes, and noting the "double standard" in how institutions respond to male coach-female athlete sexual relationships versus
female coach-female athlete sexual relationships).
402. See Heywood, supra note 399 (discussing problem of sexual harassment and abuse
of female athletes by male coaches and lack of adequate response to the problem by educational institutions).
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linity, and at the level of experience, by placing female but not
male athletes in a situation where their gender is an added vulnerability in a relationship that is already defined by a marked
imbalance of power. However, the leadership structures in sport
are just the beginning of the analysis of the masculinization of
sport. A broader account of sex inequality in sport must look at
how institutions shape sexism and male dominance within the culture of sport itself.40
2. Linking Sport, Masculinity, and Male Dominance in Male Athletic
Culture--Sport and masculinity have been conflated in American
culture.4 Athletic programs in schools originated out of a desire
to inculcate masculinity in males. 5 Schools created athletic programs in response to concerns that boys were becoming
"femininized" by the increasing absence of fathers from the home
during the industrial revolution. 4°6 Not surprisingly in light of this
history, school athletic programs were originally conceived as activities for males only. °7 Likewise, the Olympics were originally
premised on an explicit linkage between athleticism and masculinity. The founder of the modern Olympics, Pierre de
Coubertin, described the justification for the Olympics in explicitly gendered terms: "The Olympic Games must be reserved for
men... [W] e must continue to try to achieve the following definition: the solemn and periodic exaltation of male athleticism,
with internationalism as a base, loyalty as a means, art for its setting, and female applause as its reward." 4°s
Sport continues to serve the social function of teaching
masculinity to males. For boys and men, sports participation
403. Cf Chambliss & Uggen, supranote 356, at 45 (discussing research suggesting that
tokenism in leadership structures alone does not explain gender inequality within institutions and highlighting the need for attention to the broader social and cultural forces that
influence the positions of women in organizations).
404. E.g., JIM McKAY, MANAGING GENDER: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL
POWER IN AUSTRALIAN, CANADIAN, AND NEW ZEALAND SPORT 20 (1997) ("Perhaps no single
institution in American culture has influenced our sense of masculinity more than sport.")
(internal quotations omitted); Willis, supra note 241, at 35-36 ("It is also clear that sport is
strongly associated with the male identity, with being popular and having friends....
Achievement particularly strengthens male identity; it is assumed that sports success is success at being masculine.").
405. See Bryson, supranote 241, at 176 ("There is clear historical evidence that sport was
often promoted with an explicit goal of enhancing masculinity....").
406. See BRIAN PRONGER, THE ARENA OF MASCULINITY: SPORTS, HOMOSEXUALITY, AND
THE MEANING OF SEX 16-17 (1990).
407. See Kidd, supra note 350, at 35 ("The men who developed and promoted sports
were careful to ensure that only males were masculinized in this way. These developers
maintained sports as male preserves by actively discouraging females from participation.").
408. WOMEN IN SPORT, supra note 238, at 169.
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constructs masculinity by placing a high value on male physical
power and by contributing to and celebrating an ideology of
masculinity as distinct from, and in opposition, to femininity. 4°9
Masculinity is linked with male sport in general, but with certain
sports in particular. The more rugged, powerful contact sports are
the preferred vehicles through which males prove their masculinity, 4' 0 and not coincidentally, the sports that are often the most

valued in school athletic programs in terms of the resources, benefits and prestige that accompany those programs.41 ' Sports that
require less physical aggression and that combine aestheticism
with athletic skill, such as figure skating, diving and gymnastics, are
regarded as less masculine, and may even subject their
male par41 2
ticipants to accusations of femininity or homosexuality.
The social practices surrounding sport often develop a particular type of masculinity that celebrates traditional manhood and
emphasizes male dominance and the devaluation of women.1 3 For
409. See Whitson, supra note 354, at 21-22. Whitson argues that the social construction
of masculinity is so important because it does not exist naturally: "If boys simply grew into
men and that was that, the efforts described to teach boys how to be men would be redundant. We can suggest, then, that 'becoming a man' is something that boys (and especially
adolescent boys) work at." Id. at 22. Likewise, the cultural norms that define what it means
to be a man are not natural, but "are themselves historical constructs." Id.
410. See PRONGER, supranote 406, at 19-20 (describing hierarchy of masculinity among
male sports, and listing boxing, football, and hockey as the "most masculine" because they
are the most violent); Donald F. Sabo & Joe Panepinto, Football Ritual and the Social Reproduction of Masculinity, in SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER, supra note 26, at 115, 125
(discussing their research into the relationship between football players and their coaches,
and concluding that this relationship serves as "a training ground for hegemonic masculinity"); Whitson, supra note 242, at 367. Whitson observes that:
Body contact games, in particular, have historically naturalized an aggressive way of
'doing masculinity' in which physical domination is legitimated; over time, these
confrontative sports have become important masculinizing practices that initiate
young males into a hierarchy of gendered identities in which the capacity to dominate is honored and physical power confers social power.
Id.
411. See Weistart, Equal Opportunity?, supra note 32, at 37 ("[O]ne does not become an
athletic director in a substantial program without understanding that the revenue sports,
which means one or both of the dominant men's sports, come first.").
412. PRONGER, supra note 406, at 20, 37-38; see also Lorraine Kee Montre, Gay or Nay?
It's Really None of Our Business What Stars' Sexual PreferenceIs, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr.
4, 1992, at IC (citing Olympic figure skater Christopher Bowman's comments about the
perception that male figure skaters are gay and discussing personal harassment he experienced for "performing in a predominantly girls' sport").
413. See Whitson, supra note 354, at 21-22; see also Brian Pronger, Gay Jocks: A Phenomenology of Gay Men in Athletics, in SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER, supranote 26, at 144
("Masculinity, then, is a strategy for the power relations between men and women; it is a
strategy that serves the interests of patriarchal heterosexuality. Athletics, as a sign of masculinity in men, can be an instrument of those power relations.").
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many males, sports participation provides an avenue for learning
and practicing a dominant masculinity and gaining status as a male
by distancing from, and establishing superiority over, females.
Much of male sports culture consists of everyday interactions
among male athletes and coaches that confirm and reinforce male
superiority and privilege, both on the playing field and in social
relations. 4 The emphasis on sport as a means of developing a
privileged masculinity through physical dominance and aggression
creates a culture in which a high value is placed on exercising sex415
ual and physical dominance over women. As the authors of one
study exploring the relationship between male athletics and sexual
dominance explained, subcultures and societies that "regard qualities such as power, toughness, dominance, aggressiveness, and
competitiveness as 'masculine' may breed individuals hostile to
women and to qualities associated with 'femininity.'

, 416

The male

athletic privilege that develops through sports participation often
includes an expectation of access to women's bodies as a side
benefit of highly developed athletic skills.1 7
Too often the culture of masculinity learned through sport is
expressed through the sexual abuse and exploitation of women by
male athletes. Male sport culture and its dominant style of masculinity create social conditions that are ripe for the practice of male
418
dominance over women. The connection between male athletic
414. Cf Chamallas, New Gender Panic,supra note 356, at 364 (describing "military culture" as "the complex of attitudes, daily interactions and institutional structures that can
give us a clue as to why the military might be so resistant to women and so fearful of feminization.").
415. See MICHAEL A. MESSNER & DONALD F. SABO, SEX, VIOLENCE & POWER IN SPORTS:
RETHINKING MASCULINITY 87 (1994). The coaching of male athletes teaches them "to take

orders, to take pain, to 'take out' opponents, to take the game seriously, to take women, and
to take their place on the team." Id. Moreover, "[d]ating becomes a sport in itself, and
'scoring,' or having sex with little or no emotional involvement, is a mark of masculine
achievement." Id. at 38.
416. Neil M. Malamuth et al., Characteristicsof Aggressors Against Women: Testing a Model
Using a NationalSample of College Students, 59J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 670, 671
(1991).
417.

See MESSNER & SABO, supranote 415, at 122, 124 (discussing implications of Magic

Johnson's statements upon announcing his HIV-positive status that "scores of beautiful
women hang around famous male jocks" and stating that "[m]ale athletes, in contrast [to
heterosexual female athletes], are expected to be heterosexually promiscuous"); Robert
Lipsyte, The Emasculation of Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995, § 6, at 51 ("Potential sports
stars-who might bring fame and money to everyone around them-are excused from
taking out the trash, from learning to read, from having to ask, 'May I touch you there?' ").
418. See MESSNER & SABO, supra note 415, at 50 (explaining that a "rape culture" is created in male sports programs where "verbal sparring and bragging about sexual conquests
[leads] to actual behavior," with group dynamics encouraging male athletes to treat women
"as objects of conquest"); Todd W. Crosset et al., Male Student-Athletes Reported for Sexual
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participation and the physical and sexual abuse of women is just
beginning to receive attention commensurate with the scope of
the problem. Numerous studies have begun to document the relatively higher propensity for male student-athletes to sexually
419
assault women.
In its most extreme form, male athletes' expression of sexual
dominance over women occurs through gang rape.4 ° Other than
fraternities, male athletes are more likely than any other social
group in college to participate in gang rape. 2 One study of campus gang rapes showed that of the twenty-four gang rapes analyzed,
athletes committed approximately thirty-eight percent (or nine) 42
Through gang rape, male athletes solidify bonds with one another
by using the woman's body as the object of sexual dominance,
while seemingly distancing themselves from the homoerotic implications of a group sexual experience.423 The culture of masculinity
and team insularity plays an important role in establishing the
group dynamic that gives rise to such conduct, and in the reluc-

Assault: A Survey of Campus Police Departments and JudicialAffairs Offices, 19 J. SPORT & Soc.
ISSUES 126, 127 (1995) (discussing elements of "rape culture" in athletics as displaying a
high level of tolerance for violence, male dominance, and sex segregation).
419. MESSNER & SABO, supra note 415, at 33 (reporting one study finding that athletes
were involved in approximately one-third of the sexual assaults on campuses in the United
States between 1988 and 1991); NELSON, supra note 242, at 130 (citing 1986 Philadelphia
Daily News survey of 350 colleges, finding that male football and basketball players were
thirty-eight percent more likely to be implicated in sexual assaults than the average male
college student); seeCrosset et al., supranote 418, at 132-33 (finding that male athletes were
alleged to be responsible for a disproportionate share of on-campus sexual assaults at Division I schools, and that male football and basketball players accounted for thirty percent of
the male athletic population, but sixty-seven percent of the reported assaults by male athletes); id. at 51 (citing another study finding that between 1983 and 1986, a college athlete
in the United States was reported for sexual assault an average of once every eighteen days);
see also Howard L. Nixon II, Gender, Sport and Aggressive Behavior Outside Sport, 21 J. SPORT &
Soc. ISSUES 379, 384, 386, 388 (1997) (reporting results of study on male athletes and violence and concluding that male athletes are more likely than female athletes to engage in
physically aggressive acts outside of sports).
420. For an in-depth account of the events and circumstances surrounding a highly
publicized gang rape of a mentally retarded adolescent girl by members of a high school
football team, and an analysis of the school and community culture which supported the
players, see BERNARD LEFKOWITZ, OUR Guys: THE GLEN RIDGE RAPE AND THE SECRET LIFE
OF THE PERFECT SUBURB (1997).
421. McKAY, supra note 404, at8.
422. Crosset et al., supra note 418, at 128, 137 n.1.
423. See MESSNER & SABO, supra note 415, at 67 (describing the dynamics of gang rape
by male athletes, and explaining, "[t]hough she is physically present, the girl or woman, as a
thinking, choosing partner, is obliterated. She serves as the conquered object through
which the guys have 'sex' with each other."). See generally PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, FRATERNITY GANG RAPE (1990) (analyzing the gender dynamics of gang rape).
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tance of team members to accept responsibility for the rape or to
implicate others.424
To the extent that male athletic culture encourages a certain
type of masculinity that teaches male superiority and values heterosexual male dominance, it is not a culture that is predetermined by
male athletic activity in and of

itself.4 2

Rather, it is a specific type of

athletic culture that is shaped, controlled and fostered by the institutions in which sport takes place. Educational institutions,
through their actions and inaction, participate in creating a culture of sport that links athletic participation with hegemonic
masculinity.426 The ways in which educational institutions contribute to this culture take subtle and not so subtle forms.
One of the more direct ways in which schools shape male athletic culture is through the actions of their coaches. Many coaches
blatantly convey the message to their male athletes that athletic
failure will jeopardize their masculinity. 427 Rebukes from coaches
and teammates such as, "You throw like a girl," and more graphic
variations on similar themes instill in male athletes the fear that

424. JEFF BENEDICT, PUBLIC HEROES, PRIVATE FELONS 10-11 (1997) (quoting one
player involved in a gang rape as stating, "The peer pressure to perform in front of the guys
...was the overlapping problem that occurred ... you get caught up in it....
[I]t was hard
to say, 'Nah, no,' because ...[y]ou're gonna be teased about it."); McKAY, supra note 404,
at 8 ("Like other tightly-knit competitive male groups ...sport often produces 'groupthink'-a mind-set that makes men incapable of believing that there is anything wrong with
their harassing, abusive, and violent behavior toward women."); see also Merrill Melnick,
Male Athletes and SexualAssault, 63J. PHYS EDUC., RECREATION & DANCE 32, 33 (1992) ("The
pressure to be one of the boys can turn rape into a team activity.").
425. See MESSNER & SABO, supra note 415, at 34 ("[N]othing inherent in sports makes
athletes especially likely to rape women. Rather, it is the way sports are organized to influence developing masculine identities and male peer groups that leads many male athletes
to rape."); cf Mary P. Koss et al., The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalenceof Sexual Aggression
and Victimization in a NationalSample of HigherEducationStudents, 55J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 162, 169 (1987) ("It is difficult to believe that such widespread violence is the
responsibility of a small lunatic fringe of psychopathic men. That sexual violence is so pervasive supports the view that the locus of violence against women rests squarely in the
middle of what our culture defines as 'normal' interaction between men and women.").
426. See HARGREAVES, supranote 1, at 151 (acknowledging that girls and boys come to
school "with definite ideas about what is appropriate for their respective gender," but that
schools "have the potential to modify children's perceptions of gender roles and to challenge sexist behaviour").
427. See PRONGER, supra note 406, at 26 ("[F] ootball coaches are well known for berating their players with insults: 'ladies,' 'faggots,' 'pansies.'"); Sabo & Panepinto, supra note
410, at 120 (describing use of misogyny and homophobia to induce conformity and athletic
achievement by male athletes: "One coach hung a bra in a player's locker to signify that
player wasn't tough enough. In order to inflame aggression or compliance, coaches called
players 'pussies' or 'limp wrists' and told them 'go home and play with your sisters' or 'start
wearing silk panties.'").
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athletic failure risks a loss of manhood itself.42' The unmistakable
message is, that to protect their masculinity, male athletes must
the same time,
differentiate themselves from girls and w9At
such interactions teach male athletes that femininity is tantamount
to failure, with the implication that a female athlete is a contradiction in terms.3 ° In this way, masculinity is constructed as

oppositional to femininity, and femininity is portrayed as something that must be controlled and suppressed. Sport as a process
for masculinizing boys and men relegates the feminine role in
sport to one that is subordinate and subject to domination.
In addition to the messages conveyed by coaches, the peer culture within male locker rooms contributes to a culture of male
dominance. Male locker rooms, while providing space for male
bonding about athletic experiences, often double as a location
where values are learned linking masculinity to the sexual exploitation of women.431 One study analyzing the conversational patterns
of male athletes in locker rooms found that "hostile talk about
women is blended with jokes and put-downs about classes and each
other."4 32 The study concluded that locker room conversation
among male athletes objectified women through language and
jokes, and valued the ability to conquer and control them.4 3
428. GRIFFIN, supra note 398, at 22 ("Male coaches send strong messages about women
and about the need for men to avoid being like women when they compare a poor performance by a male athlete to that of a girl (for example, throwing like a girl)."). For an
insightful essay on what it means to "throw like a girl," and an explanation of how female
athleticism is culturally constructed, see YOUNG, supra note 353, at 141-59.
429. See PRONGER, supra note 406, at 26 ("Coaches demand that their athletes play like
men even if they are just boys; it's boys' concern about masculinity that is played upon to
motivate more aggressive performances.").
430. See Bryson, supra note 241, at 173 ("The inferiorising of the 'other' is most frequently implicit, though it is also explicitly and graphically conveyed when, for example,
coaches, supporters, and commentators chastise their team for playing like girls or poofters.").
431. See Kidd, supra note 350, at 42 (describing "the gross sexism and homophobia of
that inner sanctum of patriarchy, the locker room", and explaining how the celebration of
physical dominance and control on the playing field, when combined with the celebration
of the sexual conquest of women in the locker room, can serve as a "training ground for
rape"); see also Whitson, supra note 354, at 26 (showing prevalence of misogynist remarks
and discussions of sexual exploitation of women in male athletic culture, and concluding
that "[t]he effect is to establish a norm that equates masculinity with domination in malefemale relationships.").
432. Timothy Jon Curry, FraternalBonding in the Locker Room: A Profeminist Analysis of
Talk About Competition and Women, 8 Soc. SPORTJ. 119, 126 (1991); see also MaryJo Kane &
Lisa J. Disch, Sexual Violence and the Reproduction of Male Power in the Locker Room: The "Lisa
Olson Incident", 10 Soc. SPORT J. 331, 333 (1993) (discussing the group dynamics of a
professional football locker room that led to sexual harassment when a female sportswriter
was attempting to conduct an interview).
433. See Curry, supra note 432, at 129.
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Finally, educational institutions shape the culture of male sports
in the privileges they extend to male athletes and the ways they
respond to the exploitation and abuse of women by male athletes.
Male athletic privilege is constructed to include an expectation of
434
increased sexual access to women. At some institutions, this message is conveyed explicitly by the use of attractive women on
campus to assist recruiters in attracting elite male athletes.3 5
School officials confirm this expectation when they overlook the
sexual and physical abuse of women by male athletes.H The vast
majority of institutions do not have any policy for dealing with
misconduct by athletes, leaving athletic directors and men's
coaches with a large degree of influence over institutional responses to male athletes' abuse of women.437 As a result, the
institution's response often values the athlete's contributions in
438
sport more highly than the protection of women from abuse. A
number of court cases in recent years have illustrated the phenomenon of educational institutions conferring a privilege to
exercise sexual dominance as part of the male athletic experience.
434. See MESSNER & SABO, supra note 415, at 15 (describing the "stars' world" that institutions cultivate for their highly valued male athletes as "a 'promised land'-full of
notoriety, women, sex, and status."); Deborah Reed, Where's the Penalty Flag? A Call for the
NCAA to Promulgate an Eligibility Rule Revoking a Male Student-Athlete's Eligibility to Participatein
Intercollegiate Athletics for Committing Violent Acts Against Women, 21 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 41,
50 (1999) (quoting one sociologist as stating that "the kid going to (a top football school)
has been recruited by eighty other schools and has a sense of entitlement ... and included
in that is the view of women as always at one's beck and call").
435. SeeJEFFREY R. BENEDICT, ATHLETES AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 14 (1998) ("Highly
recruited athletes are exposed to women who are used to entice players to their school. This
initial experience with women as a benefit is expanded over the course of a college career. .. .").
436. See id. at 13; MESSNER & SABO, supra note 415, at 14; see also Jeffrey Benedict &
Alan Klein, Arrest and Conviction Rates for Athletes Accused of Sexual Assaul 14 Soc. SPORT J.
86, 91 (1997) (finding that although male college athletes are more likely to be arrested for
sexual assault charge than nonathletes, they are much less likely to be convicted because of
the public perception of the victim as a "groupie," and the "larger institutional safety net
that is available to athletes accused of criminal behavior... [such as] exceptional financial
resources and powerful advocates in the form of coaches, agents, lawyers, and pillars of the
community").
437. See Colleges Confront Athlete's Crimes, USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 1998, at 20C (finding
that, of the nation's twenty-five top football schools, only eight have a written policy on how
to deal with athlete misconduct, and that of these eight, seven permit the coach and the
athletic director to have some role in determining punishment and reinstatement of the
athlete); id. (finding that, at schools where there is no written policy on athlete misconduct,
most coaches and athletic directors have a great deal of discretion in determining the athlete's fate at the institution). The NCAA has no official policy for dealing with sexual abuse
by athletes. Reed, supra note 434, at 43.
438. See Reed, supra note 434, at 47-48 (stating that the tendency of coaches and athletic directors is to protect male student athletes who are accused of sexual assault).
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In one of the most widely publicized of such cases, Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,139 Christy Brzonkala
sued the University under Tide IX for hostile environment sexual
harassment based on its response to her allegation that she was
gang-raped in a student dormitory by two of the school's football
players when she was a freshman at the school." 0 In response to the
charges, the University held a disciplinary hearing at which it found
one of the accused students guilty of sexual misconduct and insufficient evidence to take disciplinary action against the other accused
student.441 The University disciplinary committee recommended a
one-year suspension for the student who was found guilty, a recommendation that was adopted by the Provost.42 At that point, the
University abruptly changed course and decided (on specious
grounds) to require a second evidentiary proceeding giving the
student who had been found guilty a second chance to prove his
innocence. 44 The second proceeding was wrought with procedural
irregularities that made it more difficult for Christy Brzonkala to
prove her allegations.4" Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the second hearing, the disciplinary committee again found the student
guilty and again recommended a one-year suspension." 5 However,
the University inexplicably (and in violation of its own procedures)
deferred the one-year suspension until after the accused student
graduated, thereby rendering the suspension moot." 6 The only
"sanction" imposed was to require the offender to participate in a
one-hour sensitivity training session conducted by school officials.447 Both football players returned to the school after the
summer break."' Christy Brzonkala never returned; she dropped
out of the university, unwilling to face the humiliation of the per-

439. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated and
affJd en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (vacating the panel decision and affirming the
district court decision with respect to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) claim
only), affd, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). The following discussion of the facts of the case are
based on the allegations of the complaint. Because the case was not fully litigated (it was
settled after the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint), the
facts were never adjudicated and remain in dispute.
440. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 952-53.
441. Id. at 954.
442. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
443. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 954.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 955.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id.
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ceived vindication of her rapists.44
The case against the university
1
eventually settled for $75,000.45

Other cases also have involved the conferral of institutional
privilege on male athletes who sexually exploit and abuse women.
In Tanja H. v. Regents of the University of California,45 1 a female stu-

dent sued the University of California at Berkeley after she was
gang-raped by four football players in her dormitory after a
45
party. 52 Unlike Christy Brzonkala, the plaintiff in this case
grounded her case on state law, arguing that the University acted
negligently in failing to enforce its alcohol policy or otherwise protecting her from the rape-a theory that was rejected by the
California Court of Appeals. 453 The case was ultimately settled with
an agreement requiring the football players to undergo counseling
and perform 40 hours of community service;
neither the players'
t'
m454
academic nor their athletic status was affected .
In a similar case of male athletic privilege, this time involving an
alleged gang-rape by two football players, Sheronne Thorpe sued
her University for its response to her report of the rapes. 45 5 The

accused rapists did not deny that the sexual incident had occurred,
but claimed that it was consensual.4 6 Thorpe alleged that the University never provided her with the student handbook, the code of
student conduct, or the school's sexual harassment complaint procedure, and never informed her of her rights in connection with
the charges. 457 The only disciplinary action imposed by the school

449. Id.
450. Settlement in Virginia Tech Rape Case, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2000, at B2. The case
also included VAWA claims against the individual attackers. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic
and St. Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 781 (W.D. Va. 1996) (dismissing Title IX and VAWA
claims), rev'd, 132 F.3d 949, 953 (4th Cir. 1997) (reinstating Title IX and VAWA claims),
rev'd en banc, 169 F.3d 820, 830 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding VAWA unconstitutional but not
addressing the Tide IX claims), aftd, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2000) (striking down VAWA as
an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power). The claims against the individual
attackers proceeded separately after the case against the University was settled, and were
finally dismissed when the Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional.
451. 278 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
452. Id. at 919-20.
453. Id. at 919.
454. See UC Women Object to Settlement of Group Rape Case, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1986, at
38.
455. Thorpe v. Va. St. Univ., 6 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508-09 (E.D. Va. 1998); see also Suit is
Filed in Rape Case Involving VSU, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 1996, at B3.
456. Thorpe, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 509; see also BENEDICT, supranote 424, at 80 (reporting that
the consensual sex defense results in the acquittal of athletes who are tried for gang rape
more than seventy-five percent of the time).
457. Thorpe, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 509; see also John Ritter, Wen Schools Act as Courts, USA
TODAY, Feb. 26, 1997, at 3A (reporting that Thorpe stated that VSU officials at first were
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was to ban the two accused students from the women's dorm.
Thorpe sued the University under Title IX for hostile environment
sexual harassment.' 9 The University unsuccessfully sought to have
the case dismissed on the grounds that it had sovereign immunity
6°
from Title IX damages claims under the Eleventh Amendment.4
The case is still pending as of this writing.
A final example of a case involving institutional acquiescence in
a male athlete's sexual abuse of women is Redmond v. University of
Nebraska. 61 Kathy Redmond, a student at the University of
Nebraska, sued her university for sex discrimination under Title IX
and state negligence law based on the school's actions in response
to her charge that she was raped by a university football player on
two separate occasions. Redmond filed charges with university
police two weeks before the Orange Bowl in 1993.62 The county
prosecutor did not receive notice of the charges until much later,
463
when it was too late to obtain any physical or medical evidence.
Redmond alleged that the University delayed forwarding the
charges to the prosecutor, or otherwise responding to them, in
464
order to protect the football player and the image of the team.
Reaching a different result than in the Thorpe case, a federal
district court in Nebraska dismissed Redmond's claims on the
ground that the University, as a state actor, was immune from suit
in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. 465 Redmond

eventually settled her case against the University for $50,000 after
she agreed to drop her lawsuit and not to discuss the case.6 No
university disciplinary action was ever taken against the accused
football player.467
These cases are not isolated incidents; they reflect a widespread
tendency among educational institutions to legitimate and
sympathetic and promised to take action, but that "they got evasive [and] ... [a]fter a while
they wouldn't take my parents' calls. They just wanted it to go away.").
458. Thorpe, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 509. Thorpe reportedly stated, "I feel so betrayed by that
school.... No one helped me. No one advised me of anything." Ritter, supra note 457, at
3A.
459. Thorpe, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 508-09.
460. See id. at 509, 517.
461. No.4:CV95-3223, 1995 WL 928211 (D. Neb. Dec. 5, 1995); see also Rick Ruggles,
Women Stage Protest OutsideHusker Game, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Oct. 1, 1995, at 12A.
462. See BENEDICT, supra note 424, at 121.
463. See id. at 122.
464. See id.; see also Lynn Zinser, Crimes That Draw Few Penalty Hags; Players Escape Punishmentfor Abusing Women, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18, 1998, at C8.
465. See Redmond, 1995 WL 928211; see also Zinser, supranote 464.
466. See Zinser, supra note 464.
467. SeeBENEDICT, supra note 424, at 121.
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minimize the sexual exploitation of women by highly valued male
athletes. Many more such instances never make it to the courts. 468
The teaching of male dominance through male athletic culture
is not limited to the privileging of male athletes' exercise of dominance over women. As in other social contexts, the culture of male
dominance in sport is complex and multi-dimensional;9 it may be
constructed and reinforced through sexual abuse and dominance
by males over other males as well as over females.47 0 The linkage of
sport and masculinity privileges a particular type of heterosexist
masculinity that can be furthered by exercising dominance over
47 1
men whose masculinity is perceived as vulnerable to challenge.

468. See, e.g., id. at 130-34, 142 (discussing many incidents of institutions ignoring or
minimizing reports of abuse of women by male athletes, including an incident where a male
basketball player was suspended from six games for assaulting his ex-girlfriend, a women's
basketball player; the woman lost her athletic scholarship after she reported him); Julie
Cart, Sports Heroes, Social Villains; Aberrant Sexual Conduct By Star Athletes Is Called Result of
Lifelong Coddling, LA TIMES, Feb. 2, 1992, at C3 (discussing similar occurrences, including
an incident at the University of South Florida where school officials took no action against a
male basketball player for more than one year after six different women filed sexual harassment or assault charges against him; the player was finally kicked off the team for a
curfew violation); id. (discussing University of Maryland incident where men's basketball
coach repeatedly called a woman urging her to drop sexual misconduct charges against one
of his players); Chris Ison & Paul McEnroe, 'U' Officials Intervened for Athletes; Records Show a
Pattern of Alleged Sex Crimes and Assaults by Players That Weren't Referred to Prosecutors, MINN.
STAR TRIB., May 21, 1999, at IA (discussing reports that athletic officials at the University of
Minnesota pressured women to drop charges alleging sexual abuse by male athletes or
otherwise intervened in sexual misconduct cases involving their male athletes); Jack McCallum & Kostya Kennedy, Nebraska'sDouble Standard,SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 29, 1996, at 17
(discussing incident where male basketball player received a brief suspension from playing
for assaulting his ex-girlfriend while she lost her athletic scholarship after reporting him).
469. See Messner & Sabo, supra note 146, at 12 (discussing R. W. Connell's analysis of
gender, and his theory that "at any given historical moment, there are competing masculinities--some hegemonic, some marginalized, and some stigmatized," and his conception of
"hegemonic masculinity" as "constructed in relation to various subordinated masculinities
as well as in relation to femininities").
470. See Messner, supra note 355, at 107 (discussing the "gender order" of sport in
which "[h]egemonic masculinity (that definition of masculinity that is culturally ascendant)
is constructed in relation to various subordinated masculinities as well as in relation to
femininities," and how such hierarchies among men "help to construct and legitimize
men's overall power and privilege over women"). For a discussion of how sexual dominance
by males over males constructs and reinforces male dominance in the workplace, see Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 757-58, 770-71
(1997).
471. See HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 145 (discussing sport as ground for celebrating
physical differences between males, as well as between males and females, and arguing that
the exalting of "hegemonic masculinity over other groups of men ... is essential to the
domination of women") (internal quotations omitted); see also Whitson, supranote 354, at
19, 26-27 (discussing the "darker side" of all-male sport culture that "demeans and objectifies women, and ... enforces and reinforces a certain standard of masculinity (i.e.,
aggressive, dominating, or 'macho') among men," and citing research "suggestfing] that
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Kenneth Karst's discussion of how the ideology of masculinity perpetuates male dominance is instructive:
The heart of the ideology of masculinity is the belief that
power rightfully belongs to the masculine-that is, to those
who display the traits traditionally called masculine. This belief has two corollaries. The first is that the gender line must
be clearly drawn, and the second is that power is rightfully
distributed among the masculine in proportion to their masculinity, as determined not merely by their physical stature or
aggressiveness, but more generally by their ability to dominate and to avoid being dominated.47 2
Thus, the exercise of male dominance over other males legitimates
a system of power in which the most "masculine" persons have the
most power over others.173 Subordinating others who are perceived
as less masculine confers power on those who practice subordination. The result is a hypermasculine culture which is not only
hostile to women, but also hostile to those men who do not fit474into,
or who dare to challenge, the dominant mode of masculinity.
The case of Seamons v. Snow 75 illustrates how male sport culture
can teach male dominance through the exercise of dominance
over other males. The Seamons case stemmed from an incident in
which a high school football player, Brian Seamons, was assaulted
by five of his teammates in the locker room after he came out of
the shower.4 76 They forced him, naked, onto a horizontal towel
rack, bound him onto the rack with adhesive tape, taped his genitals, and brought a girl whom he dated into the locker room to
view him, while other teammates watched.477
Brian reported the incident to the football coach and other
school administrators.4

ball

players

of any

78

These officials not only absolved the foot-

wrongdoing,

but

blamed

Brian

for

sport as a male preserve remains a bastion of reaction, in which traditional masculinity is
celebrated and other kinds of masculinity are disparaged and deterred").
472. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuitof Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38
UCLA L. Rxv. 499, 505 (1991).
473. See id. at 506.
474. See Catharine MacKinnon, Briefof Amici Curiae National Organizationon Male Sexual
Victimization, Inc. et al., 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 17-22 (1997) (analyzing male dominance
over other males and arguing that such dominance is integral to the ideology of male
dominance over women).
475. 84F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996).
476. Id. at 1230.
477. Id.
478. Id.
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complaining.4 79 The football coach brought Brian before the entire
team and forced him to apologize for reporting the incident and
betraying his teammates.480 When Brian refused, the coach dismissed Brian from the team, but allowed the five assailants to play
in the next game. 8' School officials told Brian that he "should have
taken it like a man," and the coach trivialized the incident, saying
"boys will be boys."48 2 When the incident drew public criticism, the
school district announced that it would have to cancel the final
game of the season, a playoff game for the state championship,
because of Brian's complaint. 48 3 After the game was cancelled,
Brian was harassed and ostracized by his peers so severely that even
484
the principal suggested that Brian transfer to a different school.

Brian ultimately took
the principal's advice and transferred out of
485
the school district.

Brian sued the school district under Title IX, arguing that its
failure to investigate and take disciplinary action in response to the
locker room incident created a hostile educational environment
4816
on the basis of his sex. Both the district and appellate courts in
the case failed to appreciate how the incident discriminated
against Brian on the basis of sex. 48 7 The Tenth Circuit, affirming

the district court's dismissal of the Title IX claim, described the
school district's actions in gender-neutral terms, insisting that:
"[t]he qualities Defendants were promoting, team loyalty and
toughness, are not uniquely male. The fact that the coach, and
perhaps others, described these qualities as they pertain to his
situation in terms of the
masculine gender does not convert this
4 88
into sexual harassment."

The court did not see that the school's reaction was influenced
by Brian's gender as a male who objected to the exercise of male
dominance in the locker room. Brian lost his male privilege when
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

487.

See Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1119-23 (D. Utah 1994) (dismissing Title

IX claim, but allowing plaintiff to proceed on First Amendment claims against the coach
and school district), affd, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (affirming dismissal of Title IX claim); see also
Seamons v. Snow, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Utah 1998) (dismissing remaining claims), rev'd,
206 F.3d 1021, 1031 (10th Cir. 2000) (reinstating First Amendment claims against both the
coach and school district).
488. Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1233.
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he broke ranks with his teammates and reported the abuse. The
coach's rebuke to Brian, "boys will be boys," reveals the gendered
meaning of the incident: by reporting his teammates, who were
acting in a gender-appropriate fashion, Brian was the one who was
not acting like a "boy." Under the rules of the locker room, Brian
became a "social female," resulting in the loss of his athletic privilege and his dismissal from the team .4 9 The explanation that "boys
will be boys" expresses explicitly what the incident expresses implicitly: sexual dominance is what boys do, and sport is sacred
ground for doing it.
The courts are just beginning to struggle with the legal issues
raised by institutional complicity in sexual abuse by male studentathletes. Where students are abused or harassed by a male studentathlete on the basis of sex, and the school responds with deliberate
indifference despite actual notice of the incident, Title IX provides
40
a remedy for sex discrimination to the individual victim.
However, in addition to discrimination against the immediate
target of the abuse, such cases involve gender bias at another level
as well: the institution's actions convey the message that male
athletic privilege includes physical and sexual dominance over
others. The privilege that is conferred is a privilege that is
distinctly male and premised on a dominant masculinity. Christy
Brzonkala, an athlete herself, received no protection from the
school on the basis of her athletic status. Likewise, Brian Seamons,
also an athlete, did not receive any protection from his athletic
status because, although biologically male, he did not act
consistently with the gendered expectations of being a male
athlete. The result in both types of cases is the reaffirmation of a
489. Id. at 1230; see also Kathryn Abrams, Complex Claimants and Reductive MoralJudgments: New Patterns in the Search for Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 337, 347 (1996) (discussing
male-male sexual harassment case as an example where a male was singled out because he
"responded to harassment in a socially female manner: he blushed, he stammered, he tried
to avoid sexual conversations"); Mary Anne C. Case, DisaggregatingGenderfrom Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and FemininstJurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 60-61
(1995) (arguing that sex discrimination law should protect men who are treated adversely
because their behavior or identity is associated with femininity).
490. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (holding that
schools are liable under Title IX for deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment by
students but "only for harassment that is 'so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that
it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit.' "). Despite
the court's ruling in Redmond that state institutions have Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit under Title IX, see Redmond v. Univ. of Neb., No. 4:CV95-3223, 1995 WL 928211,
at *1 (D. Neb. Dec. 5, 1995), the majority of courts have rejected this argument. See, e.g.,
Pederson v. La. St. Univ., 213 F. 3d 858, 876 (5th Cir. 2000); Franks v. Ky. Sch. for Deaf, 142
F.3d 360, 362-63 (6th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Univ. of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 659-60 (7th Cir. 1998);
Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1282-83 (8th Cir. 1997).
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male sport culture that binds together sport, masculinity, and male
dominance.
The masculine culture of sport described here is not something
that needs to be expected or accepted. Sport is socially constructed
as masculine; it is not masculine by nature."' A primary purpose of
this Article is to demonstrate that educational institutions have
enormous control over the culture of sport that occurs within
them, and thus have the power to reconstruct the masculine
culture that they have participated in creating.
Research into the
problem of sexism and sexual violence in the culture of male sport
has produced a number of concrete recommendations
that
49 3
institutions can implement to change the culture of sport.
One way educational institutions can influence sport culture is
through their coaches, who have tremendous power and influence
over the athletes they coachY. Coaches have the ability to change
male athletic culture by eliminating their own sexist comments
and punishing athletes who make such comments.4 9 5 The tone set
by the coach may even affect the practice of sexual dominance by
male athletes. One study of male athlete sexual abuse found that
the prevalence of reported sexual assaults by athletes changed
dramatically in some instances following changes in coaching

491.

Cf Carol Oglesby, Women and Sport, in SPORTS,

GAMES AND PLAY: SOCIAL AND PSY-

129, 143 (1989) (noting that sports involve traditionally feminine
characteristics as much as male-associated qualities of achievement, independence, and
activity).
492. See Timothy Davis & Tonya Parker, Student-Athlete Sexual Violence Against Women: Defining the Limits of Institutional Responsibility, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 55, 113 (1998)
("[C]olleges regulate [the] academic performance, course selection, training, practice
sessions, diet, attendance at study halls, curfews, and substance abuse [of their athletes].").
493. See McKAY, supra note 404, at 148-53 (stating that "[mien-particularly sports
administrators and coaches-have the capacity to eradicate sexism and sexual violence in
sport," and listing recommendations identified by researchers for how to go about doing
so).
494. See PRONGER, supra note 406, at 10 ("Many coaches seem like gods to their athletes, almost arbitrarily presiding over their athletic futures. What the coach says goes, even
if it has little to do with the athletic enterprise."); Timothy Davis, Student-Athlete Prospective
Economic Interests: ContractualDimensions, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 585, 622 (1994) ("[T]he
student-athlete's relationship with his or her institution is marked by dominance by institutions over most aspects of his or her college life.").
495. See NELSON, supra note 242, at 174 (describing experience of one female university
coach who had a policy forbidding sexist remarks and who once enforced that policy by
kicking a male athlete out of practice; she concluded, "They learn. Now the guys are respectful of the women's team."); Kidd, supra note 350, at 41 ("We can start [liberating sports
from patriarchal structures of domination] by actively questioning the pervasive masculinist
bias in the sports world. The language is rife with words and phrases that unconsciously
reinforce the male preserve..
").
CHOLOGICAL VIEWPOINTS
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staffs.496 The authors of the study concluded that coaches "may
social milieu and thus on
have a significant impact on the team's
497
athletes' behavior outside of sport."

The reconstruction of sport culture is crucial to transform both
men's and women's relationship to sport.491 the cultivation of
sport as a way for males to attain a privileged masculinity plays an
important role in shaping male athletic participation. 4 9

The

strength of the masculine ideology of sport-and the use of sport
as an avenue for proving one's masculinity-grealy influences the
decision of boys and men to play sports.500 At the same time, it puts
girls and women on notice that their place in sport is precarious,
influencing their participation as well. 50 1 The identification of sport

with a dominant masculinity has important implications for
women in sports. As long as sport is defined as a male domain, and
the culture of sport emphasizes the development of a dominant
masculinity, sport will continue to be unequal terrain for women.52
496. See Crosset et al., supranote 418, at 137.
497. Id.
498. Cf YOUNG, supranote 312, at 23 ("Culture is ubiquitous, but nevertheless deserves
distinct consideration in discussions of social justice. The symbolic meanings that people
attach to other kinds of people and to actions, gestures, or institutions often significantly
affect the social standing of persons and their opportunities.").
499. See Messner, supra note 355, at 107 (citing and discussing feminist literature
"demonstrat[ing] that organized sports give men from all backgrounds a means of status
enhancement that is not available to young women").
500. See id. at 106 (summarizing research suggesting that "within a social context that is
stratified by social class and by race, the choice to pursue or not to pursue an athletic career
is explicable as an individual's rational assessment of the available means to achieve a respected masculine identity").
501. See Lois Bryson, Sport and the Maintenance of Masculine Hegemony, in WOMEN, SPORT,
AND CULTURE, supra note 1, at 47, 50 (discussing "vast store of evidence which provides
illustration that sport is traditionally defined in such a way as to engage men rather than
women," and concluding that "[s]chool children learn very early the message about the
masculinity of sport"); Kerry A. White, 25 Years After Title IX, Sexual Bias in K-12 Sports Still
Sidelines Girls, EDUC. WEEK ON WEB, at http://www.edweek.org/ew/vol-16/38titlei.h16 (last
visited June 28, 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(discussing research finding that girls and boys younger than the age of nine show an equal
interest in playing sports, and that this begins to change around puberty, when girls respond to messages pervading schools and the media that sports are largely a male domain).
502. SeeGRIFFIN, supra note 398, at 16-17 ("The importance of sport in socializing men
into traditional masculine gender roles also defines the sport experience for women. Because sport is identified with men and masculinity, women in sport become trespassers in
male territory, and their access is limited or blocked entirely.") (citations omitted); HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 171 ("Changes in women's sports cannot happen unilaterally
when boys continue to be schooled through sports to accept an aggressive model of masculinity that embodies compulsory heterosexuality, the subordination of women, and the
marginalization of gay men."); cf Chamallas, New Gender Panic, supra note 356, at 366
(citing to scholarship "detailing how informal customs and traditions in the service
academies and during basic training construct a hypermasculine environment in which
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3. Constraintson Female Athleticism-The conflation of sport and

masculinity in the culture of sport leaves women in a compromised
position in relation to sport. Historically, athletic participation has
conflicted with the dominant cultural meaning of femininity.
Female athletes have had some difficulty defining their relationship to sport as a result of the social forces that have constructed
sport as a proving ground for masculinity.0 4 The perceived conflict
between athleticism and femininity is illustrated most graphically
in the sex-testing of successful female athletes to make sure that
the athlete is biologically female. 5 Although this is not a practice
that is used within educational institutions, its continuing existence
in other sport arenas, including the Olympics, serves as a graphic
reminder of the dominant perception that elite female athletes are
culturally suspect.
In recent years, as girls' and women's sports have become more
popular, the cultural conflict between athleticism and femininity
has become more selective, but it is still present. 50 6 Its intensity var-

ies in response to what sports female athletes play, how they
compete, and how they present their femininity. 50 The pressure to
maintain a culturally approved mode of femininity while participating in a masculine institution places female athletes in the

women are regarded as alien and inferior," and concluding that "[u]nless the job of the
soldier is degendered, in the sense that the image of a 'good soldier' is no longer seen as
exclusively male, we can expect continued resistance to women in the military, particularly
in leadership roles").
503. See Willis, supra note 241, at 35 ("There is a very important thread in popular consciousness which sees the very presence of women in sport as bizarre.").
504. See Cole, supra note 240, at 20 ("The female athletic body was and remains suspicious because of both its apparent masculinization and its position as a border case that
challenges the normalized feminine and masculine body.").
505. See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 239, at 263-64 (discussing International Olympic Committee practice of mandatory chromosome-testing of female Olympic athletes); id. at 2
(describing incident where two fathers of athletes on the losing girl's soccer team demanded that the three best players on the winning team undress in the bathroom so that a
designated parent could verify that they were girls).
506. See Michael A. Messner, Sports and Male Domination: The Female Athlete as Contested
Ideological Terrain, in WOMEN, SPORT, AND CULTURE, supra note 1, at 65, 71 (citing a 1985
poll showing that ninety-four percent of the female athletes surveyed did not regard athletic
participation as threatening to their femininity, but that fifty-seven percent of these same
athletes agreed that "society still forces a choice between being an athlete and being feminine, suggesting that there is still a dynamic tension between traditional prescriptions for
femininity and the image presented by active, strong, even muscular women").
507. See Willis, supra note 241, at 36 ("As the athlete becomes even more outstanding,
she marks herself out as even more deviant. Instead of confirming her identity, success can
threaten her with a foreign male identity.").
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classic "double bind."50 8 Participation in sports requires strength,
competitiveness, aggression, and drive-qualities culturally defined as masculine-and maintaining traditional femininity
requires passivity, vulnerability, softness, and physical weaknessqualities defined by sport culture as unathletic.
Navigating this tension can be tricky. Some female athletes react
to this cultural conflict by engaging in efforts to "prove" their
cultural femininity (and, by extension, their heterosexuality) . °
Mary Jo Festle has called this reaction "apologetic behavior"
designed to mediate role conflict by downplaying the contra510
diction between a woman's role as an athlete and as a woman.
Examples of apologetic behavior include promoting a sexualized
or traditionally feminine image, overtly disassociating from
lesbianism, preferring male over female coaches, disclaiming any
affinity for feminism, and not challenging the prioritization of
male over female athletics. 5" The very need for, and existence of,
apologetic behavior in turn reinforces the perception of the
conflict.
Educational institutions may contribute to and exacerbate the
cultural tensions between sport and femininity through the structuring of their athletic programs and the sport cultures they
maintain. For many institutions, at the same time that they construct sport as a masculine domain, they actively reinforce women's
compromised relationship to sport. This process often involves
several overlapping practices, described here as marginalization,
containment, and objectification. One or more of these strategies
plays a role in shaping women's relationship to sport at many institutions.
508. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 17 (discussing the "double bind" facing women
who strive to achieve in predominantly male fields).
509. See Kidd, supra note 350, at 36 ("Female athletes have also faced inordinate pressures to conform to the heterosexual expectations of most males.") (internal citation
omitted).
510.

FESTLE, supra note 36, at 45.

511. See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 398, at 66 (defining "apologetic" response to the
"lesbian bogeywoman" in women's sports); Nelson, Who We Might Become, supranote 7, at xi
("Some female athletes deliberately dissociate themselves from femininism. They assert that
their involvement [in sports] changes nothing, that they can compete 'and still be feminine.' These athletes take great pains-and it can hurt-to send reassuring signals to those
who would oppose their play.... It has been a survival strategy."); Julie Cart, Lesbian Issue
Stirs Discussion; Women's Sports: Fear and DiscriminationAre Common As Players Deal With a Perception of Homosexuality, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1992, at CI ("To counter the perception of
lesbianism, some female athletes adopt compensatory behavior; they wear makeup while
competing, they dress in ultra-feminine clothes when not competing, they talk about their
boyfriends, whether they have them or not.").
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The marginalization of women's sports occurs at many levels,
including the unequal treatment of and benefits provided to female athletes, and the devaluation of female athletes by paying
coaches more money to coach male athletes than female athletes.
The existence and impact of these practices has been discussed
previously.

51 2

However, marginalization also occurs at the level of

sport culture, conveying the message that athletics is, by nature,
male, and that women's place in sport is peripheral.
One example of how institutions perpetuate a sport culture that
marginalizes female athletes is in the naming of athletic teams. It is
common practice for educational institutions to specifically identify the gender of their women's teams through the team name,
while employing sex-neutral language to describe their men's
teams. 513 The gendered names affixed to girls' and women's teams
reflect a cultural fixation with the need to reinforce the femininity
and the specialness of what is presented as a distinctly female,
modified version of sport.51 4 For example, the "Tennessee Lady
Volunteers" (women's basketball), juxtaposed with the "Tennessee
Volunteers" (men's basketball) reflects the value judgment that
the normal baseline for sports is male. 51 5 The women's team is

shown to be an add-on or an after-thought to the school athletics
program, as women's teams in fact were historically.1 6 As historian
Susan Cahn explains:
The primary status of male sport found expression in common language, too. Women's presence was signaled with
references to "women's basketball" or the "ladies golf tour,"
while the unmodified "basketball" or "golf" presumed the
512. Seediscussion supra Part III.D.1-2.
513. See Lady Nanooks? What's a Women's Team to Do?; Equality of Sexes Vexes When Schools
Tiy Names that Are Gender Benders, BALT. SUN, Jan. 10, 1999, at 4C ("By the time women were
permitted to play intercollegiately, most schools already had team nicknames, and they had
been chosen to reflect the characteristics of the men's teams."); Lois Kerschen, Schoolgirls:
Clasfications, Roles and Sports, Women's Sports Foundation, at http://208.178.42.127/
templates/re.. ...topics2.html?article=61&record=36 (last visitedJan. 21, 2000) (on file with
the University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform) ("[M]ost of the time, the Cardinals are the
men, and the Lady Cardinals are the women.").
514. The practice of gender-differential naming can lead to strangely gendered team
names. See RHODE, supra note 25, at 62 ("Female sporting events often feature zoologically
bizarre competitions between beaverettes, lady panthers, and teddy bears."). Of the oddly
gendered women's athletic names I have heard, my personal favorite is "The Lady Warriors." See Suggs, At Smaller Colleges, supranote 322, at A69.
515. See FESTLE, supra note 36, at 52 ("[I]t was not 'basketball'-it was 'girls' basketball.'
The word basketball connoted boys' basketball, just as athlete referred to a male unless otherwise qualified. This was not merely an issue of language but of norms.").
516. See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 239, at 222; FESTLE, supra note 36, at 52.
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presence of men. Similarly, by itself the
noun "athlete" was in common usage a
athleticism found acknowledgment only
fied term "woman athlete." In language
women's sport required modification .

supposedly neutral
male term. Female
through the modias well as practice,

The cultural significance of the sex-differentiated naming of
athletic teams is not always agreed upon among advocates for
women in sport.5 1 ' Female athletes themselves do not always object
to the naming of "ladies" or "women's" teams, despite the absence
of comparable qualifiers for the men's teams. 519 In part, this may
be because female athletes do not want to draw attention to disparities that they view as trivial in the scheme of things, or to be
viewed as radical or trouble-makers. Some female athletes may
even welcome the special designation as reinforcement that they
are feminine in a sport culture that requires female athletes to

517. CAHN, supra note 239, at 222.
518. See, e.g., Amy Moritz, Sticking Up for the 'Lady'; Gail Maloney's Fightfor Women's Sports
Has Paralleledthe Timeline of Title IX BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 27, 2000, at 8S (discussing opposition
of coach to changing team name from the "Lady Bengals"); Libby Sander, Title IX Report
Card: Goals, Assists and Fouls for Girls' and Women's Sports: What's In a Name, Anyway?, THE
WOMEN'S SPORTS EXPERIENCE, Oct./Nov. 1999, at 14, 14 (discussing belief of the opponents
of a move to strike the prefix "Lady" from female athletic teams that doing so "would actually send the message to female athletes that men's athletic programs are superior, and that
women's programs need to fit the mold of men's programs in order to be worthy of recognition"). But see Christine Brennan, Words to the Wise About Unwise Words, USA TODAY, Mar.
4, 1999, at 3C (urging the NCAA to change the name of the "Final Four" to the "Men's Final
Four," and for women's teams to remove the word "Lady" from their school names, and
stating that "as the women's game has grown, respect for its presence also should expand.
To continue to call the men's tournament the Final Four, implying that it is the be-all and
end-all of college hoops as if it's the only game in town, is to reach the heights of institutional arrogance").
519. See, e.g., Kim Ode, Hey, Lady... You'll Have to Leave Now; It's Long Past the Time to
Dump the Term as a Nickname for Female Athletic Teams, MINN. STAR TRIB., June 6, 1999, at 4E
(discussing experience with gendered team names at a Wisconsin high school whose athletic director states that female athletes at the school like their team nickname, the "Lady
Popes," and do not want to change it).
520. See, e.g., Kerschen, supra note 513 (relaying author's conversation with a highranking professor in women's athletics at Texas Tech about why their women's teams were
called the "Lady Raiders":
She said that they hated the name and wanted to be called just Raiders or the Raider
women's team, but that they were just starting to get some attention from the media
because of their national ranking, and they were too afraid of alienating the press by
trying to make any demands.
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prove their femininity.5 2' Nevertheless, the message is clear: athletes and 2 sports are presumptively male unless otherwise
specified.
A related constraint on girls and women in sport is the containment of women's sports to modes of athleticism that are
considered culturally appropriate and nonthreatening. The practice of containment occurs when female athletes who push the
boundaries of their accepted place in sport too far are met with
resistance and hostility 2 3 For example, the culture of sport, while
it is increasingly tolerant of the presence of women in sport, becomes very hostile to demands for equal resources. 4 Female
athletes who provoke the guardians of male sport privilege by vocalizing inequality risk retaliation and retribution.52 ' Many female
athletes respond by accepting inferior treatment because they recognize the dangers associated with challenging sex inequality in
sport in a culture that has not fully reconciled5 2female
athleticism
6
with dominant notions of traditional femininity.

521.

See, e.g.,
Ben Tschann & Mikki Chullino, Creighton Dissolves Gender Distinctions in

Nickname, THEPCREIGHTONIAN, Sept. 25, 1998, at 7 (discussing reaction of female athletes to

change in teams name from "Lady Jays" to the "Bluejays," and noting that, although some
women athletes were very supportive of the change, others thought that the change was not
"a big deal," and even liked the "LadyJays" because it made them "'a little different'"); see
also FESTLE, supra note 36, at 26 (defining "'hegemonic' norms" as "notions so pervasive
and taken for granted that even people oppressed by them do not challenge them" and
discussing the importance of retaining one's femininity as such a norm affecting women in
athletics).
522. See Kerschen, supra note 513 (stating that the message of referring to women's
teams as "Lady Bulls" or "Rebelettes" is that "sports are for men; women who participate are
'coeds' where 'co' means 'in addition to or as an afterthought to' the real participants who
are, of course, men").
523. GRIFFIN, supra note 398, at 17 (describing a 1997 incident in which a twelve-yearold female catcher playing in a Babe Ruth baseball league was forced to wear a protective
cup to comply with league rules, despite the absence of any medical reason for a girl to wear
a protective cup; "[t]his example shows the absurd lengths to which some men will go to try
to humiliate a young girl to make sure she knows that she is trespassing on male turf").
524. See FESTLE, supra note 36, at 185, 359 n.l, 12; see also Andrea M. GiampetroMeyer, Recognizing and Remedying Individual and Institutional Gender-Based Wage Discrimination
in Sport, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 343, 353 (2000) (discussing men's historic control over sport, and
stating, "Men generally believe they deserve more and better of everything. After all, they
are better athletes who provide exciting entertainment.... When women 'score' by gaining
financial support, men perceive they have lost something that was rightfully theirs.")
525. See Lillian Howard Potter, 'Man-Woman'. Anti-Gay Peer Harassmentof Straight High
SchoolActivists, 1 GEO.J. GENDER & L. 173, 175 (1999) (discussing author's experiences as a
student who encountered severe harassment by other students when she raised gender
equity concerns about the athletic programs in high schools in Montgomery County, Maryland.).
526. See FEsTLE, supra note 36, at 285, 349 n.119.
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A primary mechanism for containment is the lesbian-baiting of
women in sport. The "lesbian label" has historically been used to
control and regulate women's participation in sport.5 2 1 With recent
improvements in the cultural acceptance of women playing sports,
the lesbian stigma has become more selective: it targets female athletes whose sport experiences defy the expectations for girls and
women in sport. Female athletes who play sports perceived as
"feminine" are less at risk for anti-lesbian reactions. Mariah Burton
Nelson reports, "Only contact sports, team sports, and traditionally
male-dominated sports are rumored to be lesbian havens.... Female athletes in traditionally masculine sports challenge social
dictates about proper behavior for females; therefore,
the reason' 2s
ing goes, there must be something wrong with them. -1

The specter of anti-lesbian harassment looms large in the lives
of female athletes. As Pat Griffin writes:
As women's participation in sport has become more acceptable and widespread, norms of femininity have expanded to
include athleticism. Lesbians in sport are now more openly
targeted within sport and continue to represent the boundary
line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior for
women. As a result, fear of the lesbian label continues to control women's sport. Fear of the lesbian label ensures that
women do not gain control over their sporting experience or
develop their physical competence beyond what is acceptable
in a sexist culture. 5
Anti-lesbian policing is not limited to female athletes whose athletic participation itself becomes too "masculine." The power of
the lesbian stigma is widely used to enforce the subordinate position of girls and women in sport by punishing resistance to the
status quo. 530 Female athletes who advocate for gender equity in
527.

See, e.g.,
Pat Griffin, Homophobia in Women's Sports: The Fear that Divides Us, in
supranote 238, at 193, 194-95.
528. NELSON, supra note 242, at 144. Nelson attributes negative charges of lesbianism in
women's professional golf and tennis to their professional status, under the reasoning that
"[a]ny woman who takes sports seriously, who devotes her life to sports, must be gay," even
though these sports have traditionally been considered appropriate activities for women. Id.
She also notes that male athletes who participate in sports viewed as feminine also face accusations of homosexuality, so that "sports requiring grace and judged on beauty-such as
diving, skating, and gymnastics-are rumored to be populated by gay men." Id.
529. GRIFFIN, supranote 398, at 48-49.
530. E.g., id. at 20 ("As long as women's sports are associated with lesbians and lesbians are stigmatized as sexual and social deviants, the lesbian label serves an important
social-control function in sport, ensuring that only men have access to the benefits of
WOMEN IN SPORT,
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sport face the risk of being labeled as lesbians and punished accordingly. One former high school athlete who led a charge for
Tide IX compliance in the Montgomery County Public Schools
offers a poignant account of the harassment she experienced from
other students:
During my senior year of high school, it was impossible for
me to walk down the halls of my high school without being
called a "dyke," or, my personal favorite, "man-woman." The
harassment followed me everywhere-to class, in the parking
lot, at the McDonald's at lunch, at the mall, and at parties on
the weekend. During every class period, at least one student
would interrupt class with some epithet or insult directed toward me. Sadly, teachers did nothing to discourage the
conduct.31
Educational institutions participate in the practice of containment by permitting lesbian-baiting and anti-lesbian harassment
within their athletic programs. When school administrators and
employees tolerate such conduct by not intervening to stop the
harassment, they contribute to the precarious place of all female
athletes in sport, regardless of their sexual orientation .
At some institutions, coaches reinforce an anti-lesbian bias
against women in sport. Coaches of female athletes have been
known to disclose anti-lesbian views or policies to potential female
recruits and their parents in an effort to bolster recruiting. 1 4 Some
sport participation and the physical and psychological empowerment available in sport.");
Cart, supra note 511, at C1 (discussing "profound impact" of widespread homophobia on
women athletes and coaches and how it affects their participation in sports).
531. Potter, supranote 525, at 175.
532. See GRIFFIN, supranote 398, at 83 (noting that female athletes, regardless of their
sexual orientation, have been subjected to anti-lesbian harassment from coaches, teammates, opposing teams, other students, or fans).
533. See Brake, The Cruelest of the Gender Police, supranote 144, at 100-01 (illustrating the
adverse effects of anti-gay harassment on students regardless of their sexual orientation); see
also Women's Sports Foundation, Homophobia in Women's Sports, at http://208.178.42.127/
templates/re.. ...topics2.html?article=54&record=39 (last visitedJan. 21, 2000) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform) ("Those who feel threatened by Title IX...
are using fear of exposing women coaches as lesbians to deter them from talking about
unequal treatment of female athletes.").
534. See FESTLE, supra note 36, at xxvii (discussing homophobic recruiting practices of
some women's coaches); GRIFFIN, supra note 398, at 79. Griffin notes that:
Penn State coach Renee Portland is not the only coach to prohibit lesbians from her
team. Other college coaches also tell athletes and their parents that they will not allow lesbians on their teams.... Some coaches follow through by dropping women
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schools even engage in "negative recruiting," whereby coaches
suggest to potential recruits and/or their parents that a rival program includes a lesbian coach or players. 3 5
Many educational institutions allow anti-lesbian bias and bias
against women in sport to limit women in coaching and athletic
administration positions as well. 516 The lesbian-baiting of female
coaches and administrators contributes to the precarious position
of women in sport leadership positions. Athletic directors sometimes avoid hiring women, preferring men to coach women's
teams in order to "rehabilitate" a women's team that has been
"tarnished" with a lesbian reputation.5 7 In this way, cultural anxiety
about women in sport combines with anti-lesbian bias to displace
women from leadership positions in sport.
The final strategy discussed here in connection with the cultural
constraints on female athletes is the objectification of women in
sport. The tendency to emphasize the sexuality of women in sport
reinforces the message that female athletes have something to
prove with regard to their femininity. The sexualization of female
athletes responds to the cultural tension between athleticism and
femininity by highlighting the heterosexual sexuality of girls and
women in sport.5 9 At the same time, it downplays their athleticism,
they discover are lesbians from the roster, limiting their playing time, or ostracizing
them.
GRIFFIN, supranote 398, at 79.
535. See GRIFFIN, supra note 398, at 82-83; Homophobia, supra note 533 (stating it is "not

uncommon" for a coach to suggest "to a recruit that the coach of the team at another
school she is considering is a lesbian").
536. GRIFFIN, supra note 398, at 79 (stating that "[slome athletic directors fire women
coaches if they suspect that they are lesbians"); NELSON, supra note 242, at 152 (quoting
Betty Jaynes, the executive director of the Women's Basketball Coaches' Association, as
stating, "We're losing women in coaching because they're afraid of being labeled lesbians.").
537. GRIFFIN, supra note 398, at 84.
538. Id. at 205 (noting that women head coaches may also prefer to hire male assistant
coaches to "counteract any lesbian aura that might be associated with an all-women coaching staff').
539. Cf Women's Sports Foundation, Women's Sports and Sexuality: The Myth and the Reality, at http://208.178.42.127/templates/re... topics2.html?article=368&record=39 website
(last visited Jan. 21, 2000) (on file with the University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform). The
Foundation observes that:
Girls, fearful of being labeled lesbians, choose not to participate in sports and miss
out on the physical and mental benefits. Those women who do engage in sports often feel the need to prove their heterosexuality by having unwanted sex or allowing
themselves to be portrayed in sexually provocative poses.
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reducing them to a less significant presence in sport. 540 The mes-

sage is that female athletes must be "feminized" to be made
acceptable, and objectified to be rendered nonthreatening. The
significance of the female athlete becomes her sexuality, not her
strength, stamina, skill, or speed.
Educational institutions, like other seats of culture, can contribute to the objectification of women in sport. One way in which
some institutions emphasize the sexuality of their female athletes is
through their publicity and promotional materials. At some institutions, female athletes are photographed in feminine, sexualized
poses, or dressed up in nonathletic clothes, while male athletes are
pictured in action shots in the heat of the game.541 Such differences
in the way schools portray their male and female athletes effectively convey the institution's view of the essential identities of men
and women in sport.
One widespread example of institutional reinforcement of the
objectification of women in sport is found in the structuring of
cheerleading programs. Cheerleaders occupy the quintessentially
"feminine" role of standing at the periphery, offering unconditional support for the athletes who play the traditionally masculine
role of competing in the primary athletic event. 54 2 The cultural
540. For an insightful discussion of the effect of objectification on female athleticism
and bodily movement, see YOUNG, supranote 353, at 141-56. See Willis, supra note 241, at 35
(describing sexualization of female athletes as a "useful technique, for if a woman seems to
be encroaching too far, and too threateningly, into male sanctuaries, she can be symbolically vapourised and reconstituted as an object, a butt for smutty jokes and complacent
elbow nudging").
541. GRIFFIN, supra note 398, at 75 (discussing 1987 media guide for Northwestern
State University of Louisiana women's basketball team in which the players were posed in
sexually suggestive positions wearing their uniforms with Playboy bunny ears, with a caption
saying "These girls can play, boy" and inviting fans and reporters to watch them play in the
"pleasure palace"); Susan Vinella, What's Wrong with This Picture?; It Spotlights the Woman and
Not the Athlete, Critics Say, DAYTON DAILY NEws, July 16, 1995, at ID (discussing media portrayal of female athletes as "vulnerable, sexy and passive women and not as accomplished
competitors" and reporting that "[a] look at about two dozen men's and women's basketball media guides on file at the Dayton Daily News shows that indeed women were much
more likely to be posed in street clothes while men were most often pictured shooting baskets on the court").
542. See Laurel R. Davis, Male Cheerleaders and the Naturalization of Gender, in SPORT,
MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER, supra note 26, at 153, 154 [hereinafter Davis, Male Cheerleaders](describing cultural image of cheerleading as a "naturally feminine" activity and
describing stereotypes of female cheerleaders as "good looking, sexy, supportive, bouncy,
and bubbly");Jay, supra note 146, at 31-32 (discussing cheerleading as a practice that contributes to women's subordination in sport by feminizing the supporting role in sport and
naturalizing the view that males are the "real" athletes). In addition to cheering at the
games, some cheerleaders perform the female nurturer and support role for male athletes
off the field. See, e.g., Potter, supra note 525, at 174 (describing role of cheerleaders in
Montgomery County Public Schools as " ' guardian angels' of the football and boys' basket-
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function of cheerleading is to exhibit feminine, sexualized women
providing a support and entertainment role in sport. As sociologist
Laurel Davis explains:
[C]heerleading sends messages about what are appropriate
activities for females or for females in sport. The female
cheerleader represents support for males, especially the male
athletes.... The place for women in sport is seen as on the
sidelines engaged in activities that
43 should not be taken too seriously by the sport community.
The athletes cheered on in the role of competitor tend to be male
as well. 44 However, even when the athletes are female, the cultural
meaning of cheerleading remains gendered, with cheerleaders
serving as a reminder of the seemingly natural, feminine place for
females in sport. The presence of cheerleaders at female athletic
events has not changed the public perception of cheerleading and
sport as differently gendered activities.
The relatively recent integration of males onto cheerleading
squads also has not altered the gendered dynamic of cheerleading,
nor its contribution to the masculinization of sport and the femininization of the female support-role. 46 Male cheerleaders play a
distinct role in cheerleading, engaging in very different physical
activities than female cheerleaders, such as tumbling and lifting
female cheerleaders, while female cheerleaders peform dancing
routines and other activities viewed as more feminine.5 47 The male
cheerleading role is perceived as helping to show off the female

ball teams, baking cookies and buying small gifts for the players," without offering such
support to the girls' teams).
543. Davis, Male Cheerleaders, supra note 542, at 155; see also LENSKYJ, supra note 239, at
101 (discussing significance of female cheerleading in sport, and stating that "[w]hatever
the rationale, the presence of attractive, admiring women validates the display of masculinity and machismo on the playing field.").
544. See, e.g., Kerschen, supra note 513 (stating that cheerleading squads "cheer for the
male teams, but seldom does anyone cheer for the girl's, or women's teams, or give them a
pep rally"); Potter, supra note 525, at 174 (describing inequities in Montgomery County
Public Schools, including that " [c] heerleaders cheered only at boys' games, never girls' ").
545. See Laurel R. Davis, A Postmodern Paradox? Cheerleadersat Women's Sporting Events, in
WOMEN, SPORT, AND CULTURE, supra note 1, at 149, 150-52 [hereinafter Davis, A Postmodern
Paradox?].
546. See id.
547. Id. at 154. Despite their different cheerleading activities, male cheerleaders also
face challenges to their masculinity-which also reinforces gender dichotomies in sport. See
id. at 155-56 (describing common perceptions of male cheerleaders as "feminine" or gay,
based on the view that cheerleading is a "feminine" activity).
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cheerleaders.
With the gender specialization of cheerleading
tasks, the presence of male cheerleaders further "feminizes" female cheerleaders and contributes to the differentiation of
masculine and feminine identities in sport.9
The emphasis on female cheerleaders' physical attractiveness
and the culturally feminine display of their athletic skills contains
important assumptions not only about the sex of the players and
the role of women in sport, but also about the gender of the spectators-and by implication, the gender of sport itself. The primary
audience for female cheerleaders is presumed to be male heterosexuals. As Davis explains:
Not only are cheerleaders seen as female, but spectators are
seen as naturally male. The assumption that the male audience is voyeuristically fixated on the female cheerleaders
helps to structure the performances and presentation of
cheerleaders ....

[T]he male view of a cameraman often

helps to frame female cheerleaders as erotic objects. This type
of camera work objectifies and sexualizes females, and it is
based on and reinforces the notion of male voyeurism as
natural and heterosexuality as universal for all men.55 O
The existence of cheerleading programs that are structured on the
basis of an objectified role for women in sport, at the periphery of
the men's game, symbolically conveys important messages about
548. Id. at 157-58 (describing the sexual division of labor on cheerleading teams as reflecting traditional norms of gender).
549. See Davis, Male Cheerleaders,supranote 542, at 153. Davis points out that cheerleading was not always considered "feminine." Id. In the 1800s, cheerleading was an all-male
activity, and the entry of females in cheerleading during World War I was viewed by many as
an intrusion into the male domain of sport. Id. However, men dropped out of cheerleading
in the 1940s and 50s, as more women became cheerleaders, and by the 1970s cheerleading
was considered to be "naturally feminine." Id. Males did not reenter cheerleading in significant numbers until the late 1970s. Id.; see also LENSKYJ, supra note 239, at 84 (discussing the
transformation of cheerleading from a mostly male event that valued gymnastic performances and deep male voices to an event emphasizing the decorative function of female
cheerleaders).
550. Davis, Male Cheerleaders, supranote 542, at 159 (citations omitted). An example of
this type of "camera work" can be found in the movie American Beauty where a middle-aged
father, played by Kevin Spacey, becomes obsessed with his high school daughter's cheerleading friend (played by Mena Suvari) after watching her perform a cheerleading routine
during a male basketball game. AMERICAN BEAUTY (DreamworksSKG 1999). The portrayal
of Kevin Spacey's character as a middle-aged father falling for a high school cheerleader was
comic, yet sympathetic, as the cheerleader represented the embodiment of idealized, irresistible, and devious sexuality combined with, in the end, a hidden innocence and
vulnerability. The storyline played out the cultural image of the female cheerleader as seductress of the male sports spectator.
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the gender of sport and the respective roles of men and women
within it.
This message is all the more profoundly communicated by those
schools that try to count cheerleaders as athletes in an attempt to
bolster their measurement of female sports participants under the
Title IX three-part test. High schools and colleges are increasingly
attempting to count cheerleading as a sport for the purposes of
Tide IX compliance!" So far, OCR has resisted this move, holding
fast to its policy determination that cheerleading is not a sport unless its primary activity is interscholastic or intercollegiate
competition. 52 Nevertheless, some schools do count cheerleaders
as athletes.5 The decision to provide cheerleading opportunities
for girls instead of additional competitive sport opportunities in
which female athletes themselves are the central event, compounds the message that the preferred place for girls and women
in sport is on the sidelines.
There is a danger that in describing the constraints facing
women in sport, the constraints will appear more monolithic and
stable than they actually are.554 In fact, the constraints that shape
girls' and women's relationship to sport are not monolithic. Many
women of color, in particular, have not had their sport experiences defined by the same cultural conflict that presents
traditional femininity as oppositional to athleticism. African
American women, for example, have a distinct history in relation
to sports; they have not experienced the same "protective" rationale as white girls and women for limiting their athletic

551. See Women's Sports Foundation, Foundation Position Papers, Addressing the Issue of
Drill Team, Cheerleading Danceline and Band as Varsity Sports, at http://208.178.42.127/
templates/action/take/results.html?record=95 (last visited Jan. 28, 2000) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("It has come to our attention that there are
athletic governance associations, schools and colleges who are attempting to recognize drill
team, cheerleading, danceline, marching bands, twirling and similar extracurricular activities as bona fide sports and varsity athletic program offerings in order to comply with Title
IX.").
552. Adrienne D. Coles, School CheerleadingEvolving into a Competitive Activity, EDUC.
2000, at http://www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?
ON WEB, Apr. 26,
WEEK
slug=33cheer.h19 (on file with author) (citing to 1995 statement of the Office for Civil
Rights that cheerleading is not considered a sport for purposes of Title IX athletics compliance).
553. See id.; see also Amy Argetsinger, This Is Cheerleading? 'All Star' Squads Are Doing It for
Themselves, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, July 17, 1999, at IC (noting that Anne Arundel
County, Md., like many other school systems, have designated cheerleading as a sport).
554. Cf NUSSBAUM, supra note 46, at 14 ("[Pleople are not stamped out like coins by
the power machine of social convention. They are constrained by social norms, but norms
are plural and people are devious.").
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Black women, having been excluded from stan-

dards of femininity shaped by white middle class norms, have been
56
less constrained by a conflict between athleticism and femininity.
Perhaps as a consequence of the different cultural meanings of
sport for white women and African American women, different
sports historically have been emphasized for white women and
African American women. This has presented its own barrier to
African American female athletes. While white women were
channeled into purportedly "feminine" sports such as field hockey
and swimming, African American women were playing basketball
and competing in track.5 5

African American girls and women

continue to be channeled into the "black" sports of basketball and
track, and are sorely underrepresented in other sports.5 s In
addition to the sport-specific cultural constraints faced by African
American girls and women, economic barriers also have distorted
the athletic participation of African American girls and women,
who have been less able to afford the private training and
experience necessary to compete in sports where access is
expensive.5 5 9 The issue of economic access has been compounded
555. See Cindy Himes Gissendanner, African-American Women and Competitive Sport,
1920-1960, in WOMEN, SPORT, AND CULTURE, supra note 1, at 88 (discussing history of African American women in sport, and noting that "[t]he African-American woman's
experience flew in the face of medical arguments linking physical exertion during menstruation with reproductive malfunction, one of the basic components of the ... argument
against scheduled competitive events for girls and women."); see also CAHN, supra note 239,
at 36-41, 69-70, 110-39 (discussing distinct societal constraints that have shaped African
American women's participation in sport).
556. See Gissendanner, supra note 555, at 88 (arguing that African American women
generally adhered to a more active ideal of femininity than their white counterparts); Messner, supra note 506, at 71 (citing to literature arguing that "there has never been an
apologetic for black women athletes, suggesting that there are cultural differences in the
construction of femininities").
557. See CAHN, supra note 239, at 89, 96-97,111-12, 129.
558. See Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Black Women, Gender Equity and the Function at the
Junction, 6 MARQ. SPORTS LJ. 239, 257 (1996) (discussing the steering of black female athletes into basketball and track, and away from other sports); see also Debra E. Blum, The
Battle for GenderEquity: Some Fear that Steps to Help Female Athletes May Curtail Opportunitiesfor
Blacks, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 26, 1995, at http://chronicle.com/che-data/arti...s41.dir/issue-37.dir/37a00101.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) (last visited June 28, 2000) (citing data showing that eighty-one percent of black

female athletes at Division I colleges competed in basketball or track); Kelly Whiteside, Race
in Sports/Wednesday Special/A Ways to Go/Minority Women Have Been Left Out in Title IX Gains,
NEWSDAY (New York), July 1, 1998, at A74 (reporting NCAA data showing that, outside of
basketball and track, only five percent of female college athletes receiving aid in 1996 were
African American).

559. Marilyn V. Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 229, 235-36
(1996) [hereinafter Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports]; see also Olson, supra note 146, at
129-30 (suggesting that African American women are typecast into only a handful of sports
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by discrimination against women of color in arenas where they
could develop their athletic skills, such as country clubs and
community recreational programs.5 6 When schools, colleges, and
universities add women's sports without addressing the barriers to
full participation by women of color, they contribute to the
inequality of women of color in sport.-5
The constraints facing girls and women of color in sport have
just begun to be the subject of critical scholarly analysis. 62 Marilyn
Yarbrough, among other scholars, provides a much-needed voice
analyzing the barriers facing African American women in sport,
who stand in a precarious place at the intersection of race and
gender.5 ' There is a great need for further research and attention
to the distinct constraints facing girls and women of color in
sport. 56 4 The national conversation about sex inequality in sport
must include an examination of the athletic experiences of all girls
and women, not just those who are at the pinnacle of racial, sexual, and class privilege.565
A related danger in discussing the social constraints facing girls
and women in sport is that the extent to which many female athletes have transcended these constraints will be obscured.5
for which it is inexpensive to acquire skills and where there is public access to facilities
where the sports can be played); Elliott Almond, Title IX 25 Years Later-Minority Women
Worry About Which Sports Get Support, SEATrLE TIMES, June 22, 1997, at All (noting that
sports commonly added in the name of gender equity-such as golf, gymnastics, rowing,
soccer, tennis, and water polo-favor participants of some means, translating into more
opportunities for college women from suburban white neighborhoods).
560. SeeYarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports, supra note 559, at 235-36.
561. Cf Almond, supra note 559 (quoting one African American women's track coach
as stating, "[w]hite coaches are less inclined to go to the inner-city areas" to recruit athletes
in the emerging sports); Whiteside, supra note 558 (noting that the "emerging sports" for
women designated by the NCAA "are primarily played by whites").
562. See, e.g., Tonya M. Evans, In the Title IX Race Toward Gender Equity, the Black Female
Athlete Is Left to Finish Last: The Lack of Access for the "Invisible Woman", 42 How. L.J. 105
(1998); Mathewson, supra note 558; Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports, supra note 559.
563. See Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports, supra note 559, at 234-38; Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Sports Law as a Reflection of Society's Laws and Values: A Sporting Chance: The Intersection
of Race and Gender,38 S. TEX. L. REv. 1029, 1033 (1997) [hereinafter Yarbrough, A Sporting
Chance]; see also Evans, supra note 562, at 105, 107; Mathewson, supra note 558, at 241-45.
564. See, e.g., Don Sabo, Mexican-American Girls and High School Sports, at http://
208.178.42.127/templates/re.. ... topics2.html?article=46&record-19 (last visited Jan. 21,
2000) (on file with the University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform) (stating that Latina and
Asian American female athletes have not been the focus of scholarly investigation).
565. Cf Elise Pettus, From the Suburbs to the Sports Arenas, in NIa Is A GODDESS, supra
note 7, at 245, 265 (noting that girls' soccer "is still primarily a white, middle-class, suburban
sport, and efforts are just beginning to bring soccer to kids in inner cities").
566. See, e.g., Bryson, supra note 241, at 182 ("[I]t is clear that despite its strongly masculine flavour, sport is not a monolithic institution. As with other sites of social life, the
hegemonic position has been continually contested."); Messner, supra note 506, at 76
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Although the constraints discussed above continue to shape and
limit women's relationship to sport, many women have found a
place in sport, and increasing numbers of women continue to do
so. Female athletes are gaining in popularity and recognition even
as they are constrained in their choices and operate within the
confines of social structures. As Mariah Burton Nelson wrote in the
late 1990s, "At the end of the millennium, it's definitely cool to be
athletic. Female
athletes know it, and the mainstream culture is
567
on.,
catching
Sport's role in perpetuating a dominant masculinity is increasingly contested as gender relations within sport are challenged."se
As more women participate in sport, and their participation becomes more highly valued, sport itself becomes less associated with
masculinity, and the culture of sport is subject to change. 569 At the
same time, female participants in sport have the potential to experience concrete
gains in their own satisfaction and sense of
570
empowerment.

("[G]ender relations, along with their concomitant images of masculinity and femininity,
change and develop historically as a result of interactions between men and women within
socially structured limits and constraints.").
567. Nelson, Who We Might Become, supra note 7, at xvii. And yet, she notes, many
women athletes "still buy in" to the notion that they need "to prove that they're not unfeminine, meaning not lesbian and not threatening to men." Id. at xviii.
568. See HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that the role of sport in producing
male domination over women is not straightforward, and that gender relations are reproduced in sport and contested at the same time).
569. See Gsurris, supra note 398, at 17. Griffin argues that:
Women's presence in sport as serious participants dilutes the importance and exclusivity of sport as a training ground for learning about and accepting traditional male
gender roles and the privileges that their adoption confers on (white, heterosexual)
men ....If women in sport can be tough minded, competitive, and muscular too,
then sport loses its special place in the development of masculinity for men. If
women can so easily develop these so-called masculine qualities, then what are the
meanings of masculinity and femininity?
Id.; HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 12 (arguing that culture is "a 'lived experience,' constructed and changed through the interaction of men and women who make, resist and
transform meanings, values and rules of behaviour").
570. See HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 109, 289; see also Bryson, supra note 241, at 184
("Although structural change is important, ultimately there is a dimension of oppressive
social relationships that must be tackled directly at the personal level.")
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR TITLE IX DOCTRINE: ENHANCING
INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEX INEQUALITY
IN ATHLETIC OPPORTUNITY AND CULTURE

The above discussion provides a more complete but by no
means exhaustive account of the ways in which educational institutions construct men's and women's unequal relationship to sport,
beyond that acknowledged by the courts in the Brown litigation.
Through the level of resources and benefits provided to male and
female athletes, the structuring of athletic programs, and the
maintenance of a distinctly masculine sport culture, educational
institutions play a critical role in the linkage of sport and masculinity. The masculinization of sport, in turn, marginalizes and
7
constrains women's role in sport and, by extension, in societyi '
While Title IX has made notable progress in holding institutions
accountable under the three-part test for creating asymmetrical
positions for men and women in relation to athletic participation
levels, it has not succeeded in making sport an activity that is
equally accessible and valuable for male and female students. This
section discusses how Title IX doctrine might be reformed to better address the unequal valuation of women's sport experiences
and challenge the construction of masculinity and femininity in
sport.
A. Securing the Equal Valuation of Women's Sports Under the
Treatment and Benefits Standard
The three-part test for equality in athletic participation opportunities, discussed above, has resulted in large numbers of new
sport participation opportunities for girls and women. However,
Title IX has not succeeded in forcing schools to equally value the
male and female sports programs that they offer. As the law has
developed, certain disparities in the treatment and valuation of
male and female athletics are permissible under Title IX.
Tide IX's standards for measuring equality in the treatment of
male and female athletes fall short of requiring schools to equally
value women's sports. Under the Tide IX regulations, disparities in
571. See Kidd, supra note 350, at 36-37 (linking the effects of disparate sport opportunities for males and females to the perpetuation of sex inequality in society and the
reinforcement of the sexual division of labor at home and in the workplace).
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funding for men's and women's sports alone do not violate Tide
IX.

2

Rather, determining compliance in this area requires compar-

ing the factors listed in the regulations and Policy Interpretation to
determine whether the programs provide for overall parity. 7 3 The
relevant comparison is program-wide, rather than sport-by-sport,
so that disparities in the treatment of individuals sports are permissible if the men's and women's programs overall provide for equal
treatment to male and female students.5 71 In other words, the key
issue is not the amount of money spent on men's and women's
sports, but whether that money buys the same quality of treatment
for men and women in the sports that they play. This standard has
enabled institutions to spend several times the amount of money
on more expensive men's athletic programs than they do on
575
women's programs, as indicated by the figures cited previously.
These differences in spending alone illustrate the higher value that
institutions place on men's sports than women's sports.
In addition to disparities in funding, the law permits disparities in
the treatment and benefits provided to men's and women's athletic
programs if the disparities result from so-called nondiscriminatory
factors.576 "Nondiscriminatory factors" may include the cost of more

expensive equipment, facilities, uniforms, and crowd control for sta572.

34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) 1999. The regulations hold that:

Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal expenditures
for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors separate teams will not
constitute noncompliance with this section, but the Assistant Secretary may consider
the failure to provide necessary funds for teams for one sex in assessing equality of
opportunity for members of each sex.
Id.
573. The factors listed in the regulation are: equipment and supplies; scheduling of
games and practice times; travel and per diems; opportunity to receive coaching and tutoring; assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; locker rooms and practice and
competitive facilities; medical and training facilities and services; housing and dining facilities and services; and publicity. Id. These factors are not exhaustive. Id. The Policy
Interpretation adds recruitment to the list of factors to consider in an equal treatment
claim. Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,417(B.4.a).
574. Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,415(B.2). The Policy Interpretation states
that the relevant standard is to evaluate the "availability, quality and kinds of benefits, opportunities, and treatment afforded members of both sexes." Id. This standard requires that
the programs overall be "equivalent"; "identical benefits, opportunities, or treatment are
not required, provided the overall effect of any differences is negligible." Id.
575. See discussion of resource allocation supra Part III.C; see also Weistart, Gender Equity,
supra note 173, at 206-07 (estimating that when all actual costs are accounted for, a "Big
Time" athletic university spends roughly $13 million on men's football and basketball
alone; out of a $20 million budget, all women's sports together receive approximately $2.2
million).
576. Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,415-16 (B.2.a-c).
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diums, among other items: The "nondiscriminatory factors" justification is most often invoked to support the higher level7 of
treatment and benefits typically allocated to football programs. 1
The argument that football is different and warrants special
privileges reflects deep-seated resistance to relinquishing male
privilege in sport.579 It persists despite the reality that the vast majority of football programs spend much more money than they
generate in revenue. 5s° Even for those big-time programs that do
bring in revenue, many of the game's excess expenditures are not
necessary to produce revenue.5 8 ' To the extent that football pro-

grams do produce net revenue, they do so because educational
institutions have chosen to invest substantial resources in them to
577. Id. Case law is clear, however, that lack of funds or a desire to save money is not a
defense to a Title IX athletics claim. See, e.g., Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578,
583 (W.D. Pa. 1993), affd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp.
737, 750 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993); Haffer v. Temple
Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1987). The source of funds spent on the teams is also
irrelevant to the analysis, so it is no defense that the teams with the most benefits receive
funding from booster clubs or outside donors. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp.
978, 996 (D.R.L 1992), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
578. See Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,415-16 (including several references
to the "unique demands" of football in discussing possible nondiscriminatory factors that
might justify different treatment of men's and women's athletics).
579. See FESTLE, supra note 36, at xxvi (quoting one athletic administrator's fear of Title
IX "emasculating" football); GRnIN, supra note 398, at 24 (describing incident where female member of high school football team was physically assaulted by her teammates to
keep her from playing). See generally MARIAH BURTON NELSON, THE STRONGER WOMEN GET,
THE MORE MEN LOVE FOOTBALL 123-26 (1994).
580. Weistart, Gender Equity, supra note 173, at 207-09, 221 & n.101 (stating that when
all costs are considered, very few football programs make more money than they spend); id.
at 219 (acknowledging that football does earn more revenues than any other sport, but
stating that "the football deficit is greater than the total cost of all women's sports excluding
basketball"); Zimbalist, supra note 326, at B9 (stating that "[iun any given year, only about a
dozen of the 973 colleges and universities in the N.C.AA. have athletics programs that run a
true surplus," and referencing the "tangled" accounting practices of college sports).
581. See DAVID F. SLATER, CRASHING THE OLD Boys' NETWORK 54 (1996) (citing excess
expenditures in Division I-A football programs, including widespread practices of paying for
the team to stay in hotels on nights before home games and flying in recruits for a campus
visit when coaches are not interested in them,just to deprive rival schools of the visit); Weistart, Equal Opportunity?, supra note 32, at 39, 42 (discussing the "athletics arms race" of
increasing men's football and basketball expenditures, and proposing NCAA-enforced.
expenditure caps as a way to curb excess expenditures while increasing the number of
teams that are competitive, thus spurring consumer interest); Weistart, Gender Equity, supra
note 173, at 211-14, 250-53 (arguing that even otherwise unbiased athletic directors will
fund men's so-called revenue sports over men's and women's non-revenue sports, and that
spending caps on the revenue sports would help fund women's sports without reducing
either the revenue potential or quality of men's revenue sports); Zimbalist, supra note 326,
at B9 (discussing "extravagant amounts of money" received by men's football and basketball
programs, and noting that such expenditures "soar well beyond what a competitive market
would offer").
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make them popular. For example, large expenditures for athletic
facilities, including expensive stadiums and other infrasturcture
that accommodate significant numbers of spectators, reflect longterm institutional investments that have enabled such programs to
become popular. 2s Rather than finding support from any intrinsic
financial consequences of the game, the sentiment that football
should be specially regarded derives much of its power from the
premise that it is not a game for women. 5 In this view, it is unthinkable that sports played by women could be compared to
football or deserve such prominence.
Title IX has resisted this argument in its most extreme form, as
Congress has repeatedly refused to exempt football and other
revenue-producing sports from Title IX coverage.584 Yet, the equal
treatment and benefits standard enables football and other major
men's sports to retain some special privilege under the guise of
nondiscriminatory factors that render the sport "unique."5 5 However, nothing about football or any other men's sport necessarily
means that women must be relegated to a lesser share of resources
for their sports. 58" Women have not had the opportunity to design
582. SLATER, supra note 581, at 53, 57 (discussing institutional investments in men's
sports, and noting that Norman May pointed out "sporting events are not intrinsically interesting but are made so"); Weistart, Gender Equity, supra note 173, at 221 n.101 (stating that
revenue sports depend on large taxpayer and institutional investments and the general
good will of the university to generate revenue); see also id. at 226-27 (discussing reasons to
be skeptical of "inherent truths" about the presumed inability of women's sports to become
money-makers); Zimbalist, supra note 326, at B9 (noting that "[a]ttendance at women's
sporting contests is growing every year, as are television ratings" and that "[u]ntil we support women's college sports at similar levels to those of the men-and for as long as a
generation-we won't be able to assess their long-run potential").
583. Messner, supra note 506, at 70-71 (arguing that "football's primary ideological salience lies in its ability, in the face of women's challenges to male dominance, to
symbolically link men of diverse ages and socioeconomic backgrounds," and to identify as
"a superior and separate caste").
584. Congress has repeatedly rejected resolutions to exempt revenue-producing sports
from Title IX's coverage. See discussion ofJavits Amendment supranote 153.
585. One sports scholar has described the argument that football is unique as an example of "institutionalized sexism," which refers to "the depth of sexism in the daily
practice of sport to the extent that it is no longer recognized as such but is instead justified
on the basis of factors such as economic and spectator interests." Knoppers, supra note 357,
at 133. As she explains: "[T]he amount of energy, publicity, and money spent on men's
football programs is justified because these programs bring in revenue that purportedly
support all the other sports programs. The fact that these football programs involve only
men is overlooked or ignored." Id.
586. The argument that football is larger than any one women's sport, and therefore
should be treated specially, is r;ot compelling. Because Tide IX looks at the men's and
women's overall athletic programs, rather than engaging in a sport-by-sport comparison,
there is no reason why women must play a sport as large as football in order to obtain equal
athletic resources. See Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,422 (rejecting sport-specific
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their own sport opportunities, much less the institutional support
to do so in any way that begins to compare to what institutions
have invested in football and other men's sports. Title IX's equal
treatment standard fails to acknowledge the reality that these socalled nondiscriminatory factors actually mask discriminatory
choices in institutional priorities.
The decision to provide more expensive sports for men than for
women is itself discriminatory.8 7 There are many expensive sports
that women may desire to participate in, such as equestrian competitions, rock climbing, water polo, and sailing, among others.588 Yet
institutions generally do not choose to offer such sports, and instead offer less expensive sports for women.589
The equal treatment standard should be informed by the theory
underlying the three-part test and hold educational institutions
accountable for the different situations of male and female athletic
programs. To the extent that football and other major men's
sports are unique, and therefore in need of greater resources, institutional decisions about how to structure and prioritize their
athletics programs have created that very uniqueness. Title IX
should not permit educational institutions to respond to the different situations they have created with further discrimination in
the treatment and benefits provided to men's and women's athletics.
approach to Title IX compliance in favor of approach that requires overall equality for the
men's and women's programs, and noting that a sport-specific standard could create unequal opportunity by limiting women to equal opportunities only in sports that both men
and women play). Moreover, the larger squad size of football reflects institutional decisions
about how to structure the game at least as much as the nature of the game itself. See Weistart, Gender Equity, supra note 173, at 214 n.78 (suggesting that football squad sizes are
artificially inflated); Zimbalist, supra note 326 (same).
587. See Weistart, Gender Equity, supra note 173, at 207 (explaining that while a "Big
Time" university spends about $10 million on football, at a rough cost of $100,000 per
player, entire women's teams can be funded at a very competitive level for about $200,000$250,000, and less competitively at $50,000-$100,000).
588. See, e.g., HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 239-40 (arguing that women's sports interests depend on what activities are offered, which tend to be relatively inexpensive; and that
when women are offered more costly "subsidized 'tasters' of a less predictable kind," such as
rock-climbing and hand-gliding, "the evidence shows that a surprising number tend to take
part"); id. at 286-87 (discussing lower profile water sports, such as water-polo, canoeing,
water-ski racing, and air sports, such as hot air ballooning, handgliding, and parachuting, as
activities with substantial female interest that receive little emphasis or funding); Jackie C.
Burke, The Highest Risks for the Boldest of Athletes, in NIIE Is A GODDESS, supra note 7, at 199,
217 ("Today the vast majority of participants in most horse sports are women. Girls outnumber boys in the Pony Club by at least ten to one and in the American Horse Shows
Association by better than eight to one.... Twenty colleges from Stanford to University of
Virginia to Cornell to Texas A&M boast of women's polo teams.").
589. See Bryson, supra note 501, at 53 (noting that "the more costly sports are almost invariably those where males predominate").
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Another example of how Title IX permits educational
institutions to evade accountability for sex inequality in their
athletics programs is the law's response to disparities in the
salaries for coaching male and female athletes. The Title IX
regulations include the "opportunity to receive coaching" among
the factors listed for consideration in determining equality in the
area of the treatment and benefits provided to male and female
athletes. 590 The unequal salaries provided to the coaches of male
and female teams could certainly fall within this factor. However,
the current interpretation of equal treatment with respect to
coaching is much more limited. Under this interpretation, in
order for the payment of lower salaries to the coaches of female
athletes to constitute discrimination against female athletes, the
lower salary must "deny male and female athletes coaching of
equivalent quality, nature, or availability." 59' Thus, female athletes
asserting a discrimination claim based on the lower coaching
salaries for female athletes must allege that they are receiving a
level of coaching that is inferior to that received by male
athletes.592 This interpretation forces female athletes into the
awkward position of having to criticize their coach's ability or
effort in order to obtain equal resources for their coaches, when
59 3
issue.
the actual performance of the coach often is not the real

The standard's limited focus on concrete indicia of the quality of
coaching does not capture the nature of the discrimination
against the women's sports program that the disparities in
coaches' salaries represents.
In theory, the discrimination against female athletes that results
from the allocation of lower salaries for coaches in female athletic
programs could be redressed in an employment discrimination
590. 34C.F.R.§ 106.41(c)(4).
591. Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,416 (B.3.e). One court has applied this
analysis to reject a female coach's claim for pay discrimination under Title IX. See Deli v. U.
of Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958, 963 (D. Minn. 1994) ("Because Plaintiff does not claim or provide any evidence to suggest that due to her receipt of a lower salary than that received by
coaches of some men's athletic teams, Plaintiff's coaching services were inferior in 'quality,
nature or availability' to those provided to the men's teams, she has failed to make out a
prima facie claim for violation of Title IX.").
592. See Heckman, supra note 375, at 1013 (discussing and criticizing OCR's treaunent
of coaches compensation in its Investigator's Manual, which states that, "if availability and
assignment of coaches are equivalent, it is difficult for OCR to assert that the lower compensation for coaches in, for example, the women's program, negatively affects female
athletes").
593. See, e.g., Deli, 863 F.Supp. at 963 (finding against plaintiff, a women's gymnastics
coach, who alleged under Title IX that she provided superior coaching services for less
money than the university's men's coaches).
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claim by the coach herself (or himself). However, such an approach runs into a quagmire of doctrinal problems. Title IX and
its regulations cover employment discrimination, although several
courts have refused to allow employees to proceed with discrimination claims directly under Title IX, ruling that Title VII preempts
an individual cause of action under Title IX.5 95 However, even if

coaches may bring pay discrimination claims directly under Title
IX, courts will apply the substantive standards that govern such
claims under Tite VII, which raises additional problems.596 Title
VII challenges brought by coaches of women's teams have been
of the
unsuccessful on the grounds that the pay disparity is because5 97
herself.
sex of the students coached, not the sex of the coach

The Equal Pay Act holds somewhat more promise for coaches'
pay discrimination claims, in that a violation of the Act is established by proof that a man and a woman perform substantially
594. SeeNorth Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (upholding Tide IX
regulations governing discrimination against employees of federally-funded education programs).
595. See, e.g., Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995); Cooper v. Gustavus Adolphus Coll., 957 F. Supp. 191 (D. Minn. 1997); Diane Heckman, Lowrey v. Texas A &M Univ.
Systems: Title IX Vis-a-Vis Title VII Sex Discrimination and Retaliation in EducationalEmployment;
124 EDUC. L. REP. 753, 755-66 (1998) (discussing case law surrounding Title VII preemption of Tide IX employment discrimination claims).
596. See Enforcement Guidance on Sex Discrimination in the Compensation of Sports
Coaches in Educational Institutions, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, n.6 (Oct. 29, 1997), at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/coaches.html (stating that courts apply Tide VII standards in
analyzing employee Tite IX claims for coaches' pay discrimination) [hereinafter EEOC
Coaches' Pay Guidance]; see also Heckman, supranote 375, at 1003 (discussing OCR's 1983
Policy Clarification interpreting Title IX employment discrimination coverage to follow
Title VII standard that coaches must establish discrimination based on their own sex, not
the sex of the students coached). Title IX discrimination claims by employees provide advantages over Title VII in the procedures and remedies available, not the substantive
standards for determining liability. See id. at 998-99 (discussing differences between Title
VII and Tide IX in exhaustion of administrative avenues, statutes of limitations, and caps on
damages).
597. See, e.g., EEOC v. Madison Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 581-84 (7th
Cir. 1987) (rejecting coach's pay discrimination claim because pay differential was based on
the sex of the team, not the sex of the coach); Bartges v. Univ. of N.C at Charlotte, 908 F.
Supp. 1312, 1328 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (rejecting female coach's Title VII pay discrimination
claim on the ground that university's decision to invest differently in its men's and women's
athletics programs did not discriminate against the coach on the basis of her sex); Kenneweg v. Hampton Township Sch. Dist., 438 F. Supp. 575, 577 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (rejecting
coaches' pay discrimination claim on the ground that the coaches were paid less because of
the sex of their teams, not their own sex; see also Coaches: Salariesfor Division I-A Men's and
Women's Coaches (1996-1997), at http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/statistics.html (last visited May 25, 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (citing
statistics showing that, with the exception of volleyball, the median coaches' compensation
for men's teams is consistently higher than for women's teams, regardless of the sex of the
coach).
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equal work for unequal pay.59s Thus, a female coach of women's
basketball could claim that the higher salary paid to the male
coach of men's basketball violated the Act, even though the salary
for coaching women's basketball would be the same if a male held
the job."° However, one difficulty with such a claim in this context
is that courts have allowed institutional decisions about how to
structure and invest in their men's and women's programs to provide a legitimate basis for paying different salaries to their men's
and women's coaches.i Institutions have escaped liability under
the Equal Pay Act for paying their men's coaches more by showing
that men's coaches have more responsibility to bring in fans and
produce revenue-reflecting, to some extent, institutional investments in these programs.601
A recent EEOC Guidance in this area may improve the potential
for legal redress for discrimination in men's and women's coaching salaries under the Equal Pay Act. 60 2 Unlike previous court
decisions interpreting the Act, the Guidance acknowledges that in
most athletic programs, the sex of the coach is connected to the
sex of the team in that women are virtually excluded from the

598. See, e.g., Lisa A. Bireline Sarver, Coaching Contracts Take on the Equal Pay Act: Can
(and Should) Female Coaches Tie the Score?, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 885, 890-92 (1995)
(describing basic framework of Equal Pay Act claims); Giampetro-Meyer, supranote 524, at
372-75 (discussing recent successful Equal Pay Act claims for discrimination in coaching
salaries).
599. See Sarver, supra note 598, at 892-901 (discussing cases involving claims by coaches
where courts found that that the Equal Pay Act was violated).
600. See, e.g., Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that
differences in the responsibilities of the coaching jobs for men's and women's basketball,
particularly with respect to public relations and promotional activities, rendered the jobs
dissimilar under the Equal Pay Act); Madison Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d at 581
(rejecting Equal Pay Act claim for coaches' pay discrimination); Bartges, 908 F. Supp. at 1334
(same); see also Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming
trial court's decision that pay differential in men's and women's basketball coaching jobs
did not violate the Equal Pay Act); Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D. Minn.
1994) (holding that greater spectator attendance, revenue generation, and responsibility
for public and media relations are sufficient to show that coaching jobs are not
"substantially equal" in Equal Pay Act claim); Sarver, supra note 598, at 916 (comparing
salaries of University of Nebraska men's and women's basketball coaches, and stating that
the greater pressure placed on the men's team to bring in revenue and generate publicity
may be a valid basis for denying an Equal Pay Act challenges to the coaches' different salaries).
601. See, e.g., Sarver, supra note 598, at 902-13 (discussing cases where coaches' pay discrimination claims have failed under the Equal Pay Act).
602. See EEOC Coaches' Pay Guidance, supra note 596, at 7. But see Weaver v. Ohio St.
Univ., 71 F. Supp. 2d 789, 802 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (declining to follow the EEOC Guidance
and stating that "such guidelines do not have the effect of agency regulations and are not
entitled to deference").

FALL 2000-WINTER

2001]

The Strugglefor Sex Equality

higher paid jobs of coaching male athletes. For this reason, the
Guidance takes the position that an institution's decision to invest
more in its men's athletics program than its women's program
should not be viewed as ajustification for a disparity in men's and
women's coaching salaries. °4 Nevertheless, the Guidance still allows institutions to justify paying coaches of men's teams more
where the pay differential is based on different levels of responsibility or status associated with the men's teams, even if the
institution itself has created such differences. °s Such a result is
contrary to the rationale underlying the three-part test, which is
appropriately skeptical of the use of differences in men's and
women's situations in sport to justify the allocation of greater opportunities to male sports.
One irony of even a successful analysis under the Equal Pay Act
is that it would provide no recourse for pay inequity if the coach of
the women's teams was a man who was paid less than male coaches
of men's teams. 6°6 Consequently, it creates an incentive for schools
to hire men to coach female athletes because they could pay male
coaches less than they would have to pay women in the same
jobs.67' Although engaging in hiring discrimination against women
for coaching positions would violate Title VII, proving such
discrimination is a difficult matter.608 As a result, under current
legal interpretation, increases in the number of successful Equal
Pay Act claims may exacerbate the relative absence of women from

603. See EEOC Coaches' Pay Guidance, supra note 596, at 7.
604. See id. at 21 n.40 (criticizing the Deli court for failing to analyze whether women
were hired predominantly to coach only female athletes).
605. For example, the EEOC Guidance suggests that no women's coaching job would
be comparable to the job of football coach, given the unique size of team, the high number
of assistant coaches, and the pressure to raise revenue and maintain a high profile, thereby,
exempting football coaching salaries from the requirements of the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 5-6.
Thus, the Guidance permits decisions about how to structure men's and women's teams to
justify paying lower salaries to coaches of the women's teams.
606. See EEOC v. Madison Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 581 (7th Cir.
1987) ("Suppose that the school district happened to have just male, or just female, coaches
and paid coaches more for coaching boys' teams than girls' teams. Men paid less than other
men for coaching, or women paid less than other women, could not complain of a violation
of the Equal Pay Act.").
607. For example, one school district responded to an EEOC investigation of coaches'
pay disparities by appointing more men to coach girls' teams and paying them the same
amount as the female coaches had received. See id. at 586.
608. See id. (holding school district's hiring of more males to coach girls teams after
EEOC Equal Pay Act investigation began was not hiring discrimination; "efforts to bring
one's conduct into conformity with one's litigating posture are not evidence of willful noncompliance with the law").
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leadership positions in athletics and further preserve the male
domain of sport leadership.
This doctrinal morass leaves coaches of. girls' and women's
sports with little effective recourse for their lower salaries. Although such pay disparities clearly reflect a devaluation of
women's sports, discrimination law has not been very receptive to
such claims.0 Paying women less to coach women athletes should
be recognized as a form of clear-cut disparate treatment against
female coaches of women's teams because women are effectively
barred from the higher paying jobs coaching males.610
However, the clearest instance of disparate treatment discrimination in this context targets the athletes, who are female,
rather than the employees who coach women's teams, who are
not necessarily female. Wholly apart from the discrimination
against coaches themselves, Title IX should recognize disparities
in coaches' pay for male and female teams as a form of discrimination against female athletes. The allocation of higher coaching
salaries to male teams places a higher valuation on male sports
than female sports. The determination that sports programs for
girls and women deserve fewer resources than those for men, or
that the job of a coach is less demanding when the persons
coached are females instead of males, devalues and marginalizes
girls and women in sport. The unmistakable message is that
coaches of women's teams are valued less than coaches of men's
teams because female athletes themselves are valued less than male
athletes. This message, combined with other institutional practices
that contribute to it, solidifies the male character of sport. For
women to equally participate in sport, Title IX must challenge
such institutional messages and priorities.
Title IX's failure to stop schools from valuing male sports more
highly than female sports is inconsistent with the value judgments
609. Martha Chamallas identifies this type of discrimination, which has not been adequately addressed under discrimination law, as devaluation. Chamallas, supra note 53, at 13.
She defines devaluation as the systematic assignment of lower worth to "activities, institutions, injuries, and other 'things,' which are associated with individuals from a disfavored
group," in those situations that do not involve clear-cut disparate treatment against a member of a protected class. Id. at 13, 33.
610. In this respect, claims for coaches' pay discrimination are on firmer legal ground
under current discrimination law than comparable worth claims, in which courts have refused to find the lower valuation of women's work (performed predominantly by women
and fewer numbers of men) as a form of unlawful discrimination. See id. at 29-32
(discussing the fate of comparable worth in the courts); see also EEOC Coaches' Pay Guidance, supranote 596, at 11 (recognizing that where women are effectively barred from jobs
coaching men, paying coaches of male athletes more than coaches of female athletes discriminates against women coaches).
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underlying Title IX's three-part test. This test does not permit institutionally created differences in men's and women's sport
experiences to justify continued unequal allocation of men's and
women's sport opportunities. In contrast, the law's treatment of
disparities in coaching salaries and other resources enables institutions to structure their sport programs in such a manner as to
justify paying the coaches of their women's sports less than the
coaches of their men's sports, and to allocate greater resources to
men's athletic programs generally.
B. De-Linking Sport and Masculinity in the Culture of Sport
The project of fashioning legal doctrine to challenge the gendered construction of sport is one that is daunting at best. Sport
and masculinity have become so intertwined in American culture
that it is hard to imagine how legal reform could make significant
inroads in separating the two. Yet, to the extent that the law reaffirms this connection by reinforcing the exclusivity of sport as a
male domain, changing the law is a necessary starting point for the
social reconstruction of sport and its relationship to gender.
1. Sex as a Classifier- The Explicit Use of Sex to Organize and Structure Sport--One way that Title IX has operated to solidify the
connection between sport and masculinity is to codify gendered
divisions in the sports that males and females play. Tide IX organizes athletic participation along gendered lines in two respects:
first, it approves of separate athletic offerings for males and females, and second, it reinforces gendered notions about which
sports males and females should play.
These two aspects of Title IX have very different implications for
the construction of masculinity and femininity in relation to sport.
The first of these, the allowance for sex-separate athletic programs,
is highly contested in terms of its relationship to the masculinization of sport. The second, the gendering of particular sports as
male or female, more clearly contributes to the subordination of
girls and women in sport.
a. Sex-Separation in Competitive Sport Programs-The decision to
allow sex-separate teams was and remains a controversial one. The
development of sex-separate athletic teams was initially advocated
by women physical education leaders to defend the creation of a
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limited sphere of physical education opportunities for girls and
women against charges that sport would "masculinize" women.61,
However protectionist and apologetic in its origins, sex-segregation
in sport came to be embraced by many women's sports advocates
as a way to seek a measure of equality for girls and women in sport
while preserving
significant opportunities for female athletes to
12
compete.6

Around the time Title IX was being considered, women physical
education teachers supported a view of equality that would provide
comparable teams to a significant number of female athletes,
rather than emphasizing competitive sport opportunities for a few
token elite female athletes.6 1 3 This approach was ultimately em-

braced in the Title IX regulations. 4 Title IX's regulations
expressly permit schools to offer athletic teams separately by sex
where team selection is based on competitive skill or the sport is
categorized as a contact sport. Much of Tide IX law, including the
three-part test for participation opportunities discussed earlier,
proceeds from the presumed validity of sex-segregation as an organizing principle for competitive athletic programs.
The relationship between the sex-segregation of competitive
sport and the linkage of sport and male dominance is complex and
context-dependent.61 5 Critics of sex-separation in sport, like proponents of formal equality, argue that Title IX's allowance for sexsegregated teams only solidifies the connection between sport and
male dominance. 6 They argue that, similar to segregation in the
611. See CAHN, supra note 239, at 24 (discussing history of women in sports and development of "female separatism" as a way to provide moderate sport opportunities "without
fear of sexual harm or the taint of masculinity").
612. During early debates over sex equality in sports, feminist groups such as the National Organization for Women (NOW) split from women physical education leaders, with
NOW arguing for co-ed teams, and women physical education (PE) teachers and educators
pushing for a separate-but-equal approach. FESTLE, supra note 36, at 325 n.155.
613. Id.
614. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1999).
615. See HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 29-34, 207-08 (discussing the complexity of the
assimilation/segregation debate in sports, in that separatism can increase women's control
over their sports, mobilize women to fight for equal resources in sport, and enable women
to participate in sport free of male interference and domination, but that it can also recreate social gender divisions and [can] exaggerate sexism by conveying the message that
biological sex rather than culture defines athleticism).
616. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 242, at 87 (citing a 1985 Women's Sports Foundation
survey showing that women who as children had played sports with boys had a more positive
body image as adolescents than women who played sports only with girls, and that women
who are most athletic as adults tend to have played mostly with boys or in mixed groups
rather than just with girls); Tokarz, supra note 266, at 232-33, 239-40 (arguing that sex
segregation in sport reinforces the social inferiority of females and stigmatizes female athletics, while reinforcing the exclusive role for males as aggressive, violent, combative).
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race context, separate-but-equal is never truly equal because of
the social significance of gender. 61 7 In this view, sex-segregation
in sport relegates female athletes to second-class status and affirms the superiority of males in sport.6"' A related argument is
that sex-separation bolsters the culture of male dominance in sport
by protecting the culture of masculinity on all-male teams. 6
On the other hand, allowing schools to provide separate athletic
teams for female athletes may challenge the linkage between sport
and masculinity by enabling female athletes to participate in sport
in large numbers and to experience their own athletic power without male interference. 62 0 The perceived sex neutrality of open

teams, where athletes are selected based on "merit," could serve to
legitimate male dominance in sports as natural, while reinforcing
the notion that few women belong in sport, and even then, only
when they can compete on men's terms.62 1 A standard requiring
617. Cf Finley, supra note 57, at 1103 (noting the cultural willingness to segregate people by their sex in contexts that would not be viewed as appropriate for racial segregation,
including prisons and athletics, and arguing that "U]ust as with separation along racial lines,
separate never really means equal").
618. SeeJay, supra note 146, at 21 (arguing that separating athletic teams by sex sends
female athletes messages of inferiority and lowered expectations); Tokarz, supranote 266, at
232-33, 239 (arguing that sex-separate teams are premised on stereotypes of female inferiority and harm women psychologically, socially, and occupationally).
619. See CAHN, supra note 239, at 52-54 (discussing male anxiety over losing to female
athletes in mixed-sex competition and the implications for male privilege); Whitson, supra
note 354, at 27 (citing research suggesting that "homophobia is actively fanned in the single-sex subcultures that have surrounded sport and physical education," and suggesting that
this "operates as a constraint that keeps heterosexual people of both sexes within the
boundaries of traditional masculinity and femininity"); cf Nancy Levit, SeparatingEquals:
EducationalResearch and the Long-Term Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
451, 511, 521 (1999) (arguing that the impact on the cultural construction of gender has
been ignored in debates over sex-segregation in education, and that separate sex environments may exalt and exaggerate perceived gender differences).
620. See Williams v. Sch. Dist., 998 F.2d 168, 175-76 (3d Cir. 1993) (reversing summary
judgment for parents of male athlete seeking to play on girls' field hockey team, and noting
that if real physical differences exist between the sexes, permitting boys to play on girls'
teams could displace girls from the team); Petrie v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n., 394 N.E.2d 855,
857-63 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979) (upholding classification of athletic competition on the basis of
sex on the grounds that it prevented male dominance in games and served state interest in
preserving athletic opportunities for girls); B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 531 A.2d 1059, 1066 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (upholding athletic association's regulation prohibiting male
participation on female teams as substantially related to the state interest in preventing
males from displacing female athletes); see also Virginia P. Croudace & Steven A Desmarais,
Note, Where the Boys Are: Can Separate Be Equal in School Sports, 58 S.CAL. L. REV. 1425, 1427
(1985).
621. It is unclear and hotly disputed whether the competitive abilities of male and
female athletes would even out over time, given equal training, encouragement and
sport opportunities, or whether a switch to sex-integrated teams would perpetually
disadvantage female athletes. CompareHARGREAVES, supranote 1, at 284-88 (arguing that
sex differences in sport are more social than biological, citing the fact that women's
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sex-integrated teams could contribute to an ideology of male athletic superiority and to the perception that men have "earned"
their privileged status on the playing field.622 It also could reinforce
the idea that in order for women to have a legitimate place in
sport, they must compete with men; that sport participation involving only women lacks value.623 Indeed, one could even argue that
sex-separate teams are required by Title IX to ensure that women
have meaningful,
rather than token, opportunities to participate in
624
athletics.

performances are improving at a faster rate than men's, and noting that some physical sex
differences give women a competitive advantage in endurance sports), andKidd, supra note
350, at 38 (citing research showing that women's athletic records are improving at a faster
rate than men's records, suggesting that if women's sport opportunities were equalized, the
best females would be competitive with the best male athletes in most sports), with Messner,
supra note 506, at 75 (arguing that average physical differences between the sexes would
disadvantage women in cross-sex competition, particularly because the major sports "are
organized around the most extreme potentialities of the male body"). Historian Jennifer
Hargreaves argues that, rather than asking whether women will ever parallel men's sporting
abilities, a question that she contends has become an "obsession" in sport, we should ask
why sport is culturally defined in ways that let men display their physical advantages. See
HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 286 ("If endurance, flexibility, skill, artistry, creativity and
timing were accorded higher value, sports would have a very different meaning.").
622. See, e.g., Lemaire, supra note 259, at 131-33 (discussing the danger that unisex
teams would legitimate male dominance in sport); Messner, supra note 506, at 75 (arguing
that mixed-sex competition under the guise of "equal opportunity" and liberal feminism "is
likely to become a new means of solidifying the ideological hegemony of male superiority"
by "provid[ing] support for the ideology of meritocracy while at the same time offering
incontrovertible evidence of the 'natural' differences between males and females").
623. Cf Willis, supra note 241, at 44. Willis notes that:
Heroic sports success amongst a few women-without a massive, corresponding ideological battle to change the field of force of meaning-will not lead to greater
participation regularly in schools and sports centres by girls and women, nor to a liberation in their sense of gender. A particular notion of masculine standards may,
paradoxically, be reproduced and further 'negative' examples of femininity made
regularly available.
Id.
624. This issue could have practical significance if Title IX's critics attempt to avoid the
obligations of the three-part test by sponsoring open teams, instead of separate men's and
women's teams, in which men would retain the lion's share of sport opportunities. See, e.g.,
Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (acknowledging but rejecting
Temple's argument that it offered "open" teams and "women's teams," and that women
were free to try out for the "open" teams). The regulations do not require institutions to
offer any of their athletic opportunities separately by sex; however, equality in this context
may require such an approach if the alternative would allow the de facto exclusion of
women from athletic participation opportunities. Cf Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp.
185, 204 (D.R.I. 1995) (stating that, in the context of counting the athletic opportunities
available to male and female athletes, "'[athletic opportunities' means real opportunities,
not illusory ones").
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The allowance for sex-separated teams may also broaden the
definition of sport by enabling female athletes to participate in
their own preferred sports, rather than forcing male and female
athletes to compete together in the same sports that have largely
been designed and selected by and for males.625 In addition to
having greater control over what sports they play, separate
women's sports enable women to experience the power of their
bodies without constant comparison with male players or an
atmosphere of male dominance. 26
Whether sex separation in athletics promotes or counters the
construction of sport as quintessentially male terrain may well depend on the context in which all-female sport occurs.6 7 As
women's sports gain increasing attention and appreciation, allfemale sports take on a different social meaning. The recent focus
on and support for women's Olympic, professional and collegiate
sports puts a more positive spin on the social meaning of female
sports than has been the case in years past. By providing women
space to develop their own sporting preferences and abilities,
while publicly demonstrating female competence in sports, the

625. Some commentators have criticized Title IX's allowance for sex-separate teams on
the grounds that, while it allows males and females to compete in separate programs, the
law nevertheless measures equal athletic opportunity for women by a male standard. See,
e.g., Olson, supra note 146, at 116-17; Note, Cheeringon Women and Girls, supra note 146, at
1634-35. Although it is certainly true as an empirical matter that women's sports programs
have largely followed the male competitive model, Tide IX itself does not dictate how men's
and women's sports programs should be organized or structured, except to require that the
same quality of treatment and support be provided to both programs. Title IX thus permits
a women's program to offer different sports than a men's program and to prioritize different aspects of each program, so long as the men's and women's programs overall provide
equal opportunity. While in practice, many women's athletic programs emulate men's programs by creating similar hierarchies within their programs and emphasizing similar aspects
of their programs, the law does not require this result.
626. See HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 243 (discussing reasons why women choose to
participate in sports in all-female environments, including to escape sexism and male
dominance, and to benefit from a collective sports experience with other women in an
atmosphere where they do not feel threatened or inadequate); NELSON, supra note 242, at
89-90 (quoting sport sociologist Susan Birrell, an advocate of sex-segregated sports, as stating that mixed-sex sports would shortchange women because of the "'subtle losses of power
the accommodated class suffers when integrated within a structure already defined and run
by others'").
627. See HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 150 (explaining that the process of assimilation
or separation is complex because femininity is not a static condition, but responds to
changes in social structures); cf. Lemaire, supra note 259, at 131-33 (acknowledging that
sex-segregation of sports teams is problematic because it reinforces traditional conceptions
of women and stigmatizes women's teams, but arguing that separate women's teams may
become equal if allowed to develop their own models of competition).
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sex-separation of athletics may in the end do more damage
to the
62
masculine construction of sport than it does to support it.

1

b. Title IX's Role in Assigning a Gender to ParticularSportsHowever one views Title IX's general authorization of sex separation in athletics in connection with the social construction of sport
and gender, Title IX's regulation of which sports males and females may play raises a different set of issues. Title IX has
permitted schools to channel girls and women into less physically
aggressive sports, while emphasizing these sports for boys and
men.6 This gender division constructs particular sporting activities
themselves as masculine or feminine.
More specifically, the Title IX regulation governing the right to
try out for teams that are otherwise only available to members of
one sex contributes to the construction of gendered sport activities. 6s° Title IX effectively limits the sports in which male and

female athletes compete in a way that conforms to traditional gender expectations. Under the Title IX regulations, if athletic
opportunities for one sex have been previously limited (which is
true for female students at virtually every educational institution in
the United States), members of that sex have a qualified right to
try out for a team in a sport that is offered only to the other sex.63'
628. See Whitson, supra note 242, at 363 ("If [Iris Marion] Young is correct [about the
empowering potential of women learning to use their bodies actively], the physical empowerment of more women and the entry into sport of greater numbers of women will steadily
contribute toward breaking down the masculine connotations of sport itself.").
629. See id. at 356 ("Despite the recent expansion of organized sports for girls, their
sports are often kept less 'physical' than boys', and girls are not encouraged as readily as
boys are to push themselves and to really develop their physical skills.").
630. See34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
631. The Regulation states:
[W]here a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of
one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the other sex, and
athletic opportunities for members of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the
sport involved is a contact sport.
Id. The regulation does not allow female athletes to compete on male teams in sports that
are offered to female athletes on the theory that the potential "talent drain" from the female teams could reduce the potential for women's sports as a whole to gain credibility and
recognition. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301, 1307-08 (1980) (refusing to
lift court of appeal's stay of a preliminary injunction requiring school district to allow girl to
tryout for boys' basketball team where the school offered a girls' basketball team, and noting that the district court's order could have the effect of hurting girls' sports overall by
draining the best players from the girls' program); O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 645 F.2d 578,
581-82 (7th Cir. 1981) (reversing and remanding preliminary injunction requiring school
to allow female student to try out for the boy's basketball team where the school offered a
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The qualification is that the right to try out in a sport offered only
to one sex does not exist if that sport is a contact sport.1 2 Thus,
female athletes have been denied the right to try out for all-male
teams in contact sports, even though
they have no other opportu633
nities to participate in that sport.

The contact sports exemption greatly restricts the opportunities
for female athletes to participate in traditionally male sports. Contact sports are defined broadly under the regulation to include
"boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and
other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily
contact." 63 4 A sport may qualify as a contact sport even though the
rules of the sport prohibit bodily contact, as long as bodily contact
does occur in the sport and is expected to occur. The breadth of
the exception leaves few traditionally male sports outside the category of contact sports.
At the same time, the regulation does little to provide women
interested in playing a contact sport with a team of their own. OCR
has interpreted the regulation governing contact sports to require
schools to provide contact sports to members of an excluded sex
only if "[t]here is sufficient interest and ability among the members of the excluded sex to sustain a viable team and a reasonable
expectation of intercollegiate competition for that team."63 6 Thus,
it is possible that although Title IX does not provide female athletes with the right to play on the boys' or men's team in a contact
sport, it may nevertheless require schools to provide female athletes with their own team in that sport. Unfortunately this modest
concession is of limited practical significance. Few female athletes
girls' basketball team on a similar rationale), remanded to, 545 F. Supp. 376, 384 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (granting summary judgment for defendants); Yellow Springs Exempted Vili.
Sch.
Dist. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 647 F.2d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 1981) (upholding sexbased classification of athletic competition and noting the state's interest in promoting
girls' athletics by retaining talented female athletes on girls' teams rather than losing them
to boys' teams).
632. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
633. See, e.g., Barnett v. Tex. Wrestling Ass'n, 16 F. Supp. 2d 690, 694-95 (N.D. Tex.
1998) (dismissing Title IX challenge by two female wrestlers to association rule forbidding
female wrestlers to compete against boys in the North Texas Open Wrestling Tournament).
634. 34 U.S.C. § 106.41(b).
635. See Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 172-74 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding field hockey may be a contact sport); see also Renee Forseth & Walter Toliver,
Casenote, The Unequal Playing Field-Exclusion of Male Athletes from Single-Sex Teams: Williams
v. School District of Bethlehem, Pa., 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 99, 125 (1995) (noting that
the court's broad definition of contact sport may ultimately decrease athletic opportunities
for women by preventing female athletes from participating on all-male teams in sports not
offered to females).
636. Policy Interpretation, supra note 6, at 71,418.
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will be able to affirmatively demonstrate enough interest and ability to support a viable team in a contact sport that has not been
offered to them since female students at the school would have
been denied access to any school-supported competition in that
sport. Consequently, OCR's regulatory interpretation does not
provide female athletes with an equal opportunity to participate in
contact sports.3 7 Instead, by denying female athletes the opportunity to develop their skills in traditionally male contact sports, the
regulation squelches the development of female athletic interest in
those sports and discourages the development of women's contact
sports.

638

An alternative approach that would be more consistent with the
rationale underlying the three-part test would require an institution to offer a women's team in a contact sport once requested to
do so by a female student at the school, and then provide the resources and opportunities necessary to see if sufficient interest
could exist for the sport.
The contact sports exemption locks in place the construction of
particular sports as predominantly "masculine" or "feminine," and
bolsters the construction of a dominant masculinity in sport. Just
as certain jobs have become "gendered" based on the sex of
persons who hold them and the sex-stereotyping of the
qualifications associated with the job,6 9 certain sports also have
acquired a "gender."6 For example, football, ice hockey, baseball,
637. One women's club team was successful in using this opening to obtain a varsity
women's ice hockey team at their institution, which had offered varsity ice hockey to men
only. See Heckman, supra note 148, at 409 & n.85 (discussing settlement in Bryant v. Colgate
Univ.); see also Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and the ContactSports Exemption: Gender Stereotypes in
a Civil Rights Statute, 32 CONN. L. REv. 381, 437 (2000) (arguing that it is difficult to establish
existing interest and ability to participate in a contact sport when women "have always been
denied the opportunity to try the sport and to develop proficiency at it").
638. See FESTLE, supra note 36, at 171 (discussing Title IX's provision that schools do
not have to allow women to play contact sports such as football, boxing, wrestling, rugby,
and ice hockey, among other sports, unless there is a demand for an active women's team);
see also Stewart, in NiKE Is A GODDESS, supra note 7, at 269, 284 ("From the earliest ages,
hockey organizers have encouraged boys and girls to play on separate teams. Since virtually
every top notch female player will tell you that she developed her skills playing with boys,
that strategy seems designed to limit the overall development of the women's game.").
639. See BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 97, at 813-14 (discussing sex stereotyping ofjobs as
requiring masculine or feminine traits based on the distribution of the sex of the workers
holding those jobs); Chamallas, supra note 53, at 27-29 (describing the process in which
jobs become "gendered" and citing to sociological research on the gender stereotyping of
jobs).
640. See CAHN, supra note 239, at 217-18 (discussing how particular sports are constructed as masculine or feminine). The process through which certain sports become
"gendered" is complex, involving the combination of gender, race, and class to produce a
dominant image and identity associated with that sport. For example, figure skating is con-
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and wrestling are perceived to be masculine sports; figure skating,
synchronized swimming, field hockey, and gymnastics are
perceived as more feminine.64 The social attribution of a gender
to particular sports furthers the construction of different and
diametrically opposed masculine and feminine sport identities.
When female athletes compete in a "male
sport," they challenge
642
the gendered construction of sport itself.

The law's resistance to female athletes' participation in traditionally masculine sports stems from the threat such participation
presents to the masculine privilege conferred by such sports. This
fear was expressed quite candidly in a 1956 decision by the Oregon
Supreme Court addressing the constitutionality of rules excluding
women from participating in wrestling.64 In State v. Hunter, a
woman was arrested for violating a state law that made it a crime
for women to participate in organized wrestling competition.64 4
The court upheld the law against the defendant's challenge under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Oregon Constitution, taking 'Judicial notice of the physical differences
between men and women," and the division of citizens into "'two
great classes of men and women.'

,645The

court's explanation of

the justification for the law is worth quoting at some length to appreciate better the full flavor of the ideology behind it:

structed around a certain type of femininity-a femininity that is upper class and typically
white. See, e.g., FESTLE, supra note 36, at xx-xxi (discussing the cultural meaning of the
Nancy Kerrigan/Tonya Harding conflict and the importance of class and role-typing in
defining "femininity").
641. See CAHN, supra note 239, at 97 (describing the development of field hockey as a
sport for upper-class women, and noting that because of its exclusively female origins "it
remained free from charges of mannishness"); Kidd, supra note 350, at 36 (describing historic efforts of sports organizers to "confine females to those sports believed to enhance
middle- and upper-class concepts of femininity, such as swimming, tennis, and gymnastics").
The attribution of "gender" to sports is clearly a cultural, rather than a natural phenomenon. See CAHN, supra note 239 at 85, 98-99 (describing the evolution of basketball from a
"feminine" game viewed as "too effete for rugged male athletes" because it was played by
women indoors, "protected from the elements and from public scrutiny," to a "masculine"
game for men as it became associated with "ruggedness, explosive power, and technical
precision").
642. See HARGREAVES, supra note 1, at 283 (asserting that when women participate in
traditionally male sports, they create "an emergent female sports culture which is transforming those conventional definitions" of masculinity and femininity); cf. Whitson, supra note
354, at 25-26 (contending that the presence of girls on all-male teams disrupts the masculinizing project of sport and threatens the opportunities for men to "rehearse their ties as
men and reaffirm their differences from women").
643. State v. Hunter, 300 P.2d 455 (Or. 1956).
644. Id. at 456-57.
645. Id.
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We believe that we are justified in taking judicial notice of the
fact that the membership of the legislative assembly which
enacted this statute was predominantly masculine. The fact is
important in determining what the legislature might have had
in mind with respect to this particular statute.... Obviously it
intended that there should be at least one island on the sea of life reserved for man that would be impregnable to the assault of woman. It
had watched her emerge from long tresses and demure ways
to bobbed hair and almost complete sophistication; from a
creature needing and depending upon protection and chivalry of man to one asserting complete independence. She had
already invaded practically every activity formerly considered suitable
and appropriatefor men only. In the field of sports she had
taken up, among other games, baseball, basketball, golf, bowling, hockey, long distance swimming, and racing, in all of
which she had become more or less proficient, and in some
had excelled. In the business and industrial fields as an employee or as an executive, in the professions, in politics, as
well as in almost every other line of human endeavor, she had
matched her wits and prowess with those of mere man, and,
we are frank to concede, in many instances outdone him. In
these circumstances, is it any wonder that the legislative assembly took
advantage of the police power of the state in its decision to halt this
ever-increasingfeminine encroachment upon what for ages had been
consideredstrictly as manly arts and privileges?Was the Act an unjust and unconstitutional discrimination against woman?
Have her civil or political rights been unconstitutionally
de"
nied her? Under the circumstances, we think not. 646
The court's rationale, although no longer expressed in such
stark terms, survives as the primary justification for the contact
sports exemption. The contact sports exemption marginalizes and
stigmatizes female athletes as fragile, delicate, and vulnerable, at
the same time that it defines male athleticism as aggressive and
physically powerful. 647 The denial of access to contact sports for
646. Id. (emphasis added); see also Calzadilla v. Dooley, 29 A.D.2d 152, 157 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1968) (rejecting equal protection challenge by female wrestler to state athletic commission rule barring women from wrestling on the ground that "'[t] he Constitution does not
require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they
were the same'") (quoting Tignerv. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1939)).
647. See Kidd, supra note 350, at 38 (discussing Ontario Hockey Association's refusal to
allow thirteen year-old female to compete on an all-male hockey team, despite her success
in making the team in a competitive try-out, and attributing the association's stance to male
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female athletes conveys the message that when it comes to highly
physical sports, women's place is on the sidelines and not on the
field . Much like the restriction of women from combat positions
in the armed services, the contact sports exception serves to reinforce a traditional, passive femininity in need of male protection,
while at the same time preserving the institution's masculine culture. 649 As a facial sex-based classification that relies on gender
stereotypes and structures sport programs to conform to traditional notions of dominant masculinity, the contact sports
exemption is inconsistent with both the theory underlying the
three-part test and the model of formal equality embraced in current interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.65 °
In practice, potential equal protection challenges for public
schools have mitigated the impact of the contact sports exemption
in public schools, as courts have granted female athletes the right
to try out for all-male teams in contact sports under the equal protection clause.65 However, since equal protection doctrine applies
fears of "the profound social and psychological changes that would result if women were
understood to be fully competent in the special domain of men").
648. Sometimes this message is expressed explicitly. See Richard Rubin, Female
Placekicker Files State Suit Against Duke, Goldsmith, THE CHRON. (Duke), Jan. 13, 1999, at 3
(reporting that the former football coach [Goldsmith] at Duke told a female place-kicker
who wanted to play on the team, "You should have gotten over wanting to play little boy
games a long time ago," and suggested that she become a cheerleader instead); see also
CAHN, supra note 239, at 224-25 (stating that "by barring women from strength-building
contact sports like wrestling or football, the sports world reaffirms the expectation of female
passivity, submissiveness, and frailty-the demeaning aspects of femininity that underlie the
aesthetic").
649. See Karst, supranote 472, at 525, 537 (noting that the ideas underlying the combat
exemption are central to the ideology of masculinity); see also Sangree, supra note 637, at
384 ("It is no accident that contact sports joins the military combat exclusion as the last
bastions of facial discrimination.").
650. See Leffel v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (E.D. Wis.
1978) (finding that Title IX's allowance for all-male teams in contact sports that are not
offered to females is inconsistent with the equal protection clause). The contact sports exemption has a parallel in the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense under
Title VII, which permits sex to disqualify employees for certain types of jobs. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e). Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a) (1999) (stating that the BFOQ defense is to be
narrowly construed), with 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (b) (1999) (defining contact sports broadly). Cf
Sangree, supra note 637, at 411 (stating that Title IX was enacted as a separate law, rather
than as an amendment to Title VII, which bars race discrimination in federally funded programs, because the Nixon Administration believed that sex, unlike race, could justify
differential treatment in education, especially in athletics). However, unlike Tide VII, Title
IX codifies an entire class of activities for which sex is a disqualification, with no proof that
sex is a necessary qualification for each activity covered).
651. Equal protection doctrine has enabled female athletes to try out for all-male teams
in contact sports that are not otherwise available to them. See, e.g., Adams v. Baker, 919 F.
Supp. 1496, 1505 (D. Kan. 1996) (upholding female student's claim to try out for male
softball team); Saint v. Neb. Sch. Activities Ass'n., 684 F. Supp. 626, 630 (D. Neb. 1988)
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only to public and not private institutions, many female athletes
are left without meaningful protection from exclusion in contact
sports. 652 Moreover, the contact sports exemption remains a powerful contributor to the ideology of male dominance and superiority
in sports.653
In addition to the contact sports exemption, which effectively
excludes female athletes from playing traditionally male sports,
Title IX polices the gender of sports by restricting the opportunities for male athletes to play traditionally female sports. Under the
Title IX regulations, male athletes seeking to participate on an allfemale team in a sport not otherwise available to them have little
recourse.6 4 Because males historically have not had their athletic
opportunities limited on the basis of sex, the regulation does not
accord them the right to try out for a team in a sport offered only
to females.655 The different treatment of members of the underrepresented sex from those of the overrepresented sex reflects the
same concern underlying the allowance for sex-separated teams
generally: a desire to preserve sufficient opportunities for female
athletes who may otherwise be displaced by male athletes. However, this regulation presents a dilemma that is somewhat different
than that posed by the general allowance for sex-separate teams.

(same); Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F. Supp. 663, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (upholding female student's claim to try out for male softball team); Force v. Pierce City R-1V Sch. Dist., 570 F.
Supp. 1020, 1031-32 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (same).
652. Cf Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a university
may exclude members of one sex from a contact sport, but that once it permits a student of
the excluded sex to try out for a contact sport, and she makes the team, it can no longer
exclude her from equal participation on the team); Abigail Crouse, Comment, Equal Athletic
Opportunity:An Analysis ofMercer v. Duke University and a Proposalto Amend the Contact Sport
Exception to Title IX, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1655, 1681-82 (2000) (noting the "perverse incentives" created by the Fourth Circuit's decision in Mercer because recipients can avoid Title
IX claims for equal participation in contact sports simply by refusing to allow members of
the excluded sex to try out for the team).
653. See Sangree, supra note 637, at 434-35 ("While the underlying motivation of the
proponents of the exemption was to protect college football and basketball from female
encroachment, the message has been that the 'weaker sex' must be protected from rough
play with superior athletic males.").
654. See, e.g., Williams v. Sch. Dist., 998 F.2d 168, 172-76 (3d Cir. 1993) (remanding to
lower court for consideration of whether field hockey is a contact sport and whether athletic
opportunities for boys in field hockey are limited in case of a boy who was not permitted to
play on girls' field hockey team despite absence of boys' field hockey team); Clark v. Ariz.
Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1983) (prohibiting boy from playing on
girls' volleyball team, even though school did not offer boys' volleyball); see also Petrie v. Ill.
High Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855, 864 (Ill. App. 1979) (rejecting male high school athlete's
equal protection challenge to high school association's rule restricting participation in
volleyball to girls only).
655. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
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By enabling schools to offer sports exclusively to female and not
male athletes, the regulation participates in the construction of
gender for particular sports. Sports that are typically offered to
girls and not boys reflect cultural judgments about which sports
are appropriately masculine and which are feminine. Softball, for
example, was designed to be a "feminized version" of baseball.6 ' 6
The regulation's denial of the opportunity for male athletes to participate in traditionally female sports furthers the gender division
between the more valued, masculine sports in which males traditionally compete, and the more feminine sports with traditionally
female participation.
Male students who seek to participate in traditionally female
sports may also represent a challenge to the gender ordering of
sports. 65' And yet, the rationale

underlying

the regulation-

preventing the displacement of female athletes from the already
limited opportunities for female athletes-is important. The challenge is to degender traditionally masculine and feminine sport
without undercutting the opportunities for girls and women to
participate in sports. One solution would be to enable males to try
out for a team offered only to female students where the denial of
the sport to males rests on cultural assumptions about the sport's
femininity. The concern for maintaining sufficient numbers of opportunities for female athletes could be addressed under the threepart test by continuing to ensure that the number of actual opportunities available to male and female athletes-regardless of
whether they play on single-sex or mixed-sex teams-does not discriminate against female students. Such a solution would meet the
goal of bolstering female athletic participation without strictly enforcing the gender composition of sports that have been deemed
culturally coded as feminine, and thus inappropriate for male participation. Under this proposal, an athlete's sex would still play a
role in the assignment of athletes to teams in sports that are available to both males and females, but exclusion from sports that are
available only to athletes of one sex would be subject to challenge.
This modification, combined with the elimination of the contact
sports exemption, would challenge the construction of masculine
and feminine sports.658 The resulting greater experience with
656. See Sangree, supra note 637, at 408.
657. See, e.g., LENSKYJ, supra note 239, at 57 (noting that the dichotomy of masculine
and feminine sports also excludes males from "feminine" sports and casts doubt on their
heterosexuality when they do participate in such sports).
658. For a related, though somewhat different proposal, see Dana Robinson, A League
of Their Own: Do Women Want Sex-Segregated Sports?, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 321, 354-55
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mixed-sex teams may help to inform continued debate about the
value of sex-separation in athletics more generally.659
2. Challenging the Masculine Culture of Sport and Constraints on
Female Athleticism-As discussed above, educational institutions
engage in a myriad of practices that contribute to the
masculinization of sport. In the end, the gendered culture of sport
may well prove more central to girls' and women's inequality in
sport than the explicit use of sex to structure and organize
competitive athletic programs. The construction of sport as an
activity premised on gender inequality goes well beyond the
allocation of unequal opportunities to male and female athletes.
Institutional practices at play in this process include the
maintenance of male leadership structures in sport and the
protection of a sport culture in which aggressive and even abusive
masculinity is encouraged and condoned. At the same time,
educational institutions contribute to cultural constraints that
marginalize girls and women in sport by projecting a disconnect
between traditional femininity and athleticism. This message is
symbolized by the use of gender in team names, enforced through
the policing of sexual orientation, and furthered by the
objectification of girls and women in sport.
Title IX has not yet begun to address the deep institutional
structures that link sport with masculinity and subordinate girls
and women in sport. Although Title IX's three-part participation
test has been successful in recognizing how institutional decisions
construct men's and women's relationship to sports, it has not
gone beyond an analysis of athletic participation numbers. And
yet, the male-dominant leadership structures of athletic programs
and the perpetuation of male dominance in the culture of sport
have at least as much to do with the structuring of men's and
women's relationship to sport as the bare numbers of sport opportunities that institutions provide. In future challenges to the threepart test, such as that launched by Brown University, courts should
look beyond the numbers of participation opportunities to un(1998) (advocating a more stringent application of the Fourteenth Amendment to sexsegregation in sports, such that members of either sex could try out for a team offered to
the other sex if there were no equivalent team with equal, tangible benefits otherwise available to them).
659. Don Sabo, Coed Sports: A CaU for Needed Research, Women's Sports Foundation, at
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/templates/res.center/relib/results-topics2html
?article=43&record=24 (last visited Nov. 11, 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) (discussing existing research disclosing positive and negative dimensions of coed sports participation and identifying a need for additional research in this
area).
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cover the many other ways institutions construct male and female
interest in sport. This would include an analysis of the broader opportunity and reward structures available to male and female
athletes, as well as an inquiry into how the institution constructs
the culture of its sport programs. The latter inquiry could be undertaken in the form of expert testimony and broad discovery into
the institution's athletic leadership structures and practices that
perpetuate male dominance in sport and constrain women in
sport, in any of the ways discussed in the previous section.
In addtion, Title IX's standard for equality in the treatment and
benefits provided male and female athletes should be modified to
reach sexism and male dominance in the culture of athletics. Title
IX should hold institutions accountable for sex discrimination
when they support a culture of sport that demeans and devalues
women and those men who represent a challenge to dominant
masculinity. As a starting point, Title IX should ensure that athletic
privilege does not include the ability of male athletes to practice
sexual dominance. Educational institutions should be held accountable for the construction of male dominance in their sport
programs and for its consequences in and beyond the locker
rooms and playing fields.
Meaningful protection under Title IX from sex discrimination
in sport would encompass the full range of institutional structures
that suppress female athletic interest while inflating and privileging sport participation by males. Title IX law does not yet
recognize this vision of equality. But the seeds for such a vision can
be found in court decisions such as Cohen v. Brown University, and a
critical approach to sex difference that focuses on how the institutions that are governed by Title IX construct sex inequality in
sport.

CONCLUSION

As scholars who study sport have increasingly recognized,
women's access to sport, and the societal and personal benefits it
brings, can play an important role in furthering women's power
and status in life's other arenas. 6 ° At the same time, the ongoing
660. See Bryson, supra note 501, at 47 ("For many feminists, sport has, quite rightly,
been identified as a supremely male activity, and therefore eschewed, both in practice and
as a topic of interest. However, such an attitude cannot be sustained, since if we are to understand the processes of our domination, we ignore sport at our peril."); Messner & Sabo,
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inequality of girls and women in sport, and the resilience of male
privilege in sport, contributes to male dominance outside of
sport.6 'As a result, much is at stake in the contest over the mean-

ing of Title IX as it applies to athletics.
Title IX's detractors and the leaders of the backlash against
the struggle for sex equality in sport do not acknowledge the
responsibility of educational institutions for creating and
perpetuating sport as a male activity that is not equally available
or appealing to women. The critics' perspective is that of formal
equality-that Title IX should treat male and female athletes the
same by similarly accommodating their respective levels of
athletic interest. Understanding Title IX as a law that goes
beyond the limited perspective of formal equality is an important
starting point in answering these objections. The rest of the
defense of Title IX lies in a deeper analysis of gender bias in
school sport programs than that yet undertaken by the courts.
As argued above, schools, colleges, and universities actively
shape and construct male and female athletic interest and experience in sport. In subtle and not so subtle ways, educational
institutions create structures of unequal opportunity and cultures
of sport that are hostile to women. Title IX law, and in particular,
the three-part test, has made important inroads toward holding
educational institutions accountable for their role in constructing men's and women's different relationship to sport. To an
extent not widely recognized, Title IX courts have avoided some
of the most blatant mistakes of sex discrimination law in other
contexts, such as adopting an overly simplistic view of sex difference and its relationship to discrimination law. However, Title IX
law has not yet applied these insights to capture the full complexity of gender inequality in sport.
A comprehensive theory of Title IX should address the construction of gender differences in male and female athletic
interests and experiences and the construction of sport itself as a
male-dominant institution. Such a theory would place a higher
value on women's current sport activities and interests, and
would recognize that providing equal resources and opportunisupra note 146, at 4-5 (reviewing research suggesting that sport plays a role in increasing
the empowerment and self-actualization of women and that women's participation in sport
challenges the public-private split that continues to privilege men over women).
661. See Whitson, supra note 354, at 23-24 ("It may be suggested that masculinizing and
femininizing practices associated with the body are at the heart of the social constnction of
masculinity and femininity and that this is precisely why sport matters in the total structure
of gender relations.").
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ties to male and female athletes is necessary but not sufficient to
break down the structures of male dominance in sport. Title IX
should strive to enable women to develop and pursue their own
interests in sports on equal terms as men, while simultaneously
breaking down the institutional constraints that suppress and
mold both women's and men's athletic interests to fit a model
that is neither intrinsic nor fully chosen.
Daunting as this task is, it is not without cause for hope. Because sport's relationship to masculinity and femininity is socially
constructed, there is the potential within sport for resistance and
transformation. How men and women (and boys and girls) participate in sports, that is, the practice of sport, affects the
structures and cultures within sport. When women (and men)
challenge the boundaries of gender expectations in sport, sport's
connection to masculinity is weakened. At the same time, as
women's sports participation is valued more highly, through increased resources and better treatment, the celebration of sport
is less connected to the celebration of masculinity, and sport becomes an activity that is equally valued for both genders. Title IX
can play an integral role in this process, if its underlying theory is
fully appreciated and applied.

